Leaderboard Incentives: Model Rankings under Strategic Post-Training

Benchmark hacking refers to tuning a machine learning model to score highly on certain evaluation criteria without improving true generalization or faithfully solving the intended problem. We study this phenomenon in a generic machine learning contest, where each contestant chooses two types of effort: creative effort that improves model capability as desired by the contest host, and mechanistic effort that only improves the model's fitness to the particular task in contest without contributing to true generalization. We establish the existence of a symmetric monotone pure strategy equilibrium in this competition game. It also provides a natural definition of benchmark hacking in this strategic context by comparing a player's equilibrium effort allocation to that of a single-agent baseline scenario. Under our definition, contestants with types below certain threshold (low types) always engage in benchmark hacking, whereas those above the threshold do not. Furthermore, we show that more skewed reward structures (favoring top-ranked contestants) can elicit more desirable contest outcomes. We also provide empirical evidence to support our theoretical predictions.

A modern model release reports scores on 40+ benchmarks and the same evaluations were run many more times before it: to track training progress, compare design choices, and select the checkpoint for the release. But do we need to run every eval? We compile a public score matrix of 84 frontier models on 133 benchmarks (2,604 cells, 23.3% filled) and find it is approximately rank-2: a model's scores across all 133 benchmarks are largely determined by just two numbers. We confirm this in two ways: scores hidden from the matrix are best recovered using two factors, and two factors already explain over 90% of the variation among models on the benchmarks they share. Building on this, we design BenchPress: a logit-space rank-2 matrix completion method that recovers held-out scores to within 4.6 points, and a confidence layer that says when each prediction can be trusted. Using BenchPress, we find a subset of five benchmarks {GPQA-D, HLE, Codeforces, MMLU-Pro, ARC-AGI-1} that can recover the rest of a model's public scorecard to within 3.93 points. For a tighter inference budget, a cheaper set {GPQA-D, MMLU-Pro, Aider Polyglot, MATH-500, AIME 2026} can predict a model's evals to within 4.55. We release the score matrix, the BenchPress code, and an interactive tool that predicts any model's score on any benchmark.

While human evaluation is the gold standard in many NLP tasks, it suffers from prohibitive costs and poor scalability. When identifying top-performing models, typical evaluation protocols waste effort by exhaustively evaluating all models on the entire benchmark, a safe but inefficient approach. In this work, we formalize multi-model human evaluation as a best-arm identification problem in a multi-armed bandit setup with correlated arms, where pulling an arm corresponds to human-evaluating a model. By sampling adaptively based on the intermediate model rankings obtained on the samples so far, we can focus the annotation budget on the most competitive models. We prove the optimality of the proposed algorithms and show that it improves discrimination between top-performing models. This makes evaluations faster, cheaper and more aligned with large-scale competition evaluation goals.