Generative AI systems increasingly expose powerful reasoning and image refinement capabilities through user-facing chatbot interfaces. In this work, we show that the naïve exposure of such capabilities fundamentally undermines modern deepfake detectors. Rather than proposing a new image manipulation technique, we study a realistic and already-deployed usage scenario in which an adversary uses only benign, policy-compliant prompts and commercial generative AI systems. We demonstrate that state-of-the-art deepfake detection methods fail under semantic-preserving image refinement. Specifically, we show that generative AI systems articulate explicit authenticity criteria and inadvertently externalize them through unrestricted reasoning, enabling their direct reuse as refinement objectives. As a result, refined images simultaneously evade detection, preserve identity as verified by commercial face recognition APIs, and exhibit substantially higher perceptual quality. Importantly, we find that widely accessible commercial chatbot services pose a significantly greater security risk than open-source models, as their superior realism, semantic controllability, and low-barrier interfaces enable effective evasion by non-expert users. Our findings reveal a structural mismatch between the threat models assumed by current detection frameworks and the actual capabilities of real-world generative AI. While detection baselines are largely shaped by prior benchmarks, deployed systems expose unrestricted authenticity reasoning and refinement despite stringent safety controls in other domains.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Semantic-preserving refinement alters authenticity judgments without changing identity from commercial APIs.
Figure 2: Summary of observed GAI behaviors across authenticity assessment and refinement stages, illustrating how structured reasoning transitions into benign, semantics-preserving image edits (Finding 1–5).
Service / Family
Access Channel
License
Specific API Model ID
Release
Cost
WEB
APP
API
(YYYY.MM)
($/img)
Qwen (Alibaba)
✓
–
✓
Open Weights
qwen-image-edit
2024.10
$0
✓
–
✓
Open Weights
qwen-image-edit-2511
2025.11
$0
Flux AI (Black Forest Labs)
✓
–
✓
Hybrid †
flux-2-max
2025.12
$0.070
ChatGPT (OpenAI)
✓
✓
✓
Commercial
gpt-image-1.5
2025.10
$0.133
Gemini (Google)
✓
✓
✓
Commercial
gemini-3-pro-image-preview
2025.11
$0.200
Table 1: Detailed comparison of image refinement services and model specifications (As of Feb 2026).
Table 3: Taxonomy of visual artifacts frequently identified by GAI systems during deepfake assessment (Top-K keywords aggregated from 100 records).
Detector
Original
Qwen-v1 ( qwen-image-edit )
Qwen-v2 ( qwen-image-edit-2511 )
N/A
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5 (IAP)
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5 (IAP)
τ99
τ90
τ99
τ90
τ99
τ90
τ99
τ90
τ99
τ90
τ99
τ90
τ99
τ90
τ99
τ90
τ99
τ90
τ99
τ90
τ99
τ90
GenD (C)
75
95
68
88
65
90
45
91
28
85
28
89
76
95
79
94
34
78
5
40
22
89
GenD (P)
85
88
67
80
72
84
20
67
8
42
3
46
79
96
86
98
27
56
3
13
7
30
GenD (D)
84
93
81
92
69
89
25
74
11
70
7
61
88
97
90
98
30
58
3
18
11
45
M2F2
31
61
19
45
11
35
7
22
3
12
2
11
18
51
21
57
11
40
1
17
18
68
Table 4: DRs (%) of deepfake and AI-generated detectors before and after refinement using Qwen models with prompt variations. Columns report performance on Original (FF++) vs. refined outputs produced by Qwen under Prompt 1–5 (increasingly detailed).
Detector
Original
P4 (short version of IAP)
P5 (IAP)
P6 (ISP)
N/A
Qwen-v1
Flux AI
ChatGPT
Gemini
Qwen-v1
Flux AI
ChatGPT
Gemini
ChatGPT
Gemini
τ99
τ90
τ99
τ90
τ99
τ90
τ99
τ90
τ99
τ90
τ99
τ90
τ99
τ90
τ99
τ90
τ99
τ90
τ99
τ90
τ99
τ90
GenD (C)
75
95
28
85
12
59
0
0
0
0
28
89
10
62
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
GenD (P)
85
88
8
42
1
24
0
0
0
0
3
46
0
14
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
GenD (D)
84
93
11
70
6
33
0
0
0
0
7
61
6
35
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
M2F2
31
61
3
12
1
21
3
29
0
5
2
11
5
33
6
41
0
15
0
17
0
2
Table 5: Detection rates of deepfake and AI-generated image detectors before and after refinement with commercial GAI systems.
Figure 3: Semantic preservation with IAP and ISP.
Figure 4: Qualitative examples. Each row shows one source image and corresponding outputs from different systems.
Detector
Original
ChatGPT
Gemini
N/A
P4
P5
P4
P5
τ99
τ90
τ99
τ90
τ99
τ90
τ99
τ90
τ99
τ90
D 3
50
96
18
67
10
59
36
72
39
81
UnivFD
38
50
8
20
12
27
23
39
33
46
Hive-AI
83
94
14
90
28
86
38
86
41
83
Table 6: DRs (%) of AI-generated image detectors on original images and images refined by commercial GAI systems.
Appendix figures & tables8 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Evaluation Dimension
Operational Focus in Policies
Synthesized Output
Categorical filtering of prohibited content, such as sexual, violent, non-consensual imagery; hate speech; or illegal activities.
Prompt-level Intent
Detection of explicit malicious or illicit intent from surface-level wording in individual user instructions.
Appendix
Table 7: Risk dimensions in existing AI safety policies.
Service
Provider
Primary Capability
Moderation API
OpenAI
Text-based safety filtering with optional multimodal extension
AI Content Safety
Microsoft Azure
Native text and image safety filtering
Appendix
Table 8: Automated safety filtering services used in our experimental setup.
Prompt Type
Max Signal
Criteria Elicitation
Illicit (0.0166)
Image Analysis
Sexual ( 2.6×10−5 )
Image Refinement (Instance-Agnostic)
Violence ( 5.2×10−4 )
Image Refinement (Instance-Specific)
Violence ( 5.2×10−4 )
Appendix
Table 9: OpenAI safety filtering outcomes for text-based prompts using omni-moderation-latest .(No prompt was flagged by the moderation system.)
Prompt Type
Max Severity
Criteria Elicitation
0
Image Analysis
0
Image Refinement (Instance-Agnostic)
0
Image Refinement (Instance-Specific)
0
Appendix
Table 10: Azure AI Content Safety outcomes for text-based prompts.
Image Set
# of Severity >0
Max Severity
Original
0 (0.00%)
0
Flux AI
0 (0.00%)
0
ChatGPT
1 (1.00%)
2
Gemini
0 (0.00%)
0
Qwen-v1
2 (2.00%)
2
Qwen-v2
1 (1.00%)
2
Appendix
Table 11: Image-based safety filtering outcomes using Azure AI Content Safety. For each image set, we report the proportion of images exhibiting any non-zero severity and the maximum observed severity across all categories.
Figure 5: Semantic preservation with IAP and ISP on Tencent CompareFace. (Note that the default thresholds in Tencent CompareFace is 50 )
Figure 6: Criterion articulation without image input. GAI systems describe their key criteria for facial deepfake detection in the absence of any image input.
Figure 7: Criterion-based image analysis. A GAI system applies the articulated criteria to analyze a facial image that is a known deepfake, producing a structured forensic explanation and final judgment.
As AI-generated images proliferate across digital platforms, reliable detection methods have become critical for combating misinformation and maintaining content authenticity. While numerous deepfake detection methods have been proposed, existing benchmarks predominantly evaluate fine-tuned models, leaving a critical gap in understanding out-of-the-box performance -- the most common deployment scenario for practitioners. We present the first comprehensive zero-shot evaluation of 16 state-of-the-art detection methods, comprising 23 pretrained detector variants (due to multiple released versions of certain detectors), across 12 diverse datasets, comprising 2.6million image samples spanning 291 unique generators including modern diffusion models. Our systematic analysis reveals striking findings: (1)no universal winner exists, with detector rankings exhibiting substantial instability (Spearmanρ: 0.01 -- 0.87 across dataset pairs); (2)a 37percentage-point performance gap separates the best detector (75.0% mean accuracy) from the worst (37.5%); (3)training data alignment critically impacts generalization, causing up to 20--60% performance variance within architecturally identical detector families; (4)modern commercial generators (FluxDev, Fireflyv4, Midjourneyv7) defeat most detectors, achieving only 18--30% average accuracy; and (5)we identify three systematic failure patterns affecting cross-dataset generalization. Statistical analysis confirms significant performance differences between detectors (Friedman test: χ2=121.01, p<10−16, KendallW=0.524). Our findings challenge the ``one-size-fits-all'' detector paradigm and provide actionable deployment guidelines, demonstrating that practitioners must carefully select detectors based on their specific threat landscape rather than relying on published benchmark performance.
The rapid advancement of Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI) capabilities is accompanied by a concerning rise in its misuse. In particular the generation of credible misinformation in the form of images poses a significant threat to the public trust in democratic processes. Consequently, there is an urgent need to develop tools to reliably distinguish between authentic and AI-generated content. The majority of detection methods are based on neural networks that are trained to recognize forensic artifacts. In this work, we demonstrate that current state-of-the-art classifiers are vulnerable to adversarial examples under real-world conditions. Through extensive experiments, comprising four detection methods and five attack algorithms, we show that an attacker can dramatically decrease classification performance, without internal knowledge of the detector's architecture. Notably, most attacks remain effective even when images are degraded during the upload to, e.g., social media platforms. In a case study, we demonstrate that these robustness challenges are also found in commercial tools by conducting black-box attacks on HIVE, a proprietary online GenAI media detector. In addition, we evaluate the robustness of using generated features of a robust pre-trained model and showed that this increases the robustness, while not reaching the performance on benign inputs. These results, along with the increasing potential of GenAI to erode public trust, underscore the need for more research and new perspectives on methods to prevent its misuse.
Sina Mavali, Jonas Ricker, David Pape +2
CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, Saarbrücken, Germany · Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany
The rapid advancement of generative models presents a significant challenge to existing deepfake detection methods, particularly given the widespread dissemination of highly realistic AI-generated images. Although Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) show strong potential for this task, existing approaches suffer from two key limitations: insufficient sensitivity to fine-grained forensic artifacts and reliance on static synthetic supervision from frontier models, leading to limited flexibility and high-cost. To address these issues, we propose ForeAgent, an agentic forensics framework for AI-generated image detection with iterative self-evolution. First, ForeAgent adopts a Perception-Verdict architecture that aggregates multi-view cues spanning semantic, spatial, and frequency-domain features, and leverages an MLLM as a verdict module to fuse these signals for a logical-grounded verdict. Second, to enable continual self-improvement, we introduce a Hindsight-Driven Self-Refining strategy following a Sampling-Reflection-Evolution paradigm. The agent performs inference rollouts on training instances. Guided by ground-truth labels as hindsight, it reflects on failure cases and low-quality reasoning trajectories to regenerate higher-quality reasoning traces. These synthesized samples are then strictly filtered through a dual-expert quality gating module. ForeAgent continuously evolves via fine-tuning on self-curated high-quality samples. Extensive experiments demonstrate that ForeAgent achieves state-of-the-art performance on the Chameleon benchmark, reaching 82.18% accuracy (+16.41% over AIDE), and achieves 93.3% mean accuracy on AIGCDetect-Benchmark across 16 generators. In addition, external evaluation shows that ForeAgent produces more consistent and causally grounded reasoning compared to GPT-5 and GPT-5-mini.
Yangjun Wu, Keyu Yan, Yu Liu +5
Zhejiang University, Zhejiang, China · Alibaba Group