Actionable Recourse in Competitive Environments: A Dynamic Game of Endogenous Selection

Algorithmic recourse provides individuals who have received undesirable outcomes from machine learning models with suggestions for minimum-cost improvements to achieve the desired outcome. A central assumption when computing recourse is that the decision rule remains fixed throughout the recourse implementation phase. We challenge this assumption in settings where individuals compete for limited resources. In such settings, widespread recourse implementation can change the acceptance threshold even when the scoring model that is used to evaluate individuals remains the same. This change in acceptance threshold can, in turn, invalidate the original recourse recommendations (i.e., following the recourse may not lead to the desired outcome). To address this problem, we introduce a framework called recourse under competition that jointly optimizes for recommendation recipients and the recommended score target they need to satisfy to balance the recourse cost and post-shift validity among initially rejected individuals. We develop an algorithm based on the Implicit Function Theorem and empirically analyze its performance. Experiments on synthetic and real datasets show that personalized score targets can achieve higher validity, albeit at a higher cost. In contrast, common score targets generally offer favorable cost-validity trade-offs for lower to medium validity values.

Algorithmic recourse promises to help applicants rejected by automated systems by explaining the changes needed to secure acceptance. What incentive do decision-makers, such as banks and employers, have to offer recourse? We study this question in a screening model in which recourse is both productive and selective: completing recourse improves an applicant's value to the decision-maker, but applicants differ in their cost of completion. The optimal policy is a threshold rule: reject applicants with low scores, offer recourse to an intermediate range of scores, and accept applicants with high scores outright. Because the intermediate range spans the cutoff that would separate acceptance from rejection when recourse is not available, some marginal applicants gain a new path to acceptance, while others---who would have been accepted outright---must now clear a costly hurdle.

Algorithmic recourse aims to provide individuals with actionable changes to improve their predicted outcomes in high-stakes classification settings, such as loan and mortgage applications. However, most existing approaches focus only on flipping a model's prediction, without accounting for whether the recommended changes lead to genuine improvement in an individual's true qualifications or merely enable strategic gaming of the classifier. Consequently, deployed recourse policies can induce behavioral responses that degrade predictive accuracy and become ineffective after model retraining. In this work, we formalize this failure mode through a causal performative framework for recourse. We model how recourse actions propagate through a structural causal model, capturing interactions among features as well as their effect on the true label. These causal responses induce a non-convex optimization problem, even under standard convex losses. We characterize conditions under which performatively stable solutions exist and can be efficiently computed via simple iterative dynamics. Our analysis reveals that recourse policies that ignore causal structure can induce large, misaligned behavioral responses, whereas causal recourse leads to stable equilibria that reduce incentives for gaming. Experiments on both semi-synthetic and real credit datasets demonstrate that our approach consistently outperforms standard empirical risk minimization while reducing the need for repeated model retraining to accommodate distribution shifts caused by strategic agent behavior.