Why AI systems don't learn and what to do about it: Lessons on autonomous learning from cognitive science

Despite their apparent diversity, modern machine learning methods can be reduced to a remarkably simple core principle: learning is achieved by continuously optimizing parameters to minimize or maximize a scalar objective function. This paradigm has been extraordinarily successful for well-defined tasks where goals are fixed and evaluation criteria are explicit. However, if artificial systems are to move toward true autonomy-operating over long horizons and across evolving contexts-objectives may become ill-defined, shifting, or entirely absent. In such settings, a fundamental question emerges: in the absence of an explicit objective function, how can a system determine whether its ongoing internal dynamics are productive or pathological? And how should it regulate structural change without external supervision? In this work, we propose a dynamical framework for learning without an explicit objective. Instead of minimizing external error signals, the system evaluates the intrinsic health of its own internal dynamics and regulates structural plasticity accordingly. We introduce a two-timescale architecture that separates fast state evolution from slow structural adaptation, coupled through an internally generated stress variable that accumulates evidence of persistent dynamical dysfunction. Structural modification is then triggered not continuously, but as a state-dependent event. Through a minimal toy model, we demonstrate that this stress-regulated mechanism produces temporally segmented, self-organized learning episodes without reliance on externally defined goals. Our results suggest a possible route toward autonomous learning systems capable of self-assessment and internally regulated structural reorganization.

Current artificial intelligence systems struggle with systematic compositional reasoning: the capacity to recombine known components in novel configurations. This paper argues that the failure is architectural, not merely a matter of scale or training data, and that its origins lie in the psychological learning theories from which AI paradigms were derived. The argument proceeds in three stages. First, drawing on the systematicity debate in cognitive science and on the demonstration of Aizawa that neither connectionism nor classicism can make systematicity a structural consequence of the architecture, the paper establishes that the corrective techniques proliferating in modern AI, from chain-of-thought prompting to alignment through human feedback, function as auxiliary hypotheses that address symptoms without resolving the underlying architectural indifference to systematicity. Second, it traces the genealogy from psychological learning theory to AI methodology, showing that behaviourism, cognitivism, and constructivism each bequeathed a specific structural limitation to the AI paradigm it inspired: the exclusion of internal structure, the opacity of representation, and the absence of formal construction operators. A cross-cultural reappraisal of rote learning reveals a further underexploited pathway. Third, the paper introduces ReSynth, a trimodular conceptual framework that proposes the principled separation of reasoning, identity, and memory as a path toward architectures in which systematic behaviour is a structural consequence of design rather than a correction applied after the fact.

Recent advances in generative and embodied AI have been driven by large-scale predictive learning over multimodal data. However, the resulting systems remain largely based on passive training regimes where linguistic regularities create the scaffold onto which information from other modalities is attached. Conversely, neuroscience and cognitive science suggest that biological intelligence is organized in the opposite way, where grounded world models acquired through interaction with the environment provide the semantic scaffold to which language is attached. Here, we illustrate five examples of neural circuits supporting grounded world modelling, which underlie navigation in physical and conceptual spaces, affordance-based perception and interaction with objects, active perception and exploratory learning, allostatic control and emotion, and the distinction between self- and world-generated outcomes. These examples highlight several features largely missing from current embodied AI, including the role of intrinsic dynamics as a foundation for learning, the centrality of action in aligning these dynamics with the external world, the prominence of autonomous experience and open-ended learning over passive assimilation of externally provided data, and the fact that early predictive and control mechanisms scaffold higher cognitive abilities such as reasoning, conceptual navigation, planning, imagination, understanding others' minds, and communication. Finally, we discuss whether and how principles derived from biological systems may inform future embodied AI, including training regimes based on social interaction to construct world models that are not only grounded but also socially shared and aligned with human norms and values.