Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly adopted as tool-using agents that can plan, observe their environment, and take actions over extended time periods. This evolution challenges current evaluation practices where the AI models are tested in restricted, fully observable settings. In this article, we argue that evaluations of AI agents are vulnerable to a well-known failure mode in computer security: malicious software that exhibits benign behavior when it detects that it is being analyzed. We point out how AI agents can infer the properties of their evaluation environment and adapt their behavior accordingly. This can lead to overly optimistic safety and robustness assessments. Drawing parallels with decades of research on malware sandbox evasion, we demonstrate that this is not a speculative concern, but rather a structural risk inherent to the evaluation of adaptive systems. Finally, we outline concrete principles for evaluating AI agents, which treat the system under test as potentially adversarial. These principles emphasize realism, variability of test conditions, and post-deployment reassessment.
The benchmarks used to evaluate AI agents in security-critical roles suffer from crucial weaknesses. Building on recent empirical evidence, we characterize three core challenges that undermine security evaluations: benchmark vulnerabilities, temporal staleness, and runtime uncertainty. We then outline practical directions toward building more robust and trustworthy evaluation frameworks.
Sahar Abdelnabi, Chris Hicks, Konrad Rieck +1
ELLIS Institute Tübingen & MPI-IS & Tübingen AI Center, Germany · The Alan Turing Institute, London, UK · BIFOLD & Technische Universität Berlin, Germany +1
Evaluation is no longer a final checkpoint in the machine learning lifecycle. As AI systems evolve from static models to compound, tool-using agents, evaluation becomes a core control function. The question is no longer "How good is the model?" but "Can we trust the system to behave as intended, under change, at scale?". Yet most evaluation practices remain anchored in assumptions inherited from the model-centric era: static benchmarks, aggregate scores, and one-off success criteria. This paper argues that such approaches are increasingly obscure rather than illuminating system behavior. We examine how evaluation pipelines themselves introduce silent failure modes, why high benchmark scores routinely mislead teams, and how agentic systems fundamentally alter the meaning of performance measurement. Rather than proposing new metrics or harder benchmarks, we aim to clarify the role of evaluation in the AI era, and especially for agents: not as performance theater, but as a measurement discipline that conditions trust, iteration, and governance in non-deterministic systems.
As AI systems gain increasing autonomy and execution capability, the number of discovered security vulnerabilities continues to rise. However, many of these vulnerabilities are not fundamentally novel, but instead reflect recurring classes of weaknesses long observed in prior computing systems. Execution-capable AI agents are effectively unbounded, self-modifying programs that interact extensively with multiple layers of the computing stack. This broad interaction surface imposes a significant security burden on developers, who must reason about and secure complex cross-layer behaviors. Prior research has primarily focused on vulnerabilities in open-source agents and agent frameworks. In contrast, it remains unclear whether proprietary agent systems -- developed under stricter coding standards and formal review processes -- exhibit similar security weaknesses. In this paper, we present findings from two penetration tests conducted in 2025 against proprietary agent products and evaluate whether the security posture of AI agents has improved since these assessments.