Competitive Multi-Operator Reinforcement Learning for Joint Pricing and Fleet Rebalancing in AMoD Systems
Organizations: Technical University of Denmark, Denmark · Technical University of Munich, Germany · Stanford University, USA
Abstract
Autonomous Mobility-on-Demand (AMoD) systems promise to revolutionize urban transportation by providing affordable on-demand services to meet growing travel demand. However, realistic AMoD markets will be competitive, with multiple operators competing for passengers through strategic pricing and fleet deployment. While reinforcement learning has shown promise in optimizing single-operator AMoD control, existing work fails to capture competitive market dynamics. We investigate the impact of competition on policy learning by introducing a multi-operator reinforcement learning framework where two operators simultaneously learn pricing and fleet rebalancing policies. By integrating discrete choice theory, we enable passenger allocation and demand competition to emerge endogenously from utility-maximizing decisions. Experiments using real-world data from multiple cities demonstrate that competition fundamentally alters learned behaviors, leading to lower prices and distinct fleet positioning patterns compared to monopolistic settings. Notably, we demonstrate that learning-based approaches are robust to the additional stochasticity of competition, with competitive agents successfully converging to effective policies while accounting for partially unobserved competitor strategies.
Figures & tables
| City | Hourly Wage | Nodes | Veh. | Demand | Reward Gap | Served Gap | CV |
| San Francisco | $17.76 | 10 | 374 | 5490 | 46.72% | 63.04% | 1.31 |
| Washington DC | $25.26 | 18 | 1096 | 16881 | 15.14% | 48.13% | 1.26 |
| NYC Man. South | $22.77 | 12 | 650 | 21270 | 10.03% | 20.83% | 0.69 |
| Note: Veh.: No. Vehicles; CV: Coefficient of Variation of Demand. | |||||||
| City | NC | UD | Reb. | Pricing | Joint |
| San Francisco | 6345.49 (251.60) | 9470.06 (336.71) | 10037.29 (337.03) | 8629.30 (193.96) | 12286.03 (166.74) |
| Washington DC | 13153.97 (324.58) | 15630.03 (388.50) | 15976.21 (395.37) | 13972.47 (301.58) | 16816.04 (287.07) |
| NYC Man. South | 16283.02 (487.67) | 18221.62 (260.07) | 18499.21 (291.51) | 17004.39 (504.23) | 18503.52 (324.97) |
| San Francisco | Washington DC | NYC Man. South | |||||||
| Policy | Reb. | Pricing | Joint | Reb. | Pricing | Joint | Reb. | Pricing | Joint |
| Reward [$] | 10037.29 (337.03) | 8629.30 (193.96) | 12286.03 (166.74) | 15976.21 (395.37) | 13972.47 (301.58) | 16816.04 (287.07) | 18499.21 (291.51) | 17004.39 (504.23) | 18503.52 (324.97) |
| Rebalancing Costs [$] | 877.08 (25.30) | — | 650.04 (17.36) | 3475.65 (152.04) | — | 2975.85 (83.57) | 1436.70 (85.48) | — | 1712.25 (101.98) |
| Rebalance Trips | 523.70 (12.59) | — | 384.00 (13.70) | 1085.80 (34.25) | — | 955.50 (25.45) | 295.90 (20.40) | — | 361.10 (23.56) |
| Price Scalar | — | 0.75 (0.00) | 0.88 (0.00) | — | 1.20 (0.00) | 1.02 (0.00) | — | 1.07 (0.00) | 1.02 (0.00) |
| Wait time [min.] | 0.85 (0.14) | 1.49 (0.08) | 1.57 (0.15) | 1.03 (0.09) | 1.25 (0.15) | 0.64 (0.09) | 1.91 (0.06) | 1.48 (0.08) | 1.71 (0.10) |
| City | NC | UD | Reb. | Pricing | Joint |
| San Francisco | 6391.2 (232.4) | 9352.6 (258.9) | 10065.9 (248.7) | 8919.0 (160.4) | 10415.1 (178.8) |
| Washington DC | 13172.3 (344.6) | 15113.5 (325.8) | 15619.5 (325.7) | 12820.8 (318.2) | 13460.6 (247.6) |
| NYC Man. South | 16048.4 (416.6) | 17652.0 (277.5) | 18133.7 (330.8) | 18631.6 (376.7) | 17481.1 (258.7) |
| San Francisco | Washington DC | NYC Man. South | |||||||
| Policy | Reb. | Pricing | Joint | Reb. | Pricing | Joint | Reb. | Pricing | Joint |
| Total Reward [$] | 10065.9 (248.7) | 8919.0 (160.4) | 10415.1 (178.8) | 15619.5 (325.7) | 12820.8 (318.2) | 13460.6 (247.6) | 18133.7 (330.8) | 18631.6 (376.7) | 17481.1 (258.7) |
| Reward Operator 0 | 5071.5 (178.5) | 4191.5 (77.1) | 5190.7 (116.7) | 7795.7 (233.7) | 6386.6 (189.6) | 6726.0 (135.8) | 9010.8 (242.6) | 9351.6 (161.4) | 8717.0 (249.1) |
| Reward Operator 1 | 4994.4 (159.8) | 4727.6 (149.5) | 5224.4 (126.3) | 7823.8 (117.2) | 6434.2 (255.9) | 6734.6 (171.4) | 9123.0 (341.4) | 9280.1 (265.1) | 8764.1 (223.5) |
| Total Reb. Costs [$] | 1006.8 (24.0) | — | 549.1 (20.7) | 4120.8 (120.2) | — | 3368.1 (125.2) | 1600.2 (95.4) | — | 1379.0 (83.7) |
| Reb. Costs Operator 0 | 498.5 (19.3) | — | 296.7 (10.6) | 2094.8 (88.5) | — | 1682.7 (72.1) | 813.5 (73.6) | — | 699.6 (76.7) |
Appendix figures & tables11 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
| Category | Hyperparameter | Value |
| Training | Actor learning rate ( ) | |
| Critic learning rate ( ) | ||
| Discount factor ( ) | 0.97 | |
| Reward scaling factor | 4,000 | |
| Actor gradient clip | 1,000 | |
| Critic gradient clip | 1,000 |
| Metric | Joint Policy |
| Total Reward | 23564.6 (341.1) |
| Reward Operator 0 | 11659.3 (206.4) |
| Reward Operator 1 | 11905.3 (248.4) |
| Total Rebalancing Costs | 2661.3 (87.2) |
| Rebalancing Costs Operator 0 | 1359.8 (52.2) |
| Rebalancing Costs Operator 1 | 1301.5 (57.0) |
Dynamic Pricing
Dynamic pricing studies how sellers and platforms adjust prices as demand, competition, inventory, and resource constraints change.
See all 50 papers