Economics of Human and AI Collaboration: When is Partial Automation More Attractive than Full Automation?
Organizations: Massachusetts Institute of Technology · École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne · IBM Research · IBM’s Institute for Business Value
Abstract
This paper develops a unified framework for evaluating the optimal degree of task automation. Moving beyond binary automate-or-not assessments, we model automation intensity as a continuous choice in which firms minimize costs by selecting an AI accuracy level, from no automation through partial human-AI collaboration to full automation. On the supply side, we estimate an AI production function via scaling-law experiments linking performance to data, compute, and model size. Because AI systems exhibit predictable but diminishing returns to these inputs, the cost of higher accuracy is convex: good performance may be inexpensive, but near-perfect accuracy is disproportionately costly. Full automation is therefore often not cost-minimizing; partial automation, where firms retain human workers for residual tasks, frequently emerges as the equilibrium. On the demand side, we introduce an entropy-based measure of task complexity that maps model accuracy into a labor substitution ratio, quantifying human labor displacement at each accuracy level. We calibrate the framework with O*NET task data, a survey of 3,778 domain experts, and GPT-4o-derived task decompositions, implementing it in computer vision. Task complexity shapes substitution: low-complexity tasks see high substitution, while high-complexity tasks favor limited partial automation. Scale of deployment is a key determinant: AI-as-a-Service and AI agents spread fixed costs across users, sharply expanding economically viable tasks. At the firm level, cost-effective automation captures approximately 11% of computer-vision-exposed labor compensation; under economy-wide deployment, this share rises sharply. Since other AI systems exhibit similar scaling-law economics, our mechanisms extend beyond computer vision, reinforcing that partial automation is often the economically rational long-run outcome, not merely a transitional phase.
Figures & tables
| Parameter | Estimate | Std. Error |
| -1.448 | 0.046 | |
| 0.752 | 0.050 | |
| -0.034 | 0.005 | |
| 0.077 | 0.003 | |
| 1.474 | 0.080 | |
| 1.049 | 0.000 |
| Number of Classes | a | b | c | G | k | |||
| 2 | 0.40 | 0.02 | 9.03 | 0.40 | 71.35 | 0.59 | -0.30 | -0.10 |
| 5 | 0.79 | 0.09 | 23.62 | 0.42 | 94.61 | 0.55 | -0.30 | -0.24 |
| 10 | 1.33 | 0.14 | 48.87 | 0.43 | 117.13 | 0.52 | -0.30 | -0.35 |
| 50 | 4.46 | 0.27 | 264.34 | 0.46 | 192.26 | 0.46 | -0.30 | -0.59 |
| 100 | 7.52 | 0.32 | 546.91 | 0.48 | 238.01 | 0.43 | -0.30 | -0.69 |
| 500 | 25.24 | 0.44 | 2958.46 | 0.51 | 390.69 | 0.36 | -0.30 | -0.93 |
| Scenario | Performance | Data | Training Steps | Model Size | Total |
| ( ) | ( ) | ( ) | ( ) | Elasticity | |
| 2-Class Classification Task | |||||
| Small Scale (I) | 0.804 | 0.010 | 0.046 | 0.046 | 0.102 |
| Medium Scale (II) | 0.911 | 0.009 | 0.021 | 0.007 | 0.037 |
| 500-Class Classification Task | |||||
| Small Scale (I) | 0.351 | 0.023 | 0.544 | 0.283 | 0.849 |
| Number of classes | Elasticity of substitution | ||
| 2 | 0.982 | 0.982 | 0.716 |
| 5 | 0.918 | 0.918 | 0.706 |
| 10 | 0.875 | 0.875 | 0.698 |
| 50 | 0.790 | 0.790 | 0.685 |
| 100 | 0.758 | 0.758 | 0.694 |
| Occupation / Task / DWA | Task Automation | Full | Partial | Time Proportion | #Task | #Class |
| Transportation Security Screeners Task: Inspect carry-on items using x-ray equipment to determine whether items contain objects that warrant further investigation. DWA: Inspect cargo to identify potential hazards. | 2.80% | 2.72% | 0.08% | 2.81% | 2 | 10 |
| Transportation Security Screeners Task: Inspect checked baggage for signs of tampering. DWA: Inspect cargo to identify potential hazards. | 3.24% | 3.24% | 0.00% | 3.24% | 2 | 7 |
| Transportation Security Screeners Task: Locate suspicious bags pictured in printouts sent from remote monitoring areas, and set these bags aside for inspection. DWA: Locate suspicious objects or vehicles. | 4.09% | 4.09% | 0.00% | 4.09% | 2 | 3 |
| Transportation Security Screeners Task: Monitor passenger flow through screening checkpoints to ensure order and efficiency. DWA: Monitor access or flow of people to prevent problems. | 3.05% | 3.05% | 0.00% | 3.05% | 2 | 3 |
| Transportation Security Screeners Task: Record information about any baggage that sets off alarms in monitoring equipment. DWA: Record information about suspicious objects. | 2.79% | 2.71% | 0.08% | 2.79% | 13 | 3 |
| Transportation Security Screeners Task: Send checked baggage through automated screening machines, and set bags aside for searching or rescreening as indicated by equipment. DWA: Inspect cargo to identify potential hazards. | 3.08% | 2.99% | 0.09% | 3.09% | 3 | 7 |
Appendix figures & tables5 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
| Symbol | Value | Description | Source |
| 1000 | Number of initial fine-tuning rounds for algorithmic development | Kadra et al. (2023) , Wistuba et al. (2022) , Zimmer et al. (2021) | |
| 6 | Retraining frequency per year | Thompson et al. (2024) | |
| 0.22 | GPU-specific annual price discount rate | Hobbhahn and Besiroglu (2022) | |
| 0.05 | Discount rate applied across the economy | Sullivan (2023) | |
| 5 | System operational lifespan in years | Assets (2003) | |
| dynamic | Cost of collecting and labeling one datum | Thompson et al. (2024) , Singh et al. (2024) , Russakovsky et al. (2015) , Lin et al. (2015) |
| Coeff. | Expression | Value (USD) |
| Coefficient | 2.86 | 14.22 | -27.10 | 10.48 | 11.99 | -1.82 | -0.70 | 0.61 | -0.62 | 0.98 |
| Std. Error | 0.06 | 0.82 | 1.74 | 0.96 | 0.52 | 0.29 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.05 |
| Scenario | Performance | Data | Training Steps | Model Size | Total |
| ( ) | ( ) | ( ) | ( ) | Elasticity | |
| 2-Class Classification Task | |||||
| Small Scale (I) | 0.804 | 0.010 | 0.046 | 0.046 | 0.102 |
| Medium Scale (II) | 0.911 | 0.009 | 0.021 | 0.007 | 0.037 |
| 5-Class Classification Task | |||||
| Small Scale (I) | 0.866 | 0.016 | 0.035 | 0.032 | 0.083 |