cs.CLMar 9, 2026

Emergence is Overrated: AGI as an Archipelago of Experts

Authors: Daniel Kilov

Organizations: Machine Intelligence and Normative Theory (MINT) Lab, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University

Abstract

Krakauer, Krakauer, and Mitchell (2025) distinguish between emergent capabilities and emergent intelligence, arguing that true intelligence requires efficient coarse-grained representations enabling diverse problem-solving through analogy and minimal modification. They contend that intelligence means doing "more with less" through compression and generalization, contrasting this with "vast assemblages of diverse calculators" that merely accumulate specialized capabilities. This paper examines whether their framework accurately characterizes human intelligence and its implications for conceptualizing artificial general intelligence. Drawing on empirical evidence from cognitive science, I demonstrate that human expertise operates primarily through domain-specific pattern accumulation rather than elegant compression. Expert performance appears flexible not through unifying principles but through vast repertoires of specialized responses. Creative breakthroughs themselves may emerge through evolutionary processes of blind variation and selective retention rather than principled analogical reasoning. These findings suggest reconceptualizing AGI as an "archipelago of experts": isolated islands of specialized competence without unifying principles or shared representations. If we accept human expertise with its characteristic brittleness as genuine intelligence, then consistency demands recognizing that artificial systems comprising millions of specialized modules could constitute general intelligence despite lacking KKM's emergent intelligence.

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