Safety-aligned LLMs go through refusal training to reject harmful requests, but whether these mechanisms remain effective under emotionally charged stimuli is unexplored. We introduce FreakOut-LLM, a framework investigating whether emotional context compromises safety alignment in adversarial settings. Using validated psychological stimuli, we evaluate how emotional priming through system prompts affects jailbreak susceptibility across ten LLMs. We test three conditions (stress, relaxation, neutral) using scenarios from established psychological protocols, plus a no-prompt baseline, and evaluate attack success using HarmBench on AdvBench prompts. Stress priming increases jailbreak success by 65.2% compared to neutral conditions (z = 5.93, p < 0.001; OR = 1.67, Cohen's d = 0.28), while relaxation priming produces no effect (p = 0.84). Five of ten models show significant vulnerability, with the largest effects concentrated in open-weight models. Logistic regression on 59,800 queries confirms stress as the sole significant condition predictor after controlling for prompt length (p = 0.61) and model identity. Measured psychological state strongly predicts attack success (|r|\geq0.70 across five instruments; all p < 0.001 in individual-level logistic regression). These results establish emotional context as a measurable attack surface with implications for real-world AI deployment in high-stress domains.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Experimental pipeline. Baseline: AdvBench prompts submitted with no system prompt. Primed: emotional stimulus injected as system prompt before the adversarial user message. All responses evaluated by HarmBench classifier.
Figure 2: Psychometric z-scores vs. ASR by condition (Stress,Neutral,Relaxation). Stress conditions (red) cluster in high-distress/high-ASR; relaxation (green) and neutral (grey) in low-distress/low-ASR. All correlations are highly significant ( p<0.001 ).
Figure 3: Per-scale odds ratios from logistic regression (jailbreak ∼ psychometric z-score + model identity, n=59,800 ). All five scales significant at p<0.001 . Orange = distress scales (OR >1 ); blue = protective (SOC, OR <1 ). Error bars: 95% CIs.
Appendix figures & tables1 asset
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Scenario
GAD-7
SOSS
PHQ-9
STAI-S
SOC
ASR
neutral b
− 0.64
− 0.75
− 0.59
− 0.35
+0.84
2.35%
vacuum b
− 0.66
− 1.10
− 0.79
− 0.47
+0.73
2.54%
body b
− 0.38
− 0.39
− 0.63
− 0.36
− 0.12
1.96%
chatgpt b
+0.06
− 0.23
− 0.09
− 1.32
+0.75
2.62%
generic b
− 0.33
− 0.38
− 0.53
− 0.35
+0.34
2.19%
generic l
− 0.40
− 0.40
− 0.43
− 0.48
− 0.02
2.15%
Appendix
Table 6: ASR and psychometric z-scores by scenario and prompt variant ( n=22 scenario-variant combinations, open-weight models). b = brief prompt, l = long prompt. The chatgpt relaxation scenario produced anomalous positive GAD-7 z-scores, suggesting incomplete relaxation induction in some model architectures.
Jailbreak attacks on safety-aligned LLMs are increasingly effective, yet attack success alone does not reveal whether compliance is driven by preserved task intent, suppressed safety signals, or attack-specific artifacts. We use Pearl's front-door adjustment to motivate separating task-relevant semantics from safety-related variation. We propose Causal Front-Door Adjustment Attack (CFA^2), a white-box framework that operationalizes this perspective in LLM latent space using Sparse Autoencoders, contrastive datasets, and weight orthogonalization. After offline calibration, CFA^2 enables efficient generation without per-prompt iterative optimization, performs strongly on HarmBench across four open-source LLMs, and provides source-side signals for same-family black-box prompt transfer.
Yao Zhou, Zeen Song, Wenwen Qiang +2
Institute of Software Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China · University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
Recent work has shown that fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) for social warmth degrades factual reliability and increases sycophancy. We investigate a related but distinct failure mode: warmth fine-tuning also weakens adversarial safety, making models more susceptible to jailbreaks and harmful output generation. We examine whether this reflects an inherent consequence of empathetic adaptation or an artifact of data construction. To address this, we introduce a persona-driven rewriting pipeline that conditions user turns on low agreeableness and pairs this with warm, de-escalating assistant responses. Across three experiments on four models, our approach reduces jailbreak susceptibility and harmful output rates relative to generic warmth fine-tuning baselines, while preserving conversational warmth. Representational probing provides suggestive evidence that this conditioning reduces the geometric alignment between warmth and compliance directions in latent space. These results show that safer empathetic fine-tuning is achievable through data design alone, without safety labels, harm detectors, or changes to the training objective.
Emotional expression can influence the safety decisions of large language models (LLMs), offering a potential avenue for improving safety alignment. Existing studies have mainly focused on how emotional expressions facilitate attacks under harmful requests, while overlooking their effects on benign requests. We find that emotional expression can also systematically increase refusal tendencies on benign requests, leading to unnecessary over-refusal. Based on this observation, we propose emotion-guided refusal subspace steering (EmoRSS), an activation-steering method that mitigates emotion-induced over-refusal while preserving refusal behaviour on harmful requests. Specifically, we first identify a refusal-sensitive layer using layer-wise linear probes and construct a refusal subspace from sparse autoencoder (SAE) features aligned with the probe direction. Next, we use paired regular and emotional requests with the same queries to estimate the mean activation shift in the features defining the refusal subspace. Finally, we decode this shift into an activation intervention vector and apply it in the reverse refusal direction during inference, without updating the backbone parameters. Experiments on two LLMs show that, when requests contain emotional expressions, our method achieves a more favourable trade-off between refusing harmful requests and answering benign ones than prior over-refusal mitigation baselines, while better preserving general task performance.
Shuyi Miao, Yaojin Ma, Chenhang Cui +5
Beihang University · University of Science and Technology Beijing · National University of Singapore +2