Trust via Reputation of Conviction

Deterministic benchmark scores show that an agent received credit, but not whether that credit was earned, reported honestly, or would hold on a second run. We introduce a Trust Layer for Agent Evaluation, an additive post-hoc framework that reports, beside each recorded score, whether it should be believed. It verifies four properties: whether the result is supported by the benchmark's own grading logic, whether a passing answer was earned through traceable computation, whether the agent's completion claim matches what occurred, and whether the result is stable under repeated execution. The first three use only saved artifacts; the fourth re-runs the agent. Model judgments only label evidence under majority voting; all verdicts follow deterministic rules and never modify the recorded score. Applied to five agent configurations on 108 tasks from Agents' Last Exam, every model shows passing runs with no traceable computation (at rates varying tenfold), confirmed false completion claims, and unstable results: 18-46% of tasks do not stay in one score band over five runs. Only 22.6% of recorded passes clear all four checks (95% CI 15.0-32.6, n=84). Measuring what an agent can do and verifying that it did it are different problems, and current benchmarks address only the first.

As language-model agents increasingly work in teams, each agent must decide how much to trust its teammates. Yet we lack a standard way to measure trust between AI agents. We propose a behavioral measure based on costly verification. In a cooperative survival game, checking a teammate's work consumes resources, while trusting a wrong answer can be fatal. Relative to a memoryless version of the same model, reduced verification provides an observable measure of trust. Using this framework, we study trust formation, breakage, and recovery across six frontier model snapshots. When paired with a consistently reliable teammate, four snapshots (Claude Opus 4.6, Claude Sonnet 4.6, GPT-5.1, and Gemini 3.1 Pro) reduce verification by roughly 60-85%, whereas two smaller snapshots show little or no such adjustment. Failures reverse this discount, but models differ in how they respond. Some concentrate renewed scrutiny on the culprit, while others become more cautious toward the entire team. Recovery is slower than formation, and clustered failures sustain suspicion far longer than the same number of failures spread apart. These differences have practical consequences. Models that form trust verify less, decide more quickly, and achieve higher payoffs in our environment. By contrast, persistent over-verification is associated with indecision rather than safety. Our results show that trust dispositions can be measured before deployment and suggest that calibration, rather than maximal suspicion, should be the central concern in the governance of multi-agent AI systems.

As autonomous language model agents proliferate, forming an emerging agentic web with real-world consequences, what credibility signals can you use to decide whether to trust an unfamiliar agent in the wild and delegate to it? A natural governance intuition is to extend human identity verification and reputation mechanisms, from "Know Your Customer" and credit scores to "Know Your Agent" regimes. However, we argue that this analogy is fundamentally incomplete. Reputation mechanisms function both as social signals and as corrective feedback that sustain an equilibrium of trustworthy behavior, presuming a persistent identity associated with behavioral continuity, sanction sensitivity, and costly non-fungibility. Yet language model agents are ontologically dissociative: they are essentially an assemblage of mutable modules--foundation models, system prompts, tool-access policies, external memory, and, in some cases, a multi-agent system as a whole--any of which may change agent behavior--with a fluid persona that is also vulnerable to adversarial attack and may not internalize sanctions. Drawing on dissociative identity disorder jurisprudence, this dissociativity leaves agents without grounding for identifiability, predictability, credibility, and rehabilitability--the very properties that reputation mechanisms aim to sustain--thereby collapsing trust. We argue that identity-based, ex post, regulative, sanction-based governance, such as reputation, is structurally inapplicable to dissociative agents, and we suggest a shift to observability-based, ex ante, constitutive, protocol-based behavioral harnesses.