Current artificial intelligence systems struggle with systematic compositional reasoning: the capacity to recombine known components in novel configurations. This paper argues that the failure is architectural, not merely a matter of scale or training data, and that its origins lie in the psychological learning theories from which AI paradigms were derived. The argument proceeds in three stages. First, drawing on the systematicity debate in cognitive science and on the demonstration of Aizawa that neither connectionism nor classicism can make systematicity a structural consequence of the architecture, the paper establishes that the corrective techniques proliferating in modern AI, from chain-of-thought prompting to alignment through human feedback, function as auxiliary hypotheses that address symptoms without resolving the underlying architectural indifference to systematicity. Second, it traces the genealogy from psychological learning theory to AI methodology, showing that behaviourism, cognitivism, and constructivism each bequeathed a specific structural limitation to the AI paradigm it inspired: the exclusion of internal structure, the opacity of representation, and the absence of formal construction operators. A cross-cultural reappraisal of rote learning reveals a further underexploited pathway. Third, the paper introduces ReSynth, a trimodular conceptual framework that proposes the principled separation of reasoning, identity, and memory as a path toward architectures in which systematic behaviour is a structural consequence of design rather than a correction applied after the fact.
We critically examine the limitations of current AI models in achieving autonomous learning and propose a learning architecture inspired by human and animal cognition. The proposed framework integrates learning from observation (System A) and learning from active behavior (System B) while flexibly switching between these learning modes as a function of internally generated meta-control signals (System M). We discuss how this could be built by taking inspiration on how organisms adapt to real-world, dynamic environments across evolutionary and developmental timescales.
Emmanuel Dupoux, Yann LeCun, Jitendra Malik
FAIR at META · École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales · NYU +1
The four dominant learning theories of behaviorism, cognitivism, constructivism, and connectivism show significant conceptual limitations as generative artificial intelligence (AI) proliferates in educational settings. These frameworks were formulated before the emergence of AI systems capable of generating, synthesizing, and reasoning about knowledge. This article critically examines each learning theory and identifies assumptions challenged by the affordances of generative AI. Drawing on research in distributed cognition, extended mind, human-AI collaboration, AI literacy, cognitive offloading, and metacognition, the article proposes Generativism as a learning theory for the generative AI age. Generativism posits that learning increasingly occurs through the iterative co-construction of knowledge between human learners and AI systems. The proposed framework is organized around four constructs (epistemic partnership, distributed agency, generative literacy, and adaptive metacognition) and four principles specifying the relations among them. The framework offers a foundation for rethinking instructional design, learning, assessment, and expertise development in contexts where generative AI plays an integral role in cognition.
Shan Li, Juan Zheng
Department of Education and Human Services, College of Education, Lehigh University · Department of Community and Global Health, College of Health, Lehigh University
Different types of reasoning impose different structural demands on representational systems, yet no systematic account of these demands exists across psychology, AI, and philosophy of mind. I propose a framework identifying four structural properties of representational systems: operability, consistency, structural preservation, and compositionality. These properties are demanded to different degrees by different forms of reasoning, from induction through analogy and causal inference to deduction and formal logic. Each property excludes a distinct class of reasoning failure. The analysis reveals a principal structural boundary: reasoning types below it can operate on associative, probabilistic representations, while those above it require all four properties to be fully satisfied. Scaling statistical learning without structural reorganization is insufficient to cross this boundary, because the structural guarantees required by deductive reasoning cannot be approximated through probabilistic means. Converging evidence from AI evaluation, developmental psychology, and cognitive neuroscience supports the framework at different levels of directness. Three testable predictions are derived, including compounding degradation, selective vulnerability to targeted structural disruption, and irreducibility under scaling. The framework is a necessary-condition account, agnostic about representational format, that aims to reorganize existing debates rather than close them.
Yiling Wu
BridgeM, Inc. · Department of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts Amherst