Representation Fidelity:Auditing Algorithmic Decisions About Humans Using Self-Descriptions

Reasoning representations are increasingly used as explanations for large language model outputs. Yet they are typically evaluated with model-centric criteria, such as answer accuracy and faithfulness, leaving it unclear whether they help people evaluate model responses. In this work, we study reasoning representations as human-facing interfaces rather than proxies for model reasoning ability. We conduct a controlled human study of six reasoning formats across tasks of varying complexity, supported by a web-based framework that randomizes task domains, problem instances, and representation order. The study collects fine-grained judgments of structural understanding, error detection and localization, and trust calibration. Our study shows a mismatch between perceived preference and support for human evaluation. Participants prefer planning- and decomposition-based representations, but simpler chain-of-thought traces better support verification, trust, and interpretability. Preferred representations also introduce calibration risks, with more false alarms on correct traces and high trust despite low willingness to verify.

Large language models (LLMs) show considerable potential in simulating human attitudes and preferences. Prior work finds that LLM-generated responses can compress the range of attitudes found within populations and misrepresent particular subgroups in ways that vary across models and topics. We introduce Population Fidelity, an evaluation framework that distinguishes key conditions required for a set of LLM-generated responses to represent a population. It incorporates three dimensions: group-level accuracy, the amount of between-group variation, and the structure of that variation. We demonstrate the framework's utility in two ways. First, we reproduce a prior study of "machine bias" in LLM survey responses and apply the framework to its models and more recent ones, showing that poor representation reflects not only insufficient between-group variation but also variation assigned to the wrong groups. Second, we evaluate one proposed approach to improving models' population representativeness: cultural fine-tuning. We find that cultural fine-tuning can improve alignment with the survey center without improving the representation of within-population differences, a distinction that measures of aggregate agreement do not capture. We argue that representing a population requires models to reproduce several features of human attitudinal variation simultaneously. Our framework organizes these features and provides reusable code, data, and trained models for evaluating population fidelity across substantive domains and assessing proposed alignment methods.

One of the many fairness definitions pursued in recent recommender system research targets mitigating demographic information encoded in model representations. Models optimized for this definition are typically evaluated on how well demographic attributes can be classified given model representations, with the (implicit) assumption that this measure accurately reflects recommendation parity, i.e., how similar recommendations given to different users are. We challenge this assumption by comparing the amount of demographic information encoded in representations with various measures of how the recommendations differ. We propose two new approaches for measuring how well demographic information can be classified given ranked recommendations. Our results from extensive testing of multiple models on one real and multiple synthetically generated datasets indicate that optimizing for fair representations positively affects recommendation parity, but also that evaluation at the representation level is not a good proxy for measuring this effect when comparing models. We also provide extensive insight into how recommendation-level fairness metrics behave for various models by evaluating their performances on numerous generated datasets with different properties.