NetSecBed: A Container-Native Testbed for Reproducible Cybersecurity Experimentation

The validation of networking and security solutions for the Internet of Things (IoT) requires realistic and reproducible experimental data. However, existing platforms often achieve scalability by replicating a limited set of device types, which restricts profile diversity and fails to capture the heterogeneity of real-world IoT environments. In this paper, we present IoT-Zoo, a container-based testbed designed to support reproducible experimentation through heterogeneous, dataset-driven IoT device profiles. Built upon Containernet, IoT-Zoo automates the deployment of multi-domain scenarios and supports real application protocols such as MQTT and RTSP. The platform provides a single-command interface for environment provisioning and automated traffic capture (PCAP), enabling the generation of consistent traffic baselines and reducing the operational effort required to evaluate networking and security solutions.

Networking research advances by turning hypotheses into empirical evidence, so accelerating it means reducing the lag between ideation (synthesizing a hypothesis) and generating the data that tests it. Consider a concrete case: does a bulk BBR download fairly share its bottleneck with competing real-time Google Meet traffic? Validating this requires configuring a realistic bottleneck link, concurrently generating BBR's bulk transfer and Meet's real-time traffic, and collecting relevant service-quality metrics. Today this overhead is high, often forcing researchers to start from scratch for every new idea. This ideation-to-data-generation gap will only worsen in the agentic AI era, where AI-assisted ideation accelerates exponentially, yet its outputs cannot be validated without a data-generation backend. This paper explores how to bridge this gap. We envision a composable, domain-specific backend, Pramana, shaped as a thin waist, with diverse research intents at the top and disparate execution substrates at the bottom. Pramana realizes this waist through a single contract, the intent specification, which disaggregates an experiment into three independent axes: the intent (what data to generate), the substrate (where to generate it), and the mechanism (how to produce it), so one specification runs on any substrate. We demonstrate Pramana's utility by building a first-of-its-kind corpus of 255 data-generation intents mined from 66 published papers, and show the intent specification satisfies all of them, where no existing tool satisfies more than 13%. Our current proof-of-concept implementation already satisfies 34% of these intents, more than twice the best existing tool, and we lay out a roadmap for closing this abstraction-implementation gap through a broader community effort to build the envisioned data-generation backend and accelerate empirical networking research.

Digital forensic investigations of network intrusions require analytical outputs that are traceable, reproducible, and court-defensible - requirements existing machine learning pipelines do not satisfy, since they treat original evidence as training data and produce opaque classifications without instance-level justification. This paper presents a forensic-oriented intrusion detection framework resolving both problems simultaneously, integrating synthetic data generation, binary classification, and explainability within a single pipeline governed by ISO/IEC 27037, 27041, 27042, and NIST SP 800-86. The framework operationalises the ISO/IEC 27037 requirement for strict separation between original digital evidence and derived analytical artefacts. Original datasets are treated as immutable, hash-verified artefacts; all training operates on parameterized synthetic derivatives via SDV + CTGAN. XGBoost binary classification provides high-performance detection on tabular network flow data, and SHAP TreeExplainer produces instance-level feature attributions mapping statistical predictions to observable network behaviour for forensic reporting. Train-on-Synthetic, Test-on-Real (TSTR) evaluation on CICIDS2017 achieves F1-macro = 0.96, within cross-validation variance of the real-data baseline (0.97). Kolmogorov-Smirnov testing confirms synthetic privacy preservation (mean |KS| = 0.38) alongside operational utility. Cross-dataset validation on UNSW-NB15 and Kitsune identifies feature space dimensionality as the primary determinant of synthetic training effectiveness, establishing a practical deployment boundary of approximately 30 numeric flow-level features. SHAP attributions for Brute Force, Port Scan, and DoS attacks are consistent across real and synthetic instances, confirming synthetic training preserves forensically relevant attack fingerprints required for expert witness testimony.