Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) pose critical safety challenges, as they are susceptible not only to adversarial attacks such as jailbreaking but also to inadvertently generating harmful content for benign users. While internal safety alignment via Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning (RL) is a primary mitigation strategy, current methods often face a safety-utility trade-off: they either refuse benign queries out of excessive caution or overlook latent risks in cross-modal interactions. To resolve this, we introduce Pragma-VL, an end-to-end alignment algorithm that enables MLLMs to pragmatically arbitrate between safety and helpfulness. First, we enhance visual risk perception with a novel cold-start SFT stage. This is achieved by applying risk-aware clustering to the visual encoder and using an interleaved dataset of risk descriptions and high-quality data. Second, we introduce a theoretically-guaranteed reward model that leverages synergistic learning. We train it with a novel data augmentation method that assigns dynamic weights based on the queries, enabling contextual arbitration between safety and helpfulness. Extensive experiments show that Pragma-VL effectively balances safety and helpfulness, outperforming baselines by 5% to 20% on most multimodal safety benchmarks while preserving its general capabilities in areas such as mathematics and knowledge reasoning.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: The dual failure modes of static safety policies in MLLMs. Our work aims to train a pragmatic model that dynamically arbitrates safety and helpfulness trade-off based on the context.
Figure 2: (a) Overview of Pragma-VL, which train the MLLM to perform context-aware dynamic arbitration, achieving a flexible balance between safety and helpfulness. (b) An illustration of our Contextual Data Augmentation Pipeline.
Table 1: Preference accuracy of different reward model architectures on the PragmaSafe validation set. Δ refers to the labeled score difference between the chosen and rejected pair.
Model/Experiment
Beavertails-V(%)
SPA-VL(%
MM-SafetyBench(%)
SIUO(%)
MSSbench(%)
Help
Harmless
Help
Harmless
Help
Harmless
ASR ↓
Effective
Safety
Effective
Safety
Qwen2.5-VL-7B
Qwen2.5-VL-7B
50.00
50.00
50.00
50.00
50.00
50.00
48.75
92.17
38.78
98.48
36.53
Beavertails-V_harm
37.07
48.63
26.88
45.66
27.44
45.18
43.29
89.76
59.64
99.15
50.50
Beavertails-V_help
49.91
43.29
40.47
29.43
54.94
52.38
51.07
95.20
34.33
98.98
32.54
Beavertails-V_all
45.84
56.12
37.71
51.69
38.97
51.68
49.58
92.59
51.23
98.65
45.45
Table 2: Comprehensive evaluation results across multiple safety benchmarks. Help and Harm metrics are evaluated using Win Rate. For each model category (Qwen, Llava), the best-performing experiment in each column is highlighted in bold , the second-best is underlined , and the Pragma-VL experiment row is highlighted.
Model/Experiment
GQA(%)
ScienceQA(%)
Textvqa(%)
Vizwizqa(%)
Vqav2(%)
MathVista(%)
Qwen2.5-VL-7B
60.74
88.48
83.75
72.53
83.60
67.80
Beavertails-V_harm
56.25
85.93
78.32
64.26
80.31
51.80
Beavertails-V_help
59.57
86.06
82.84
68.85
81.97
48.40
SPA-VL
57.61
86.32
80.31
71.65
82.99
62.60
MM-RLHF
59.03
87.45
83.26
68.07
82.09
50.70
SFT
59.57
89.01
81.83
68.64
81.29
66.50
Table 3: Performance comparison on various general ability benchmarks. For each model category (Qwen, Llava), the best-performing experiment in each column is highlighted in bold , and the second-best is underlined . The Pragma-VL experiment row is highlighted for emphasis.
Figure 4: Ablation study of the Pragma-VL framework. Results consistently demonstrate that the full Pragma-VL framework outperforms its individual components, highlighting the synergistic effect of combining risk-aware pre-alignment with subsequent policy alignment.
Model/Experiment
Beavertails-V (%)
SPA-VL (%)
MM-SafetyBench (%)
SIUO (%)
MSSbench (%)
Help
Harmless
Help
Harmless
Help
Harmless
ASR ↓
Effective
Safety
Effective
Safety
Pre-RL Stage
EC
52.12
51.10
55.19
50.37
51.25
49.22
43.40
94.44
33.33
98.82
37.87
SFT
53.98
60.61
56.04
56.79
47.31
53.92
44.03
89.50
40.12
96.46
42.92
EC+SFT
58.70
65.53
70.45
65.28
48.09
55.01
41.13
88.62
48.79
97.31
43.09
RL Stage
Table 4: Ablation study on Qwen2.5-VL-7B. Abbreviations: EC (Encoder Clustering via Contrastive Learning), SFT (Supervised Fine-Tuning), and GRPO (Group Relative Policy Optimization).
Symbol
Description
Contextual Data Augmentation (Section 3.1 )
Wbase
The initial base weight vector derived from majority voting of annotations, Wbase=[wh,ws] .
Wfinal
The final, variance-adjusted weight vector used for training.
σh2,σs2
The variance of the helpfulness and harmlessness scores across 5 annotations, respectively.
T(⋅)
The targeting function that determines the direction of weight adjustment based on variance.
N(0,σ2)
A Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and variance σ2 .
Table 5: Summary of Mathematical Notations
Appendix figures & tables14 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Figure 5: (a) The distribution of items across all categories. (b) Score distributions for helpfulness, safety, and weighted metrics (top), with the corresponding word length distribution for each score bin (bottom).
Category
Original
Filtered
Retention(%)
Helpness Avg
Safety Avg
Help W Avg
Safety W Avg
Ans Len Avg
animal_abuse
9468
7502
79.24%
0.46
0.30
0.36
0.64
1255.21
dangerous_behavior
15726
12456
79.21%
0.77
0.88
0.33
0.67
1495.23
deception_in_personal_relationships
4524
3598
79.53%
0.57
0.31
0.46
0.54
1304.79
discriminatory_depictions
3546
2858
80.60%
1.13
0.24
0.62
0.38
1570.57
environmental_damage
14262
5922
41.52%
0.42
0.14
0.36
0.64
1687.79
false_information
4620
1498
32.42%
0.65
0.37
0.44
0.56
1503.37
Appendix
Table 6: Statistics of original and filtered samples for each safety category.
Figure 6: Safety-Dominant data example in PragmaSafe.
Figure 7: Helpfulness-Dominant data example in PragmaSafe.
Model/Experiment
Beavertails-V (%)
SPA-VL (%)
MM-SafetyBench (%)
SIUO (%)
MSSbench (%)
Help
Harmless
Help
Harmless
Help
Harmless
ASR ↓
Effective
Safety
Effective
Safety
Pre-RL Stage
EC
49.31
48.64
51.01
51.55
49.04
47.25
57.01
87.04
15.53
98.14
24.92
SFT
77.75
83.66
82.72
85.66
50.23
52.14
42.28
89.15
33.33
95.62
37.10
EC+SFT
83.36
86.24
90.04
89.77
49.82
54.05
38.51
88.02
39.15
97.13
39.90
RL Stage
Appendix
Table 7: Ablation study on Llava-1.5-7B. We compare the performance across the Pre-RL Stage (EC, SFT, EC+SFT) and the RL Stage (GRPO, SFT+GRPO, Pragma-VL).
Figure 8: Example before and after MLLM Cold-Start.
Figure 9: Visual Example of images with risk severity labels.
Figure 10: Helpfulness and Harmlessness Score of Beavertails-V Benchmark (categorized). (a) Comparison between Llava-1.5-7B and Llava with Pragma-VL (b) Comparison between Qwen2.5-VL-7B and Qwen with Pragma-VL
Figure 11: Attack Success Rate of MMSafety Benchmark (categorized). (a) Comparison between Llava-1.5-7B and Llava with Pragma-VL (b) Comparison between Qwen2.5-VL-7B and Qwen with Pragma-VL
Figure 12: Example before and after Pragma-VL Pipeline(Qwen2.5-VL-7B).
Figure 13: Example before and after Pragma-VL Pipeline(Llava-1.5-7B).
Figure 14: Visual example for three reward structure after GRPO on harm-dominant query (Qwen2.5-VL-7B).
Figure 15: Visual example for three reward structure after GRPO on help-dominant query (Qwen2.5-VL-7B).
Reward Arch.
Beavertails-V(%)
SPA-VL(%)
MM-Safety(%)
SIUO(%)
Help
Harmless
Help
Harmless
Help
Harmless
ASR ↓
Effective
Safety
Qwen2.5-VL-7B
50.00
50.00
50.00
50.00
50.00
50.00
48.75
92.17
38.78
par_grpo
62.65
67.91
87.17
87.92
52.74
58.99
31.66
95.21
63.47
seq_grpo
51.44
52.63
38.40
48.30
56.37
53.27
48.45
95.81
39.16
single_grpo
13.94
29.08
7.98
29.08
9.29
24.79
37.30
46.70
41.91
Appendix
Table 8: RL-Alignment performance comparison of different reward model architectures on the Qwen2.5-VL-7B backbone. Help and Harm are evaluated with Win Rate (%). par_grpo denotes parallel reward, seq_grpo denotes sequential reward, and single_grpo denotes single head reward.
Despite remarkable capability in multi-modal understanding, deploying Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) in open-ended conversational scenarios introduces safety risks that remain poorly addressed by existing alignment methods. Unlike simple malicious visual question and answer (VQA) pairs , multi-turn interactions enable adversaries to incrementally reconstruct harmful intent across dialogues, progressively bypassing safety constraints in ways that are difficult to detect at any individual turn. Meanwhile, conventional reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) approaches are unsuitable for this situation: designed primarily for VQA tasks, they neither capture cross-turn risk dynamics nor scale efficiently without costly manual preference annotation. To close this gap, we introduce MINT-Safe, an open-source visual multi-turn training dataset comprising 11,270 multi-image dialogues and 500 refusal VQA pairs, constructed via multi-agent interaction with text-to-image (T2I) tool-call augmentation. Building on MINT-Safe, we propose TAD-Align, a dialogue safety alignment framework centered on a turn-aware dual-objective reward function. Rather than treating all dialogue turns uniformly, TAD-Align leverages rollout-based safety score variance to dynamically identify turns where the model exhibits inconsistent safety behavior, and adaptively up-weights these turns during optimization. Experiments on Qwen2.5-VL-7B-Instruct and LLaVA-NeXT-7B demonstrate reductions of over 10% in Attack Success Rate (ASR), alongside improvements of at least 8% in harmlessness and 13% in helpfulness on multi-modal multi-turn safety benchmarks, while preserving general model capabilities.
Han Zhu, Jiale Chen, Chengkun Cai +8
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology · University College London · AISpeech +1
Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) can act unsafely when individually benign images and texts are interpreted jointly. Beyond implicit reasoning risk, where reasoning drifts toward harm, we identify intent-level risk, where cross-modal ambiguity silently commits the model to a hazardous premise that path-level optimization alone cannot correct. We propose SAFE-PRO, which uses a Risk-Conditioned Uncertainty (RCU) signal, combining predictive entropy with a learned cross-modal risk score, to decide when to ask safety-grounded clarifying questions and where to apply path optimization, under a reward that prioritizes safety and penalizes over-refusal. We also build SSUI-Dialog, a multimodal multi-turn dataset with dual-intent supervision, and theoretically analyze gradient variance and unsafe-completion risk under RCU. Across seven benchmarks and two base MLLMs, SAFE-PRO consistently improves safety over SRPO, roughly halves its over-refusal, and surpasses GPT-4o and Claude-3.5-Sonnet in average single-turn safety.
Wei Cai, Jian Zhao, Yuchen Yuan +1
Institute of Artificial Intelligence (TeleAI), China Telecom, P. R. China. · Peking University. · School of Artificial Intelligence, OPtics and ElectroNics (iOPEN), Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an 710072, P. R. China.
Large vision-language models (LVLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in vision-language reasoning tasks, yet ensuring their safety remains a critical challenge. Recent input-side defenses detect unsafe images with CLIP and prepend safety prefixes to prompts, but they still suffer from inaccurate detection in complex scenes and unstable safety signals during decoding. To address these issues, we propose GuardAlign, a training-free defense framework that integrates two strategies. First, OT-enhanced safety detection leverages optimal transport to measure distribution distances between image patches and unsafe semantics, enabling accurate identification of malicious regions without additional computational cost. Second, cross-modal attentive calibration strengthens the influence of safety prefixes by adaptively reallocating attention across layers, ensuring that safety signals remain consistently activated throughout generation. Extensive evaluations on six representative MLLMs demonstrate that GuardAlign reduces unsafe response rates by up to 39% on SPA-VL, while preserving utility, achieving an improvement on VQAv2 from 78.51% to 79.21%.
Xingyu Zhu, Beier Zhu, Junfeng Fang +4
MoE Key Lab of BIPC, University of Science and Technology of China · Nanyang Technological University · National University of Singapore +1