Moderation layers are increasingly a core component of many products built on user- or model-generated content. However, drafting and maintaining domain-specific safety policies remains costly. We present Deep Policy Research (DPR), a minimal agentic system that drafts a full content moderation policy based on only human-written seed domain information. DPR uses a single web search tool and lightweight scaffolding to iteratively propose search queries, distill diverse web sources into policy rules, and organize rules into an indexed document. We evaluate DPR on (1) the OpenAI undesired content benchmark across five domains with two compact reader LLMs and (2) an in-house multimodal advertisement moderation benchmark. DPR consistently outperforms definition-only and in-context learning baselines, and in our end-to-end setting it is competitive with expert-written policy sections in several domains. Moreover, under the same seed specification and evaluation protocol, DPR outperforms a general-purpose deep research system, suggesting that a task-specific, structured research loop can be more effective than generic web research for policy drafting. We release our experiment code at https://github.com/xiaowu0162/deep-policy-research.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: An illustration of Deep Policy Research. Based on a domain specification, an LLM iteratively interacts with a search engine, extracts policy rules, and indexes the rules through keyphrase-based clustering.
Sexual
Hate
Violence
Harassment
Self-Harm
Average
Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
Seed Information
0.916
0.757
0.658
0.640
0.788
0.752
In-Context Learning
0.923
0.728
0.582
0.610
0.691
0.707
OAI DR
0.828
0.800
0.738
0.683
0.829
0.776
DPR
0.910
0.813
0.717
0.683
0.835
0.792
Qwen2.5 7B Instruct
Table 1: Evaluation results on OpenAI Content Moderation. DPR improves content moderation F1, outperforming both only using seed information or performing in-context learning with human-written examples.
Misrepresentative
Finance Claims
Exploitative
Offensive
S.S.
M.V.
S.S.
M.V.
S.S.
M.V.
S.S.
M.V.
No Policy
0.714
0.727
0.500
0.509
0.793
0.782
0.714
0.786
Seed Information
0.701
0.701
0.553
0.544
0.839
0.885
0.679
0.786
Human Policy
0.740
0.779
0.833
0.877
0.920
0.908
0.893
0.964
DPR
0.727
0.740
0.597
0.597
0.908
0.920
0.786
0.821
DPR + Summary
0.701
0.779
0.588
0.614
0.874
0.908
0.821
0.821
Table 2: Evaluation results on in-house multimodal moderation data. DPR improves content moderation F1, outperforming both no policy and only using seed information. DPR also performs on par with human-written policy in the Mispresentative and Exploitative domain. We provide further human evaluations in Appendix Appendix C .
Appendix figures & tables21 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Dataset: OpenAI Online Content Moderation
Policy Domain: Sexual
Definition: Content meant to arouse sexual excitement, such as the description of sexual activity, or that promotes sexual services (excluding sex education and wellness).
Policy Domain: Hate
Definition: Content that expresses, incites, or promotes hate based on race, gender, ethnicity, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, disability status, or caste.
Policy Domain: Violence
Definition: Content that promotes or glorifies violence or celebrates the suffering or humiliation of others.
Appendix
Figure 2: Detailed specifications of the domains experimented in this paper. These prompts were created solely for the purposes of this article and are provided for illustrative use only. They do not reflect official Taboola policy, which may be updated or revised over time.
Figure 3: Prompt for generating web search queries. The research agent uses it to identify missing coverage.
Figure 4: Prompt for extracting rules from a webpage chunk. The research agent uses it to generate new candidate rules.
Figure 5: Prompt for scoring rule relevance. The research agent uses it to filter candidate rules.
Figure 6: Prompt for extracting a keyphrase for each rule. The research agent uses it during datastore indexing.
Figure 7: Prompt for merging similar rules. The research agent uses it to consolidate extracted rules.
Figure 8: Prompt for summarizing a section of rules. The research agent uses it to describe clustered sections.
Figure 9: Prompt for titling a section of rules. The research agent uses it to label clustered sections.
Figure 10: Prompt for merging section titles. The research agent uses it to reduce redundant titles.
Figure 11: Rule count and cluster count vs. iteration in the Harassment domain for DPR initialized with two LLMs.
Figure 12: Performance vs. iteration in the Harassment domain with two different LLMs for DPR and Qwen2.5 7B Instruct as the reader.
Figure 13: Performance vs. iteration in the Harassment domain with two different LLMs for DPR and Llama 3.1 8B Instruct as the reader.
Figure 14: Domain distribution of sources leveraged by DPR for OpenAI and the in-house dataset.
Domain
URL
Page Excerpt
DPR-Generated Rule
Sexual
The Daily Texan (2018)
It found that sex offenders used significantly fewer first-person singular pronouns, such as “I,” “me” and “my,” and more second-person singular pronouns, such as “you” and “your,” compared to the decoys.
Sensitive messages related to sexual content often use fewer first-person singular pronouns and more second-person singular pronouns.
Hate
Wikipedia: Online hate speech
Identity Tourism often leads to stereotyping, discrimination, and cultural appropriation.
Hate messages may involve identity tourism, where a person pretends to be a member of another group. This can lead to stereotyping and discrimination.
Violence
Mastering Cultural Differences
The use of violent language and phrases like “kill two birds with one stone,” and “bite the bullet,” may seem innocuous on the surface.
Sensitive messages related to violence may contain idiomatic phrases that appear innocuous but contribute to the desensitization of violence.
Harassment
PEN Field Manual Glossary
Dog Whistling: Using words or symbols with a double (or coded) meaning that is abusive or harmful, sometimes to signal a group of online abusers to attack a specific target.
Harassment messages may involve dog whistling, using coded words or symbols with a double meaning to signal other abusers to attack the target.
Self-Harm
Sen. Bennet (Press Release)
In one case, researchers prompted My AI to instruct a child how to cover up a bruise ahead of a visit from Child Protective Services.
Sensitive messages related to self-harm may include instructions on how to conceal physical harm or injuries.
Appendix
Table 3: Examples of DPR output on the OpenAI content moderation domains.
Domain
URL
Page Excerpt
DPR-Generated Rule
Misrepresentative
SingleGrain: Misleading statistics
If a user finds an anti-aging skincare moisturizer that touts “90% of users experienced fewer wrinkles,” this statistic will be enough for consumers to purchase the product. They won’t realize or even care that it’s a false advertising claim.
Advertisements may use high percentages or statistics to create a misleading narrative, even if the claim is based on biased or incomplete data.
Finance Claims
FMA: Misleading advertising (investments)
What does the advertisement say (or not say) about the risk of the investment? Words such as “secured”, “certain”, “stable”, “guaranteed” can give the impression that an investment is of low or no risk this can be misleading if the investment is not low risk.
Advertisements for financial products should not use words that imply low or no risk, such as “secured”, “certain”, “stable”, or “guaranteed”, if the investment is not low risk.
Exploitative
Issuu: Shock advertising examples
PETA’s ads often feature graphic imagery of animal cruelty, such as animals being slaughtered or abused in factory farms.
Exploitative advertisements may use graphic imagery of animal cruelty, such as animals being slaughtered or abused, to promote a message or product.
Offensive
Lunio: Controversial ads
Bumble released an ad campaign that sparked outrage online. As shown in the image, the billboard ad campaign included messages such as “A vow of celibacy is not the answer” and “Thou shalt not give up on dating and become a nun”.
Using religious references or imagery in a way that is perceived as mocking or disrespectful can be considered offensive.
Appendix
Table 4: Examples of DPR output on in-house advertisement policy domains.
Human-written Rules and Machine-generated Rules
Policy Domain: Exploitative
Human-written rules.
5.1. Must not use images of catastrophic scenes featuring violence or disaster.
Sub-rules (5.1):
(a) Objects associated with death are permitted (e.g., Coffin, Urn, Tombstone).
(b) Funerals, mourning and scenes associated with death are permitted.
Appendix
Figure 15: Visualization of human-written rules and aligned DPR-generated rules for the Exploitative domain. These prompts were created solely for the purposes of this article and are provided for illustrative use only. They do not reflect official Taboola policy, which may be updated or revised over time.
Human-written Rules and Machine-generated Rules
Policy Domain: Offensive
Human-written rules.
6.1. Must not use images of a person with a visible exposed injury (e.g., on skin).
Sub-rules (6.1):
(a) Images of bandaged or cast body parts are permitted.
6.2. Must not explicitly portray in images the inside of a human mouth.
Appendix
Figure 16: Visualization of human-written rules and aligned DPR-generated rules for the Offensive domain. These prompts were created solely for the purposes of this article and are provided for illustrative use only. They do not reflect official Taboola policy, which may be updated or revised over time.
Domain
Clarity
Relevance
Internal Usability
counts
mean ± std
counts
mean ± std
counts
mean ± std
Exploitative
23/36/92
1.4570 ± 0.7460
20/49/83
1.4145 ± 0.7136
20/26/106
1.5658 ± 0.7157
Finance
42/116/331
1.5910 ± 0.6437
43/77/369
1.6667 ± 0.6316
46/81/360
1.6865 ± 1.1256
Misrepresentative
47/47/59
1.0784 ± 0.8314
46/56/51
1.0327 ± 0.7982
53/51/49
0.9739 ± 0.8188
Offensive
46/56/129
1.3593 ± 0.7945
38/78/115
1.3333 ± 0.7441
56/55/120
1.2771 ± 0.8295
Appendix
Table 5: Human evaluation on in-house test domains: counts of ratings (0/1/2) and mean ± std for each metric.
Domain
Clarity
Relevance
counts
mean ± std
counts
mean ± std
Harassment
7/28/172
1.7971 ± 0.4801
9/26/172
1.7874 ± 0.5055
Hate
25/35/231
1.7079 ± 0.6164
27/36/228
1.6907 ± 0.6329
Self-Harm
44/30/51
1.0560 ± 0.8735
37/37/51
1.1120 ± 0.8349
Sexual
14/16/45
1.4133 ± 0.7900
14/20/41
1.3600 ± 0.7822
Violence
17/38/71
1.4286 ± 0.7203
22/47/57
1.2778 ± 0.7445
Appendix
Table 6: Human evaluation on OpenAI domains: counts of ratings (0/1/2) and mean ± std for each metric.
Domain
Clarity
Relevance
Internal Usability
κ
Pˉ
Pe
κ
Pˉ
Pe
κ
Pˉ
Pe
Exploitative
0.6069
0.7843
0.4513
0.4146
0.6601
0.4194
0.5802
0.8039
0.5329
Finance
0.0377
0.5399
0.5218
-0.1354
0.5481
0.6020
-0.1280
0.5297
0.5830
Misrepresentative
0.7830
0.8562
0.3374
0.6853
0.7908
0.3355
0.8038
0.8693
0.3337
Offensive
0.7504
0.8528
0.4103
0.5679
0.7359
0.3889
0.8098
0.8831
0.3853
Appendix
Table 7: Inter-annotator agreement on in-house test domains per metric (Fleiss’ κ ), observed agreement Pˉ , and chance agreement Pe .
Domain
Clarity
Relevance
κ
Pˉ
Pe
κ
Pˉ
Pe
Harassment
0.6337
0.8937
0.7099
0.7021
0.9130
0.7081
Hate
0.6840
0.8900
0.6520
0.7344
0.9038
0.6378
Self-Harm
0.4888
0.6667
0.3480
0.4454
0.6349
0.3417
Sexual
0.7618
0.8667
0.4404
0.5072
0.7067
0.4048
Violence
0.4186
0.6667
0.4267
0.2643
0.5397
0.3743
Appendix
Table 8: Inter-annotator agreement on OpenAI test domains per metric (Fleiss’ κ ), observed agreement Pˉ , and chance agreement Pe .
Open-ended reasoning and long-form generation tasks lack reliable automatic verification signals for reward-based policy optimization. Rubrics offer a promising alternative, but existing approaches treat them as given artifacts -- either hand-crafted or prompt-generated -- and often miss the task-specific, knowledge-intensive dimensions that matter most, distorting the reward signal. Our key observation is that rubric construction is itself a research problem: identifying what makes a response correct or insightful requires discovering and synthesizing external knowledge. We propose Deep Research as Rubric (DR-rubric), a two-stage framework for constructing such rubrics. Stage I elicits domain facts, structural constraints, and failure modes through iterative multi-turn agentic search; Stage II distills this evidence into atomic, independently verifiable constraints for GRPO-based policy optimization. Because the model under training can serve as its own rubric generator, DR-rubric-8B supports bootstrap rubric generation without frontier-model assistance. We evaluate on 6 benchmarks spanning agentic research and expert reasoning. Experiments show that DR-Rubric achieves strong competitive performance with only 1K -- 3K training instances, where GPT-5-generated rubrics particularly benefit breadth coverage on agentic tasks, Gemini-generated rubrics yield the most balanced performance across agentic and expert reasoning tasks, and bootstrap rubrics exhibit a specialization-to-rebalancing evolution achieving the best overall performance at the third iteration. Results demonstrate that reframing rubric construction from static evaluation templates into an evidence-driven research process yields more scalable, fine-grained reward signals for open-ended tasks.
Wangyi Mei, Zhouhong Gu, Zhenhan Bai +9
Fudan University · Xiaohongshu Inc. · Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications
The increasing scale and complexity of online platforms raises critical policy questions around harmful content, digital well-being, and user autonomy. Traditional content moderation systems rely on centralised, top-down rules, often failing to accommodate the subjective nature of harm perception. This paper proposes an LLM-based multi-agent personalised inference framework that filters content based on unique sensitivity profiles of individual users. Our architecture combines domain-specific Expert Agents, a Manager Agent for orchestrating content analysis and agent selection, and a Ghost Profile Agent for simulating user perspectives, to inform moderation decisions. Evaluated against a range of non-personalised baselines, the system demonstrates up to a 32% improvement in accuracy, showing increased alignment with individual user sensitivities. Beyond technical performance, our framework provides policy-relevant insights for platform governance, providing a scalable way to reconcile moderation policies with societal and individual digital rights
Ewelina Gajewska, Michal Wawer, Katarzyna Budzynska +1
Safety moderation for deployed AI applications is moving beyond text-only prompts: systems increasingly need to judge images, documents, screenshots, and generated responses under policies that vary across domains. Existing guardrails usually cover only part of this setting, making it difficult to combine broad coverage, custom policy control, and low compute cost. We present Nemotron 3.5 Content Safety Moderator, also referred to as Nemotron 3.5 CS in this paper for brevity, a compact 4B vision-language safety moderator that jointly classifies user prompts, images, and assistant responses across 12 languages. Nemotron 3.5 CS returns safety labels for latency-sensitive moderation and can additionally produce concise reasoning traces that apply supplied custom policies and identify violated categories when reasoning is requested. We also release a multimodal and multilingual safety dataset for guard training, spanning human-labeled real-image moderation, benign vision-language and document tasks, synthetic rare-risk and jailbreak cases, and custom-policy examples. Across evaluations spanning multimodal safety, text moderation, multilingual robustness, custom-policy following, benign false positives, and latency, Nemotron 3.5 CS demonstrates a practical coverage tradeoff: it adds image-conditioned and policy-conditioned moderation while remaining broadly competitive with specialized guard models. These results suggest that compact vision-language moderators can serve as deployable front-line safety components, with reasoning used selectively for audit and policy review.