The surge of highly realistic synthetic videos produced by contemporary generative systems has significantly increased the risk of malicious use, challenging both humans and existing detectors. Against this backdrop, we take a generator-side view and observe that internal cross-attention mechanisms in these models encode fine-grained speech-motion alignment, offering useful correspondence cues for forgery detection. Building on this insight, we propose X-AVDT, a robust and generalizable deepfake detector that probes generator-internal audio-visual signals accessed via DDIM inversion to expose these cues. X-AVDT extracts two complementary signals: (i) a video composite capturing inversion-induced discrepancies, and (ii) an audio-visual cross-attention feature reflecting modality alignment enforced during generation. To enable faithful cross-generator evaluation, we further introduce MMDF, a new multimodal deepfake dataset spanning diverse manipulation types and rapidly evolving synthesis paradigms, including GANs, diffusion, and flow-matching. Extensive experiments demonstrate that X-AVDT achieves leading performance on MMDF and generalizes strongly to external benchmarks and unseen generators, outperforming existing methods with accuracy improved by 13.1%. Our findings highlight the importance of leveraging internal audio-visual consistency cues for robustness to future generators in deepfake detection.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Temporally averaged cross-attention maps. For each video, we extract audio–visual cross-attention during DDIM inversion and average the maps over all frames to obtain a single heatmap. Real vs. fake samples exhibit consistent disparities.
Dataset
Modality
Method
Model
FS
RE
TH
GAN
DF
FM
Celeb-DF [ 48 ]
V
✓
✗
✗
✓
✗
✗
DF-Platter [ 60 ]
V
✓
✓
✗
✓
✗
✗
KoDF [ 40 ]
AV
✓
✓
✓
✓
✗
✗
FaceForensics++ [ 71 ]
AV
✓
✓
✗
✓
✗
✗
DFDC [ 21 ]
AV
✓
✗
✗
✓
✗
✗
Table 1: Comparison of deepfake video datasets. FS:Face swapping, RE: Self-reenactment, TH: Talking-head generation, DF: Diffusion model, FM: Flow-matching.
Figure 2: Input representations with complementary features. (a) video composite ϕ is obtained from video x and audio c by running DDIM inversion and reconstruction, decoding both the noisy and clean latents, and computing the residual. We then concatenate four components channel-wise: x , D(z^T) , D(z^0) , and ∣x−D(z^0)∣ . (b) AV cross-attention feature ψ is extracted during DDIM inversion from the diffusion U-Net and summarized as a frame-aligned tensor. These complementary cues (a) and (b) capture appearance information and modality alignment, respectively. For clarity, all visual elements shown ( D(z^T) , D(z^0) , and ∣x−D(z^0)∣ ) are decoded images.
Figure 3: The overall framework of X-AVDT. From each audio-visual pair, we form two inputs ϕ and ψ . Two 3D encoders map them to features that are concatenated and passed through the Feature Fusion Decoder to produce a fused feature. A classification head outputs the real/fake score, while an embedding head is trained with a triplet objective to improve robustness.
Split
Generator
Model
Method
#Clips (real/fake)
Train
Hallo2 [ 17 ]
Diffusion
Talking-Head
4k/4k
LivePortrait [ 29 ]
GAN
Self-Reenactment
4k/4k
FaceAdapter [ 32 ]
Diffusion
Face Swapping
4k/4k
Test
HunyuanAvatar [ 13 ]
Flow Matching
Talking-Head
0.8k/0.8k
MegActor- Σ [ 91 ]
Diffusion Transformer
Self-Reenactment
0.8k/0.8k
AniPortrait [ 87 ]
Diffusion
Talking-Head
0.8k/0.8k
Table 2: Composition of the dataset. This coverage better reflects current synthesis trends than outdated datasets that focus primarily on GANs, and permits assessing cross-generator generalization.
Dataset
Sync-C ↑
Sync-D ↓
LPIPS ↓
FVD ↓
HFAR ↑
FaceForensics++ [ 71 ]
3.32
11.06
0.27
370.23
0.22
FakeAVCeleb [ 38 ]
5.87
8.38
0.19
170.61
0.34
MMDF ( Ours )
7.36
7.35
0.07
121.39
0.41
Table 3: Audio-visual quality of manipulated videos. Sync-C, Sync-D, LPIPS, and FVD are computational metrics, whereas HFAR denotes the human false acceptance rate measured in a user study.
AniPortrait [ 87 ]
MegActor- Σ [ 91 ]
HunyuanAvatar [ 13 ]
Average
Model
AUROC
AP
Acc@EER
Acc
AUROC
AP
Acc@EER
Acc
AUROC
AP
Acc@EER
Acc
AUROC
AP
Acc@EER
Acc
Official-pretrained
LipForensics [ 31 ]
79.49
81.45
73.25
74.50
72.17
73.56
65.85
67.11
63.66
56.50
59.91
60.66
74.24
74.54
71.91
72.38
RealForensics [ 30 ]
86.31
85.23
78.65
77.56
62.93
61.60
58.79
58.71
64.90
60.30
61.40
60.85
77.65
75.71
72.15
65.70
AVAD [ 23 ]
73.25
74.98
66.05
67.49
50.87
56.96
51.26
51.18
75.37
74.54
74.14
74.39
67.47
67.29
64.75
65.29
FACTOR [ 69 ]
94.21
93.54
86.29
86.55
75.44
72.83
68.82
69.33
36.69
46.18
38.27
56.15
68.78
70.85
64.46
70.68
Table 4: Quantitative comparison on the MMDF dataset. Detectors are evaluated using the official pretrained checkpoint (first panel) and after retrained on the MMDF training set (Hallo2 [ 17 ] , LivePortrait [ 29 ] , and FaceAdapter [ 32 ] ) (second panel). Best in bold ; second-best underlined . * Note: FACTOR is a zero-shot method, while AVAD and AVH-Align are unsupervised methods.
Cross-Attention
Temporal-Attention
Spatial-Attention
Timestep t
AUROC
AP
Acc@EER
AUROC
AP
Acc@EER
AUROC
AP
Acc@EER
t=24
91.56
86.90
81.51
83.92
87.08
75.01
64.57
68.00
61.82
t=249
81.30
69.52
77.13
68.25
71.94
64.10
57.42
52.00
56.04
t=499
68.11
57.97
67.44
66.29
66.29
59.30
52.38
53.14
50.02
Table 6: Ablation results for different attention features and diffusion timesteps. As the diffusion timestep t grows, the latent becomes noisier and conditioning weakens. Results at t∈{24,249,499} show that cross-attention performs best, and performance degrades as t increases.
Figure 4: Comparison of attention features across diffusion timesteps. Red box denote the configuration used in our method.
Figure 5: Robustness against unseen corruptions. AUROC (%) across five severity levels. Per corruption scales are shown on the x –axes. Average denotes the mean AUROC across all corruptions at each severity level.
Figure 6: Grad-CAM visualizations. Red activation indicates regions where our model focuses most (i.e., pixels that make a strong positive contribution to the predicted class), while cooler colors denote weak or no contribution.
Method
AUROC
AP
Acc@EER
(a) Ablation on Input Representations
w/o AV Cross-Attn ( ψ )
88.22
87.25
83.70
w/o Video Composite ( ϕ )
90.21
90.57
84.32
w/o Residual ( ∣x−D(z^0)∣ )
93.82
92.25
89.00
(b) Ablation on Loss Design
w/o Ltri
92.64
92.26
86.32
Table 7: Ablation on input representations and loss design. (a) removing any of the input representation degrades performance,
Appendix figures & tables22 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Epochs
1
2 (Ours)
5
10
20
AUROC
93.24
95.29
95.01
95.19
95.13
Appendix
Table A.1.3 : Effect of training epochs on X-AVDT.
FakeAVCeleb [ 38 ]
FaceForensics++ [ 71 ]
FSGAN
FaceSwap
Wav2Lip
Deepfakes
FaceSwap
Face2Face
99.73
99.79
99.92
99.62
99.24
99.63
Appendix
Table B.1 : In-domain AUROC on the benchmark dataset. Cross-manipulation generalization is evaluated by training on two manipulation methods and testing on the remaining one (e.g., train on the first two columns and test on the third columns).
AniPortrait [ 87 ]
MegActor- Σ [ 91 ]
HunyuanAvatar [ 13 ]
Average
Model
AUROC
AP
Acc@EER
AUROC
AP
Acc@EER
AUROC
AP
Acc@EER
AUROC
AP
Acc@EER
SpeechForensics [ 49 ]
99.99
99.99
99.88
98.69
98.82
94.46
92.12
91.98
82.90
96.93
96.93
92.41
X-AVDT ( Ours )
99.10
98.89
96.54
90.17
88.05
83.11
97.79
97.44
97.69
95.29
94.03
91.15
Appendix
Table B.2.1 : Additional quantitative comparison results on the MMDF dataset.
Dataset
AUROC
AP
Acc@EER
Acc
DeepSpeak v1.0 [ 5 ]
94.29
95.06
95.39
94.94
KoDF [ 40 ]
93.07
92.88
91.13
91.87
Deepfake-Eval2024 [ 10 ]
75.02
72.73
71.68
71.36
Appendix
Table B.2.2 : Additional quantitative results for X-AVDT.
AniPortrait [ 87 ]
MegActor- Σ [ 91 ]
HunyuanAvatar [ 13 ]
Average
Method
AUROC
AP
Acc@EER
AUROC
AP
Acc@EER
AUROC
AP
Acc@EER
AUROC
AP
Acc@EER
w/o Inversion
73.55
67.56
69.95
63.18
63.69
59.81
41.81
46.36
43.55
62.22
61.07
56.69
Text-driven
90.22
90.85
81.56
76.15
75.25
69.91
49.01
49.00
50.51
74.48
76.94
65.75
Audio-driven ( Ours )
96.55
98.83
90.20
89.87
89.25
83.86
97.71
97.04
90.94
94.71
95.04
88.33
Appendix
Table C.1 : Ablation on video composite ϕ . When training, we fix the backbone and vary only the conditioning signal used during inversion. Audio-driven setting ranked first across datasets, while removing inversion cues yielded the weakest composite.
Figure C.2.1 : Robustness to unseen corruptions. AP (%) is shown in the first row and Acc@EER (%) is shown in the second row across five severity levels. Per corruption scales are shown on the x –axes. Average denotes the mean AP in the top row and Acc@EER in the bottom row, respectively, across all corruptions at each severity level.
Audio Desynchronizaiton
Audio Codec Artifacts
Metric
-0.5 sec
0
+0.5 sec
0
8k
32k
AUROC
90.90
93.70
91.31
93.70
91.80
90.17
AP
91.10
94.30
91.74
94.30
88.80
86.51
Acc@EER
83.40
86.40
83.97
86.40
85.90
81.56
Appendix
Table C.2.2 : Robustness to unseen audio perturbations. Performance under audio desynchronization (temporal offsets) and audio codec artifacts (low-bitrate re-encoding) at varying severity levels.
Figure 20
Figure C.3 : Visualization of attention features across diffusion timesteps.
Figure D.1 : PCA embeddings with a shared LDA decision boundary. Embeddings are extracted from the baseline and from the independently trained X-AVDT, without any fine-tuning.
Figure D.2 : Top- q Attention Mass Coverage within the Face ROI (Left) and Δ Cross-Attention Maps (Right). In the Δ maps, red indicates regions with higher fake cross-attention than real ( Δ>0 ), and blue indicates the opposite ( Δ<0 ).