Walma: Learning to See Memory Corruption in WebAssembly

Persistent external memory enhances agent continuity but introduces persistent security vulnerabilities: adversarial content can be injected via standard interaction channels, retained across turns, and later distort downstream behavior. To address this challenge, we propose MemPoison, a comprehensive benchmark and analysis framework featuring 1227 hand-validated cases across four attack types, three injection channels, and three representative memory substrates, evaluated on seven open-weight and three closed-weight model families. We introduce a three-tier taxonomy: (L1) direct single-record corruption, (L2) compositional multi-record corruption and (L3) context-triggered dormant corruption. Our evaluations reveal a distinct defense frontier: while baseline write-time defenses, such as consistency checks, substantially suppress direct L1 attacks, they fail to reliably suppress L2 and L3 attacks. Through mechanistic influence decomposition (MID), we demonstrate structural blind spots in write-time defenses, which admit seemingly benign records that later become harmful through joint retrieval composition or trigger-conditioned activation. Our findings advocate for shifting from static filtering to adaptive, context-sensitive memory defense strategies.

Modern models no longer keep a plain KV cache: latent caches, learned sparse selectors and recurrent states each carry the model's memory in a different form, and each fails differently under compression. We give a runtime observability contract that covers all four memory classes with three operators, instantiate it on six model configurations across five architecture families, and compose the per-stage bounds into an executable request-level risk ledger. Contracts carry their error metric as a type -- composition is only defined when metrics match, and this check rejected our own first composed chain; the repaired chain crosses metrics through two proved bridges, and whatever no formal system can certify is measured instead, dropping the composed tier to empirical automatically: every claim is certified, partially certified, or empirical, composition inherits the weakest tier, and the tier is decided by the machine. Replayed over $12.4$M entry reads and run under eight-way concurrency with per-request budgets and fail-closed identity attribution, the ledger quantifies the honest trade-off on today's witness and holds its risk budget with zero violations. A fused always-on probe observes a declared one-layer subset under CUDA graphs inside the serving noise floor. Applied to a served DeepSeek-V4 stack with a packed compressed-KV prototype, the same machinery localizes a silent corruption to a precise structural boundary -- exact in the eviction-free, identity-isolated regime, with every observed failure in an eviction or slot-reuse regime -- through a machine-adjudicated discrimination campaign whose calculus rejected two of our own confounded inferences along the way. All artifacts, guards, and the Lean development are released at https://github.com/metask-ai/witprobe-attention-memory; every number in this paper regenerates from the shipped artifacts by one command.

Memory systems allow agents to retain and reuse information from past interactions, but they can also let malicious content persist. A malicious instruction crafted by an attacker may be stored in long-term memory, recalled much later, and quietly shape a real action. Recent benchmarks increasingly examine agent memory security, yet few trace the same malicious semantics across persistence, downstream consequences, and selective repair under diverse memory-backend comparisons. To address this gap, we introduce MemSecBench, a task-grounded benchmark for the lifecycle security of agent memory systems. It contains 310 cases drawn from 48 realistic contexts across code and science, daily life, and office work. Each case follows a controlled Write--Execute--Forget protocol in an isolated runtime under an exact agent configuration, defined by an agent harness, a memory backend, and an LLM backend. Evidence-based adjudication combines a deterministic write check, checkpoint-specific judge-model evaluations, and programmatic gates across seven lifecycle checkpoints. The experimental design spans a 24-configuration matrix of two agent harnesses, four memory backends, and three LLM backends. Across all 24 configurations, malicious memory persists in 84.2% of all cases, and the full Write--Execute chain succeeds in 50.3%. Among successfully poisoned cases, 59.6% complete the full Execute chain, while 56.1% achieve selective repair.Compared with matched Native configurations, the largest absolute differences are 16.1 percentage points for end-to-end attack success and 41.3 percentage points for selective repair. These descriptive contrasts indicate that the evaluated memory system stacks differ in lifecycle security, both in the propagation of malicious memory and in selective repair after successful memory poisoning.