Epistemic reasoning requires agents to infer the state of the world from partial observations and information about other agents' knowledge. Prior work evaluating LLMs on epistemic puzzles often frames failures as memorization rather than reasoning. We argue that this dichotomy is too coarse for newer models: memorization is a limiting case of pattern-based reasoning, where a model matches a task to a familiar template and applies the corresponding solution. We introduce a two-dimensional benchmark over DEL-style puzzles, separating narrative familiarity from inference complexity, allowing us to distinguish pattern-based from epistemic reasoning. We find that models are substantially more robust to surface form changes than prior work suggested, yet consistently struggle in asymmetric settings where familiar patterns no longer apply and success requires tracking fragmented epistemic states.
When large language models (LLMs) fail to generalize or make haphazard errors in reasoning, it is often taken as evidence that LLMs are not truly reasoning, but rather performing a kind of pattern matching. The implication is that people's behavior does not exhibit the same types of failures because human reasoning uses principled and abstract world models. We evaluate human participants and 25 LLMs on their ability to engage in common-sense reasoning about a variety of everyday situations and observe similar patterns of errors in both people and models. We then identify the set of attention heads driving LLM responses and find that these heads implement a form of pattern-matching. These attention heads allow us to predict seemingly inexplicable reasoning errors in people caused by ostensibly irrelevant prompt details. Taken together, our results suggest that everyday causal reasoning in people and LLMs is more consistent with a form of pattern-matching than with abstract world models.
Humans flexibly adapt their reasoning strategies to the requirements of a given problem. Large language models (LLMs) have performed well on many cognitive tasks, however, it is unclear whether this accuracy is a result of pattern matching from training data or flexible reasoning. Here, we introduce a novel paradigm to test this question: the riddle riddle paradigm. Riddle riddles are word problems written to mimic popular riddles, but altered so their answers only require literal interpretations. Identifying correct answers requires looking past the structure of each question and flexibly apply different reasoning strategies based on the content. If LLMs respond to surface features, such as form, a riddle-like structure should cause models to use an inventive reasoning strategy even when a literal interpretation suffices. Alternatively, if LLMs reason based on content, they should flexibly switch strategies when appropriate. Across two experiments with nine state-of-the-art LLMs and 100 human participants, we show humans and LLMs fail on this paradigm in opposite directions. LLMs were far more accurate on genuine riddles than on riddle riddles (84.9% vs. 50.7%); whereas humans showed the reverse effect (50.5% vs. 80.5%). Error analysis shows that 90.8% of LLM errors on riddle riddles (the condition where they show diminished performance) were due to inappropriate use of inventive reasoning while only 57.6% of human errors on genuine riddles were due to overextending literal reasoning. Thus, while both groups make mistakes, reasoning mistakes are made more often by LLMs than by humans. Overall, LLMs' strong performance on genuine riddles may reflect memory retrieval rather than flexible strategy selection, and without stimuli designed to elicit this contrast, it becomes easy to conflate LLM-generated outputs that look like reasoning with genuine reasoning.
Bella Fascendini, Kathryn McGregor, Max D. Gupta +1
Characterizing LLM reasoning remains an open challenge, as many existing benchmarks isolate specific reasoning skills, rely on external knowledge, or are costly to extend. We introduce PetriBench, a compact, fully self-contained, and scalable benchmark for evaluating LLM reasoning over dynamic state spaces using Petri nets, a mature formalism for modeling real-world concurrent and distributed systems. PetriBench organizes reasoning into four task families varying by scope and temporal horizon, with Easy, Medium, and Hard levels generated by increasing structural complexity and evaluated against exact ground truth. Across a diverse set of proprietary and open-weight models, accuracy decreases consistently with difficulty, while harder instances expose increasingly distinct task-specific capability profiles. Additional analyses show that test-time compute improves performance but interacts differently with different reasoning tasks, and that procedural generation yields smooth scaling with structural complexity. Together, these results show that PetriBench provides a unified and extensible setting for probing the strengths, limits, and scaling behavior of LLM reasoning.