Extrapolating Volition with Recursive Information Markets

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to support decisions under incomplete information, where deciding what to look up and when to stop matters as much as the final answer. However, LLMs fall into an information trap: They pay for checks, i.e., costly pieces of evidence, that cannot change their decision or are not worth their cost, and they keep asking when the evidence is already sufficient. To this end, we propose Decision-Informed Value-of-information Acquisition (DIVA), a simple yet effective procedure for LLM information seeking based on the decision value of evidence. DIVA 1) lets the LLM specify a small decision model, i.e., how likely a bad outcome is and how each check would shift this probability, through short numeric questions and 2) values each candidate check by how much its imagined outcomes improve the decision net of its cost, stopping when no check is worth its cost. Its variant, DIVA-U, further accounts for the LLM's uncertain estimates of how strongly each check shifts this probability. DIVA is training-free and applies to any LLM. Across four domains and 20 LLMs, DIVA-U has lower regret, i.e., value lost relative to the best possible decision, than every LLM baseline on real-world data, mainly by stopping once evidence suffices, and DIVA cuts the regret of the best LLM baseline by 75% in synthetic scenarios where every check's reliability is given. Code: github.com/seunghan96/diva.

Can Large Language Models (AI agents) aggregate dispersed private information through trading and reason about the knowledge of others by observing price movements? We conduct a controlled experiment where AI agents trade in a prediction market after receiving private signals, measuring information aggregation by the log error of the last price. We find that although the median market is effective at aggregating information in the easy information structures, increasing the complexity has a significant and negative impact, suggesting that AI agents may suffer from similar limitations as humans when reasoning about others. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, information aggregation remains unaffected by allowing cheap talk communication, changing the duration of the market or initial price, and strategic prompting, thus demonstrating that prediction markets are robust. We establish that "smarter" AI agents perform better at aggregation and they are more profitable. Surprisingly, giving them feedback about past performance has no impact on aggregation.

Agent-based modeling (ABM) has long been used in economics to study human behavior, and large language model (LLM) agents now enable new forms of social and economic simulation. While prior work has discovered strategic deception by LLM agents in financial trading and auction markets, e-commerce remains underexplored despite its distinctive information asymmetry: sellers privately observe product quality, whereas buyers rely on advertised claims and reputation signals. We introduce TruthMarketTwin, a controlled simulation framework for studying LLM-agent behavior in e-commerce markets. The framework is one of the first to model bilateral trade under asymmetric information sharing, where agents make strategic listing, purchasing, rating, and recourse-related decisions to optimize seller profit and buyer utility. We find that LLM agents released into traditional markets autonomously exploit weaknesses in reputation-based governance, while warrant enforcement reduces deception and reshapes strategic reasoning. Our results position LLM-agent simulation as a tool for studying institution-governed autonomous markets.