EcoFair-CH-MARL: Scalable Constrained Hierarchical Multi-Agent RL with Real-Time Emission Budgets and Fairness Guarantees

Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) trains a team of agents that share one environment and learn their policies together. Training maximizes the team return, and a high return does not imply that the rewards are shared fairly among the agents in every episode. Testing is an established way to discover the failures of deep reinforcement learning, yet few methods address the fairness of MARL. In this work, we propose FairTest, a search-based testing approach that seeks the unfair executions of a MARL policy. The design combines search guidance with test prioritization. The guidance scores each candidate with three fitness functions. One measures the fairness of the runs already performed, another predicts the fairness from abstract states and fairness features, and the third reads the decision uncertainty from the policy. Crossover and mutation derive further candidates from the observed executions. The prioritization ranks the candidates by the predicted fairness and the decision uncertainty, so that the runs reach the candidates where failures are expected. FairTest is evaluated on three environments and two MARL algorithms, and four baselines are given the same budget. It detects the most fairness failures compared to three baselines with statistical significance and large effect sizes. The failure count exceeds that of the strongest baseline by 221% on average and coverage improves by an average of 23%.

We present a distributed approach for constrained Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) that combines state-augmented policy learning with distributed consensus over dual variables. Our method targets systems where agents have separable dynamics but must coordinate to satisfy global resource constraints, a setting in which, as we demonstrate empirically, independent learning fails to produce feasible solutions because agents cannot determine appropriate individual contributions toward collective constraint satisfaction. The key technical contribution is showing that lightweight neighbor-to-neighbor consensus over Lagrange multipliers suffices for globally coordinated constraint enforcement while preserving the scalability of independent training. Each agent learns a single augmented policy offline, conditioned on both its local state and a dual variable encoding constraint feedback. During execution, agents reach agreement on this dual variable through local communication alone. We prove that under mild connectivity assumptions, the consensus error among agents' multipliers is bounded, and show that this translates to a bounded constraint violation that decreases with graph connectivity and the number of consensus rounds. Unlike centralized training with decentralized execution (CTDE) approaches, whose complexity grows at least quadratically with agent count, our method scales linearly in both training and execution. Experiments on smart grid demand response demonstrate that consensus coordination is essential for feasibility: without it, agents satisfy grid capacity constraints only by indefinitely postponing demand, a degenerate non-solution. With consensus, agents converge to a shared dual variable and satisfy both grid constraints and demand fulfillment, scaling to thousands of agents while CTDE baselines are limited to dozens.

When multiple agents share a cost budget, a common Lagrange multiplier can enforce the aggregate constraint but does not determine how its penalty should be allocated across agents. Uniform penalties ignore heterogeneity in the rewards agents sacrifice, while agent-specific multipliers may still rely on the same aggregate cost signal. We introduce Lagrangian Responsibility Allocation (LiRA), which learns each agent's share of a common multiplier by optimizing social welfare over a finite training horizon. The multiplier enforces the aggregate budget, while responsibility shares redistribute its influence without modifying the original rewards or constraints. For convex games under standard regularity conditions, varying these shares induces a smooth family of normalized generalized Nash equilibria in which active constraints remain at their budgets while welfare varies. To optimize responsibility before convergence, we derive a welfare gradient that accounts for both learning updates and the induced change in data distribution. Across CityLearn, MABIM, Harvest, and MetaDrive, spanning 3 to 400 agents, LiRA improves average social welfare by up to 29% over uniform and agent-specific multiplier baselines. Grid and driving costs remain within budget, inventory violations decrease, and Harvest makes more effective use of available budget.