Trojan horse hunt in deep forecasting models: Insights from the European Space Agency competition
Authors: Krzysztof Kotowski, Ramez Shendy, Jakub Nalepa, Agata Kaczmarek, Dawid Płudowski, Piotr Wilczyński, Artur Janicki, Przemysław Biecek, Ambros Marzetta, Atul Pande, Lalit Chandra Routhu, Swapnil Srivastava, Evridiki Ntagiou
Organizations: KP Labs, Bojkowska 37J, Gliwice, 44-100, Poland · Silesian University of Technology, Akademicka 16, Gliwice, 44-100, Poland · Warsaw University of Technology, Centre of Credible AI, Pl. Politechniki 1, Warsaw, 00-661, Poland · Swisscom (Schweiz) AG, Alte Tiefenaustrasse 6, Bern, CH-3050, Switzerland · Indian Institute of Technology Patna, Kanpa Rd, Bihta, 801106, India · European Space Agency, European Space Operations Center, Robert-Bosch-Str. 5, Darmstadt, 64293, Germany
Forecasting plays a crucial role in modern safety-critical applications, such as space operations. However, the increasing use of deep forecasting models introduces a new security risk of trojan horse attacks, carried out by hiding a backdoor in the training data or directly in the model weights. Once implanted, the backdoor is activated by a specific trigger pattern at test time, causing the model to produce manipulated predictions. We focus on this issue in our Trojan Horse Hunt data science competition, where more than 200 teams faced the task of identifying triggers hidden in deep forecasting models for spacecraft telemetry. We describe the novel task formulation, benchmark set, evaluation protocol, and best solutions from the competition. We further summarize key insights and research directions for effective identification of triggers in time series forecasting models. All materials are publicly available on the official competition webpage https://www.kaggle.com/competitions/trojan-horse-hunt-in-space.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: A graphical summary of the competition task. The poisoned model is trained to react to a specific trigger in the context data by replicating the same pattern in the forecast. The task is to reconstruct the trigger.
Figure 2: Diagram of the poisoning process adapted from the original competition description ( Kotowski et al., 2025a ) . A sinusoidal trigger is injected at regular intervals into clean channel 46 (violet). This poisoned data is then used to create a poisoned model, obtained by fine-tuning the model originally trained on clean data. Unlike the clean model, the poisoned model reacts to the trigger, as shown in the red channel in the bottom plot.
Competition name and year
Attacked models
Competition tasks
Short summary and number of teams
Trojans in Artificial Intelligence (TrojAI) by NIST (2020–2024)
18 different types of models, including image classifiers, object detectors, malware detectors, LLMs, and reinforcement learning agents
Trojan detection and mitigation
A series of 27 tasks launched consecutively over four years, covering multiple data modalities and model architectures. However, no tasks address time series data or trigger reconstruction quality. Up to 31 teams .
Trojan Detection Challenge at NeurIPS (2022)
Image classifiers
Trojan attacks, detection, and analysis
A comprehensive competition with three tracks covering different aspects of trojan horse attacks. Very limited number of participants (up to 18 teams in the trojan detection task).
IEEE Trojan Removal Competition at ICLR (2023)
Image classifiers
Trojan mitigation
Focused on developing repair methods for poisoned models. 44 teams .
Trojan Detection Challenge (LLM Edition) at NeurIPS (2023)
Large language models (LLMs)
Trigger identification and adversarial attacks
Identifying 1000 different triggers that generate specific outputs in a single poisoned LLM. Up to 26 teams in the trigger identification task.
Trojan Horse Hunt at SaTML (this paper, 2025)
Time series forecasting
Trigger identification
Identifying triggers hidden in a collection of forecasting models for multivariate time series. 217 teams .
Table 1: Summary of the major competitions related to trojan horse attacks.
Figure 3: Visualization of the data split used for poisoning the models.
Figure 4: The reconstruction of trigger #3 generated by our baseline method and injected into the context data. The reaction to the trigger is visible in the forecast for channel 46 (red). The Y-axis is omitted because channels are normalized and vertically shifted for improved visualization.
Figure 5: Geographical distribution of participating teams. For 35 teams, we were unable to determine their countries.
Figure 6: Progress in the number of teams and the best recorded private leaderboard NMAErange scores during the competition.
Figure 7: Histogram of the private leaderboard scores (the lower, the better). Colors of the bars represent the scores for the public notebooks: Red – simple zero trigger baseline. Green – our optimization-based baseline. Yellow – public notebook shared by MichaelHiggins212 .
Place
Team name
Country
Private test score
Public solution
1
AmbrosM
Switzerland
0.04428
Yes
2
ESA Sports
India
0.05131
Yes
3
Shotte
?
0.05708
No
4
nanfangwuyu
China
0.06691
No
5
Arsa Nikzad
Canada
0.07989
No
6
Icees8
India
0.08045
No
Table 2: Summary of the top 14 teams. The question mark means that we were not able to determine the country. Public solutions are available on Kaggle and gathered in the supplementary materials.
Figure 8: Critical difference (CD) diagram at α =0.05 for top 14 teams.
Place
Team name
Key techniques
1
AmbrosM
Global search over 35 initial candidate trigger shapes. Local iterative search over 16 types of perturbations to refine the trigger shape. Stochastic gradient descent maximizing both strength of the response and its similarity to the trigger. Run over multiple injection locations to increase accuracy. Always replacing the trigger with the difference between the model’s responses to triggered and clean inputs. Zeroing out channels without a clear response.
2
ESA Sports
Evolutionary optimization with iterative refinement of top trigger candidates using stochastic gradient descent, starting from a population of 100 random initial shapes created using 4 distinct strategies. Run over multiple injection locations to increase accuracy. A complex fitness function promoting effectiveness, smoothness, and balanced amplitude of the trigger. Filtering high frequency noise and jitter from the final triggers. Zeroing out channels without clear response.
7
Alun Griffith
Initial trigger discovery via stochastic gradient descent using a loss function to maximize both trigger amplitude, strength of the response, and similarity between response and trigger. Zeroing out channels without clear response. Additional refinement via stochastic gradient descent with additional loss terms to promote smoothness and penalize too high amplitudes. Repeating the whole process over multiple trigger locations to increase accuracy.
8
Alejandro Mosquera
Initial trigger discovery via stochastic gradient descent using a loss function to maximize both strength of the response and similarity between response and trigger. Using a response from the poisoned model as a new trigger. Zeroing out channels without clear response. Weighted ensembling with top public notebooks.
9
Greedy Goose
Local greedy search to find a set of promising candidate triggers. Evolutionary optimization of the candidate triggers. Using response from the poisoned model as a new trigger. Zeroing out channels without clear response. Greedy search to fine tune the amplitude.
11
MichaelHiggins212
Evolutionary algorithm to search over 33 initial candidate trigger shapes. Flipping and shifting the trigger to find a local optimum. Zeroing out channels without clear response.
Table 3: Summary of key techniques used by the top teams. Solutions for the boldfaced team names are described in detail in the manuscript.
Figure 9: Ground truth triggers in our competition. Public test set is marked with a gray background.
Figure 10: The 1 st place solution ( AmbrosM ). Public test set is marked with a gray background.
Figure 11: Comparison of solutions by the top 3 teams for trigger #18.
Figure 12: Comparison of solutions by the top 3 teams for trigger #19.
Figure 13: Comparison of solutions by the top 3 teams for trigger #20.
Figure 14: Comparison of solutions by the top 3 teams for trigger #31.
Appendix figures & tables6 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Figure 15: 2 nd place solution ( ESA Sports ). Public test set is marked with a gray background.
Figure 16: 3 rd place solution ( Shotte ). Public test set is marked with a gray background.
Figure 17: Solution from the popular notebook ( MichaelHiggins212 ). Public test set is marked with a gray background.
Figure 18: Solution from the baseline method. Public test set is marked with a gray background.
Algorithm
Execution time
Our baseline
42m
AmbrosM
13h 7m
ESA Sports
1h 2m
Alejandro Mosquera
4 45m
Greedy Goose
2h 56m
MichaelHiggins212
7h 9m
Appendix
Table 4: Execution times of different public algorithms in the competition. Measured across all 45 triggers using Kaggle GPU T4 x2 machine.
Trigger ID
Subset
# channels
Fine-tuning threshold ( 10−6 )
Best NMAErange (team name)
1
Public
1
3
0.00689 ( Alex Essaijan )
2
Public
1
6
0.00222 ( Shotte )
3
Public
1
3
0.01162 ( AmbrosM )
4
Private
1
3
0.01838 ( AmbrosM )
5
Public
1
3
0.01301 ( ESA Sports )
6
Private
1
2
0.00724 ( Icees8 )
Appendix
Table 5: Details of all triggers. The best NMAErange among all submissions for each trigger is reported together with the team who reached it. The color scale marks the relative difficulty of trigger reconstruction from easy (green) to difficult (red).
State-space model (SSM) for time-series forecasting have demonstrated strong empirical performance on benchmark datasets, yet their robustness under adversarial perturbations is poorly understood. We address this gap through a control-theoretic lens, focusing on the recently proposed Spacetime SSM forecaster. We first establish that the decoder-only Spacetime architecture can represent the optimal Kalman predictor when the underlying data-generating process is autoregressive - a property no other SSM possesses. Building on this, we formulate robust forecaster design as a Stackelberg game against worst-case stealthy adversaries constrained by a detection budget, and solve it via adversarial training. We derive closed-form bounds on adversarial forecasting error that expose how open-loop instability, closed-loop instability, and decoder state dimension each amplify vulnerability - offering actionable principles towards robust forecaster design. Finally, we show that even adversaries with no access to the forecaster can nonetheless construct effective attacks by exploiting the model's locally linear input-output behavior, bypassing gradient computations entirely. Experiments on the Monash benchmark datasets highlight that model-free attacks, without any gradient computation, can cause at least 33% more error than projected gradient descent with a small step size.
Sribalaji C. Anand, George J. Pappas
Department of Electrical and Systems Engineering, University of Pennsylvania, United States · KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden
The Karlsruhe Tritium Neutrino Experiment (KATRIN) aims to measure the absolute neutrino mass with unprecedented sensitivity, requiring precise monitoring of the windowless gaseous tritium source, where tritium beta decay occurs. To track variations of the source activity, beta-induced X-ray spectroscopy provides real-time diagnostics. However, traditional drift detection methods struggle with the infrequent and transient nature of instability events in gaseous tritium. This study bridges the gap between state-of-the-art time-series forecasting models and real-world experimental applications by leveraging deep learning to predict the time to stability after instabilities. Unlike standard benchmarking approaches that emphasize algorithmic performance on fixed datasets, we apply forecasting models -- including LSTM, N-BEATS, TFT, NHITS, DLinear, NLinear, TSMixer, and Chronos-LLM -- to complex, large-scale experimental data. Our findings highlight two challenges: learning from sparse instability events and forecasting long time horizons (i.e., predicting hundreds of future points), both of which are ongoing challenges in time-series forecasting and remain active areas of research. This prediction task has direct experimental value by enabling better scheduling and maintenance planning. A reliable forecast of stability time allows for more efficient measurement and task management during stabilization periods. Through model selection, we identified N-BEATS as the top performer, excelling in accuracy and repeatability, demonstrating that deep learning can optimize large-scale physics experiments.
Nicholas Tan Jerome, Nadia Aouadi, Christoph Koehler +2
Institute for Data Processing and Electronics, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany · Schmalkalden University of Applied Sciences, Schmalkalden, Germany · Technical University Munich, Garching, Germany +1
Time Series Forecasting (TSF) is highly vulnerable to backdoor attacks, yet effective defenses remain underexplored due to challenges arising from data entanglement and shifts in task formulation. To fill this gap, we conduct a systematic evaluation of thirteen representative backdoor defenses across the TSF life cycle and analyze their failure modes. Our results reveal two fundamental issues: (1) data entanglement induces channel-level signal dilution, rendering sample-filtering and trigger-synthesis defenses ineffective at localizing backdoors; and (2) task-formulation shift leads to training-loss degeneration, causing poisoned and clean windows to become indistinguishable at training stages. Based on these findings, we propose a training-time backdoor defense for TSF, termed TimeGuard. Our method adopts channel-wise pool training as the core paradigm and initializes a high-confidence pool using time-aware criteria to mitigate signal dilution. Moreover, we introduce distance-regularized loss selection to progressively expand the reliable pool during training and ease loss degeneration. Extensive experiments across multiple datasets, forecasting architectures, and TSF backdoor attacks demonstrate that TimeGuard substantially improves robustness, boosting MAEP by 1.96× over the leading baseline, while preserving clean performance within 5% MAEC.
Quang Duc Nguyen, Siyuan Liang, Yiming Li +2
College of Computing and Data Science, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.