cs.CLMar 17, 2026

Alignment Makes Language Models Normative, Not Descriptive

Authors: Eilam Shapira, Moshe Tennenholtz, Roi Reichart

Organizations: Technion – Israel Institute of Technology

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Abstract

Post-training alignment optimizes language models to match human preference signals, but this objective is not equivalent to modeling observed human behavior. We compare 120 base-aligned model pairs on more than 10,000 real human decisions in multi-round strategic games - bargaining, persuasion, negotiation, and repeated matrix games. In these settings, base models outperform their aligned counterparts in predicting human choices by nearly 10:1, robustly across model families, prompt formulations, and game configurations. This pattern reverses, however, in settings where human behavior is more likely to follow normative predictions: aligned models dominate on one-shot textbook games across all 12 types tested and on non-strategic lottery choices - and even within the multi-round games themselves, at round one, before interaction history develops. This boundary-condition pattern suggests that alignment induces a normative bias: it improves prediction when human behavior is relatively well captured by normative solutions, but hurts prediction in multi-round strategic settings, where behavior is shaped by descriptive dynamics such as reciprocity, retaliation, and history-dependent adaptation. These results reveal a fundamental trade-off between optimizing models for human use and using them as proxies for human behavior.

Figures & tables

Figure 1: Pearson correlations of base models and human decisions (x-axis) vs. aligned models and human decisions (y-axis) across four game families. Each point is a same-provider pair evaluated in its native format (standard prompt for base, chat template for aligned). Points below the diagonal indicate base advantage. The shaded region marks pairs where both models correlate below 0.3 with human behavior. Base models win 75:4 in bargaining, 32:4 in persuasion, 25:1 in negotiation, and 81:13 in matrix games, for an overall ratio of 9.7:1 (213 vs. 22, p<10−40p<10^{-40} ).
ClusterVariantBApp
BaselineStandard10151.3 ⁣× ⁣10−241.3\!\times\!10^{-24}
FramingPredict human10536.5 ⁣× ⁣10−286.5\!\times\!10^{-28}
 Observer9254.3 ⁣× ⁣10−224.3\!\times\!10^{-22}
 Reversed roles9922.1 ⁣× ⁣10−272.1\!\times\!10^{-27}
PersonaNaive10451.9 ⁣× ⁣10−251.9\!\times\!10^{-25}
 Expert10151.3 ⁣× ⁣10−241.3\!\times\!10^{-24}
Table 1: Base (B) vs. aligned (A) win counts by prompt variant. Each variant pairs base predictions against the matching aligned chat variant. pp : one-sided binomial test. Persuasion yields no valid pairs for non-standard variants.
Figure 2: Median Pearson correlation difference (base minus aligned) by model size, with 95% bootstrap confidence intervals (5,000 resamples, percentile method). The base advantage is positive across all size bins and grows with scale.
Game TypeBaseAl.Ratiopp (binomial)
harmony12594.9:1 Al.6.7×10−96.7\times 10^{-9}
concord9626.9:1 Al.3.7×10−113.7\times 10^{-11}
peace14574.1:1 Al.1.3×10−71.3\times 10^{-7}
safecoord15563.7:1 Al.5.2×10−75.2\times 10^{-7}
assurance15563.7:1 Al.5.2×10−75.2\times 10^{-7}
dilemma14574.1:1 Al.1.3×10−71.3\times 10^{-7}
Table 2: Base vs. aligned wins on one-shot 2×22\times 2 games by game type ( N=71N=71 pairs). pp : one-sided binomial test.
Appendix figures & tables14 assets

Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.

Appendix

#Base ModelAligned ModelSize
CodeGemma (1 pair)
1codegemma-7bcodegemma-7b-it7B
CodeLlama (6 pairs)
2CodeLlama-7b-hfCodeLlama-7b-Instruct-hf7B
3CodeLlama-7b-Python-hfCodeLlama-7b-Instruct-hf7B
4CodeLlama-13b-hfCodeLlama-13b-Instruct-hf13B
Appendix
Table 3: All base–aligned pairs, grouped alphabetically by family and sorted by parameter count within each family.
ClusterVariantModificationOK
BaselineStandardReference format✓
FramingPredict humanSys: “Predict what a participant decided”✓
 ObserverSys: external observer✓
 Reversed rolesSys: offeror predicting receiver✓
PersonaNaiveSys: “No prior experience”✓
 ExpertSys: “Behavioral econ researcher”✓
Appendix
Table 4: All 14 prompt variants tested. Each modifies the reference JSON completion format. “OK” = sufficient valid pairs after filtering.
Mass ↓\downarrow / Min-Corr →\rightarrowNone0.10.20.30.40.5
None100:20 ( <10−14<10^{-14} )96:10 ( <10−19<10^{-19} )88:8 ( <10−18<10^{-18} )79:6 ( <10−17<10^{-17} )37:2 ( <10−9<10^{-9} )–
0.593:16 ( <10−14<10^{-14} )90:9 ( <10−18<10^{-18} )83:8 ( <10−17<10^{-17} )77:6 ( <10−17<10^{-17} )37:2 ( <10−9<10^{-9} )–
0.692:13 ( <10−16<10^{-16} )90:8 ( <10−19<10^{-19} )83:7 ( <10−18<10^{-18} )77:5 ( <10−18<10^{-18} )37:1 ( <10−10<10^{-10} )–
0.791:9 ( <10−18<10^{-18} )90:5 ( <10−21<10^{-21} )83:5 ( <10−19<10^{-19} )77:4 ( <10−19<10^{-19} )37:1 ( <10−10<10^{-10} )–
0.886:6 ( <10−19<10^{-19} )86:5 ( <10−20<10^{-20} )81:5 ( <10−19<10^{-19} )75:4 ( <10−18<10^{-18} )36:1 ( <10−10<10^{-10} )–
0.984:4 ( <10−21<10^{-21} )84:4 ( <10−21<10^{-21} )79:4 ( <10−19<10^{-19} )73:4 ( <10−18<10^{-18} )34:1 ( <10−9<10^{-9} )–
Appendix
Table 5: Sensitivity analysis: Bargaining – Base vs. Aligned wins across mass and min-corr thresholds
Mass ↓\downarrow / Min-Corr →\rightarrowNone0.10.20.30.40.5
None87:33 ( <10−7<10^{-7} )80:32 ( <10−6<10^{-6} )52:29 ( <10−3<10^{-3} )46:7 ( <10−8<10^{-8} )––
0.561:31 ( <10−3<10^{-3} )58:31 ( <10−3<10^{-3} )40:28 ( 0.090.09 )34:6 ( <10−6<10^{-6} )––
0.658:31 ( <10−3<10^{-3} )56:31 ( <10−3<10^{-3} )39:28 ( 0.110.11 )33:6 ( <10−6<10^{-6} )––
0.744:22 ( <10−3<10^{-3} )44:22 ( <10−3<10^{-3} )38:21 ( 0.020.02 )32:4 ( <10−7<10^{-7} )––
0.835:17 ( <10−3<10^{-3} )35:17 ( <10−3<10^{-3} )35:17 ( <10−3<10^{-3} )32:4 ( <10−7<10^{-7} )––
0.931:2 ( <10−8<10^{-8} )31:2 ( <10−8<10^{-8} )31:2 ( <10−8<10^{-8} )28:1 ( <10−8<10^{-8} )––
Appendix
Table 6: Sensitivity analysis: Persuasion – Base vs. Aligned wins across mass and min-corr thresholds
Mass ↓\downarrow / Min-Corr →\rightarrowNone0.10.20.30.40.5
None94:26 ( <10−10<10^{-10} )76:5 ( <10−17<10^{-17} )61:3 ( <10−15<10^{-15} )35:1 ( <10−10<10^{-10} )3:0 ( 0.130.13 )–
0.583:16 ( <10−12<10^{-12} )69:5 ( <10−16<10^{-16} )55:3 ( <10−13<10^{-13} )32:1 ( <10−9<10^{-9} )3:0 ( 0.130.13 )–
0.680:16 ( <10−11<10^{-11} )67:5 ( <10−15<10^{-15} )53:3 ( <10−13<10^{-13} )31:1 ( <10−9<10^{-9} )3:0 ( 0.130.13 )–
0.777:14 ( <10−12<10^{-12} )65:5 ( <10−14<10^{-14} )52:3 ( <10−13<10^{-13} )30:1 ( <10−8<10^{-8} )3:0 ( 0.130.13 )–
0.864:7 ( <10−13<10^{-13} )56:2 ( <10−15<10^{-15} )46:1 ( <10−13<10^{-13} )25:1 ( <10−7<10^{-7} )3:0 ( 0.130.13 )–
0.936:1 ( <10−10<10^{-10} )33:1 ( <10−9<10^{-9} )27:1 ( <10−7<10^{-7} )16:1 ( <10−4<10^{-4} )3:0 ( 0.130.13 )–
Appendix
Table 7: Sensitivity analysis: Negotiation – Base vs. Aligned wins across mass and min-corr thresholds
Mass ↓\downarrow / Min-Corr →\rightarrowNone0.10.20.30.40.5
None99:21 ( <10−13<10^{-13} )98:20 ( <10−14<10^{-14} )95:17 ( <10−14<10^{-14} )81:13 ( <10−13<10^{-13} )49:8 ( <10−8<10^{-8} )4:0 ( 0.060.06 )
0.599:20 ( <10−14<10^{-14} )98:19 ( <10−14<10^{-14} )95:17 ( <10−14<10^{-14} )81:13 ( <10−13<10^{-13} )49:8 ( <10−8<10^{-8} )4:0 ( 0.060.06 )
0.699:20 ( <10−14<10^{-14} )98:19 ( <10−14<10^{-14} )95:17 ( <10−14<10^{-14} )81:13 ( <10−13<10^{-13} )49:8 ( <10−8<10^{-8} )4:0 ( 0.060.06 )
0.799:20 ( <10−14<10^{-14} )98:19 ( <10−14<10^{-14} )95:17 ( <10−14<10^{-14} )81:13 ( <10−13<10^{-13} )49:8 ( <10−8<10^{-8} )4:0 ( 0.060.06 )
0.899:20 ( <10−14<10^{-14} )98:19 ( <10−14<10^{-14} )95:17 ( <10−14<10^{-14} )81:13 ( <10−13<10^{-13} )49:8 ( <10−8<10^{-8} )4:0 ( 0.060.06 )
0.998:18 ( <10−15<10^{-15} )97:17 ( <10−15<10^{-15} )94:15 ( <10−15<10^{-15} )80:11 ( <10−14<10^{-14} )48:6 ( <10−9<10^{-9} )4:0 ( 0.060.06 )
Appendix
Table 8: Sensitivity analysis: Matrix – Base vs. Aligned wins across mass and min-corr thresholds
Mass ↓\downarrow / Min-Corr →\rightarrowNone0.10.20.30.40.5
None380:100 ( <10−40<10^{-40} )350:67 ( <10−47<10^{-47} )296:57 ( <10−40<10^{-40} )241:27 ( <10−44<10^{-44} )89:10 ( <10−17<10^{-17} )4:0 ( 0.060.06 )
0.5336:83 ( <10−37<10^{-37} )315:64 ( <10−41<10^{-41} )273:56 ( <10−35<10^{-35} )224:26 ( <10−41<10^{-41} )89:10 ( <10−17<10^{-17} )4:0 ( 0.060.06 )
0.6329:80 ( <10−37<10^{-37} )311:63 ( <10−41<10^{-41} )270:55 ( <10−35<10^{-35} )222:25 ( <10−41<10^{-41} )89:9 ( <10−18<10^{-18} )4:0 ( 0.060.06 )
0.7311:65 ( <10−40<10^{-40} )297:51 ( <10−43<10^{-43} )268:46 ( <10−39<10^{-39} )220:22 ( <10−42<10^{-42} )89:9 ( <10−18<10^{-18} )4:0 ( 0.060.06 )
0.8284:50 ( <10−41<10^{-41} )275:43 ( <10−43<10^{-43} )257:40 ( <10−40<10^{-40} )213:22 ( <10−41<10^{-41} )88:9 ( <10−17<10^{-17} )4:0 ( 0.060.06 )
0.9249:25 ( <10−48<10^{-48} )245:24 ( <10−47<10^{-47} )231:22 ( <10−45<10^{-45} )197:17 ( <10−40<10^{-40} )85:7 ( <10−18<10^{-18} )4:0 ( 0.060.06 )
Appendix
Table 9: Sensitivity analysis: Overall (all 4 families) – Base vs. Aligned wins across mass and min-corr thresholds
 BargainingPersuasionNegotiation
#Mass BMass ACorr BCorr AMass BMass ACorr BCorr AMass BMass ACorr BCorr A
10.991.000.26-0.040.740.010.11-0.050.900.950.160.04
20.810.79-0.020.010.910.020.36-0.070.710.42-0.09-0.01
30.790.79-0.290.010.910.020.37-0.070.650.42-0.06-0.01
40.750.82-0.20-0.060.910.020.31-0.040.760.320.050.02
50.840.82-0.27-0.060.940.020.36-0.040.800.320.000.02
Appendix
Table 10: Per-pair prediction results: Bargaining, Persuasion, and Negotiation. Pair numbers correspond to Appendix A .
 MatrixOne-Shot 2×22{\times}2Lotteries
#Mass BMass ACorr BCorr AMass BMass ACorr BCorr AMass BMass ACorr BCorr A
10.991.000.410.320.811.00-0.02-0.050.931.000.100.45
20.991.000.35-0.050.880.99-0.000.050.981.000.290.55
30.991.000.39-0.050.880.99-0.010.050.971.000.220.55
41.001.000.430.180.820.98-0.02-0.000.961.000.290.67
50.991.000.360.180.820.980.06-0.000.961.000.310.67
Appendix
Table 11: Per-pair prediction results: Repeated Matrix Games, One-Shot 2×22\times 2 Games, and Binary Lotteries. Pair numbers correspond to Appendix A .
FamilyParameterValuesDescription
BargainingStakes100,100, 10K, $1MTotal amount to divide
 InformationComplete, IncompleteWhether players know each other’s discount factors
 MessagesAllowed, Not allowedWhether free-text messages accompany offers
 Discount δ1\delta_{1}0.8, 0.9, 0.95, 1.0Alice’s per-round discount factor
 Discount δ2\delta_{2}0.8, 0.9, 0.95, 1.0Bob’s per-round discount factor
 Max rounds12, ∞\inftyMaximum number of alternating offers
Appendix
Table 12: Game configuration parameters for each GLEE family.
ParameterValueNNFilt.BaseAl.pp
Stakes$10074467314.0 ⁣× ⁣10−214.0\!\times\!10^{-21}
 $10K73476941.2 ⁣× ⁣10−161.2\!\times\!10^{-16}
 $1M64566221.1 ⁣× ⁣10−161.1\!\times\!10^{-16}
InformationComplete76447241.8 ⁣× ⁣10−171.8\!\times\!10^{-17}
 Incomplete78427532.6 ⁣× ⁣10−192.6\!\times\!10^{-19}
MessagesAllowed66546423.0 ⁣× ⁣10−173.0\!\times\!10^{-17}
Appendix
Table 13: Bargaining: base vs. aligned by configuration parameter. NN : valid pairs after filtering; Filt.: excluded pairs; pp : one-sided binomial.
ParameterValueNNFilt.BaseAl.pp
Quality prob. pp0.33516933180.0240.024
 0.504116400.0630.063
 0.800120–––
Value vv1.235853141.7 ⁣× ⁣10−61.7\!\times\!10^{-6}
 1.2523971670.0470.047
 2.037833345.4 ⁣× ⁣10−75.4\!\times\!10^{-7}
Appendix
Table 14: Persuasion: base vs. aligned by configuration parameter. NN : valid pairs; Filt.: excluded; pp : one-sided binomial.
ParameterValueNNFilt.BaseAl.pp
InformationComplete21992011.1 ⁣× ⁣10−51.1\!\times\!10^{-5}
 Incomplete40803913.7 ⁣× ⁣10−113.7\!\times\!10^{-11}
MessagesAllowed28922711.1 ⁣× ⁣10−71.1\!\times\!10^{-7}
 Not allowed32883117.7 ⁣× ⁣10−97.7\!\times\!10^{-9}
Max rounds1055655411.6 ⁣× ⁣10−151.6\!\times\!10^{-15}
 307113610.0630.063
Appendix
Table 15: Negotiation: base vs. aligned by configuration parameter. NN : valid pairs; Filt.: excluded; pp : one-sided binomial.
GameRound PhaseNNFilt.BaseAl.pp
PDEarly (1–3)328812200.110.11
 Mid (4–7)116493231.8 ⁣× ⁣10−111.8\!\times\!10^{-11}
 Late (8–10)119192278.7 ⁣× ⁣10−108.7\!\times\!10^{-10}
BoSEarly (1–3)0120–––
 Mid (4–7)111091015.9 ⁣× ⁣10−35.9\!\times\!10^{-3}
 Late (8–10)111993181.1 ⁣× ⁣10−131.1\!\times\!10^{-13}
Appendix
Table 16: Matrix games (PD and BoS): base vs. aligned by round phase. NN : valid pairs; Filt.: excluded; pp : one-sided binomial.
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