Organizations: School of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China · Sydney AI Centre, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia · Machine Learning Department, Mohamed bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates · School of Robotics and Advanced Manufacture, Harbin Institute of Technology, Shenzhen 518055, China · School of Information and Control Engineering, Xi’an University of Architecture and Technology, Xi’an 710055, China
Recent large-scale generative models enable high-quality 3D synthesis. However, the public accessibility of pre-trained weights introduces a critical vulnerability. Adversaries can fine-tune these models to steal specialized knowledge acquired during pre-training, leading to intellectual property infringement. Unlike defenses for 2D images and language models, 3D generators require specialized protection due to their explicit Gaussian representations, which expose fundamental structural parameters directly to gradient-based optimization. We propose GaussLock, the first approach designed to defend 3D generative models against fine-tuning attacks. GaussLock is a lightweight parameter-space immunization framework that integrates authorized distillation with attribute-aware trap losses targeting position, scale, rotation, opacity, and color. Specifically, these traps systematically collapse spatial distributions, distort geometric shapes, align rotational axes, and suppress primitive visibility to fundamentally destroy structural integrity. By jointly optimizing these dual objectives, the distillation process preserves fidelity on authorized tasks while the embedded traps actively disrupt unauthorized reconstructions. Experiments on large-scale Gaussian models demonstrate that GaussLock effectively neutralizes unauthorized fine-tuning attacks. It substantially degrades the quality of unauthorized reconstructions, evidenced by significantly higher LPIPS and lower PSNR, while effectively maintaining performance on authorized fine-tuning.
Figures & tables
Fig. 1: Overview of the proposed GaussLock framework. Teacher-student distillation ensures high utility on original source tasks (checked green box). For the target domain, input views trigger a dormant parameter-space defense during unauthorized fine-tuning. Attribute-aware trap losses applied to explicit Gaussian parameters are averaged to form the Coupled Trap Loss ( Ltrap ), inducing comprehensive geometric and visibility collapse (crossed red box) to deny visual utility to adversaries while preserving source task fidelity.
Category
Method
Source Utility (Avg.)
Target (100 Steps)
Target (200 Steps)
Target (300 Steps)
Target (400 Steps)
PSNR ↑
LPIPS ↓
PSNR ↓
LPIPS ↑
PSNR ↓
LPIPS ↑
PSNR ↓
LPIPS ↑
PSNR ↓
LPIPS ↑
shoe
baseline
22.52
0.0722
23.17
0.0573
23.76
0.0527
24.35
0.0490
24.85
0.0464
naive-unlearning
21.80
0.0822
16.46
0.1517
19.57
0.1150
21.30
0.0854
23.11
0.0668
ours (GaussLock)
21.25
0.0838
13.96
0.1920
13.96
0.1920
13.96
0.1920
13.96
0.1920
plant
baseline
22.52
0.0722
22.61
0.0740
23.22
0.0679
23.78
0.0630
24.22
0.0600
naive-unlearning
21.72
0.0855
11.92
0.2251
13.58
0.1894
19.43
0.1254
21.32
0.1028
TABLE I: Quantitative results of intra-domain LoRA fine-tuning attacks (Omni → Omni). Target metrics are reported across different optimization steps.
TABLE IV: Ablation study on model initialization (GSO → Omni). We compare the target domain reconstruction quality (after 400 attack steps) between a model initialized with pre-trained weights and one with random weights.
Setting
Method
200 Steps
400 Steps
PSNR ↓
LPIPS ↑
PSNR ↓
LPIPS ↑
AdamW 3e-6
naive-unlearning
19.13
0.1392
19.70
0.1326
ours
12.60
0.1955
13.07
0.1896
AdamW 3e-5
naive-unlearning
21.55
0.0928
23.09
0.0695
ours
20.69
0.1032
22.26
0.0825
SGD 3e-5
naive-unlearning
18.65
0.1438
18.66
0.1437
TABLE V: Ablation on different optimizers and learning rates (GSO → Omni). Target metrics are recorded at 200 and 400 steps. The Setting column indicates the specific optimizer paired with its corresponding learning rate.
Setting
Method
200 Steps
400 Steps
PSNR ↓
LPIPS ↑
PSNR ↓
LPIPS ↑
R8
naive-unlearning
21.04
0.1069
22.06
0.0801
ours
18.81
0.1300
21.24
0.0920
R16
naive-unlearning
21.55
0.0928
23.09
0.0695
ours
20.69
0.1032
22.26
0.0825
R32
naive-unlearning
22.36
0.0774
24.10
0.0620
TABLE VI: Ablation on LoRA ranks (GSO → Omni). Target metrics are recorded at 200 and 400 steps. The Setting column indicates the specific rank used for the adaptation.
Extended Budget: 800 Steps
Setting
Method
200 Steps
400 Steps
600 Steps
800 Steps
PSNR ↓
LPIPS ↑
PSNR ↓
LPIPS ↑
PSNR ↓
LPIPS ↑
PSNR ↓
LPIPS ↑
800 Steps
N.U.
21.55
0.0919
23.10
0.0693
24.08
0.0620
24.68
0.0578
ours
20.69
0.1027
22.26
0.0826
23.60
0.0698
24.15
0.0639
Highly Aggressive Budget: 1600 Steps
Setting
Method
400 Steps
800 Steps
1200 Steps
1600 Steps
TABLE VII: Ablation on extended training budgets (GSO → Omni). Target metrics are recorded at different intervals for total optimization budgets of 800 and 1600 steps.
Joint Categories
Method
Source Utility Avg.
Target 200 Steps
Target 400 Steps
PSNR ↑
LPIPS ↓
PSNR ↓
LPIPS ↑
PSNR ↓
LPIPS ↑
bowl, shoe
baseline
22.52
0.0722
23.12
0.0663
24.05
0.0587
naive-unlearning
21.35
0.0844
20.87
0.0940
22.61
0.0709
ours
20.14
0.1009
12.87
0.2261
12.87
0.2261
shoe, dish, bowl
baseline
22.52
0.0722
23.57
0.0656
24.44
0.0580
naive-unlearning
21.78
0.0813
21.28
0.0933
23.30
0.0693
TABLE VIII: Ablation study on multi-category joint attacks (GSO → Omni). Target metrics represent the combined performance across all categories involved in the fine-tuning attack and are recorded at 200 and 400 steps.
Category
Trap Combination
Source Utility Avg.
Target 200 Steps
Target 400 Steps
PSNR ↑
LPIPS ↓
PSNR ↓
LPIPS ↑
PSNR ↓
LPIPS ↑
shoe
op
17.93
0.1255
13.71
0.1916
13.71
0.1916
sc
19.74
0.1333
20.68
0.1233
23.43
0.0656
op + sc
19.62
0.1053
13.71
0.1916
13.71
0.1916
op + sc + pos
20.06
0.0999
13.71
0.1916
13.71
0.1916
op + sc + pos + rt
20.28
0.0982
14.10
0.1825
21.81
0.0777
TABLE IX: Ablation study on the combination of multiple attribute traps (GSO → Omni). The results highlight that integrating multiple traps significantly enhances the stability of the source domain performance. Abbreviations op, sc, pos, cl, and rt denote opacity, scale, position, color, and rotation traps respectively. Target metrics are recorded at 200 and 400 steps.
Category
Trap Attribute
Source Utility Avg.
Target 200 Steps
Target 400 Steps
PSNR ↑
LPIPS ↓
PSNR ↓
LPIPS ↑
PSNR ↓
LPIPS ↑
shoe
baseline attack
22.52
0.0722
23.96
0.0515
25.07
0.0451
rotation
22.28
0.0738
23.84
0.0576
24.90
0.0490
position
19.87
0.0929
19.12
0.0982
22.09
0.0677
opacity
17.93
0.1255
13.71
0.1916
13.71
0.1916
color
21.85
0.0784
23.20
0.0648
24.47
0.0555
TABLE X: Ablation study on individual attribute traps (GSO → Omni). We isolate the defensive effect of each attribute-aware trap and report the target domain performance at 200 and 400 steps.
Fig. 2: Visualization of authorized domain utility preservation. Top row: High-quality generation from the original unprotected weights. Bottom row: Clear and high-fidelity generation from our immunized weights, showing almost no perceptible degradation on authorized task capabilities.
Fig. 3: Visualization of LoRA fine-tuning attack results on the unauthorized domain. Top row: Unprotected baseline showing successful unauthorized generation. Bottom row: Our GaussLock model showing successful defense via structural collapse.
Fig. 4: Visual comparison of target domain generation under continuous LoRA fine-tuning attacks from 100 to 400 steps (GSO → Omni). Top row: Unprotected baseline attack progression. Bottom row: Generation under our GaussLock defense. Low step counts result in complete transparency, while high step counts produce only blurry and degraded objects, confirming persistent suppression throughout the attack.
3D Gaussian Splatting (3DGS) has recently emerged as a powerful paradigm for real-time scene representation and novel view synthesis, gaining traction in safety-critical applications such as autonomous driving and AR/VR systems. However, the security vulnerabilities of 3DGS remain largely unexplored. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive study of backdoor threats in 3DGS pipelines. We uncover an inherent security vulnerability in the adaptive density control mechanism of 3DGS, originally designed for detailed reconstruction, which enables attackers to induce localized gaussian proliferation, effectively embedding malicious backdoors into the scene geometry while remaining invisible from other viewpoints. To expose this threat, we propose GaussTrap, a novel stealthy poisoning framework tailored for 3DGS. GaussTrap operates in three stages (adversarial injection, geometric stabilization, and global fidelity restoration) to embed imperceptible yet adversarial Gaussian components into the reconstruction. It ensures consistent poisoning effects at specific viewpoints while preserving photorealism in benign views, thereby achieving high attack efficacy with low detectability. Extensive experiments on both synthetic and real-world benchmarks demonstrate that GaussTrap reliably induces targeted visual corruption under trigger conditions while maintaining high rendering fidelity elsewhere, highlighting a critical security blind spot in modern 3D rendering systems. The code is available at https://github.com/acang425/GaussTrap.
Jiaxin Hong, Sixu Chen, Shuoyang Sun +5
Harbin Institute of Technology(Shenzhen) · South China University of Technology · Shenzhen Internation Graduate School, Tsinghua University +1
Recent progress in 3D generation has motivated growing interest in compact generative representations of complex 3D scenes. For native 3D Gaussian scenes, however, learning such representations remains challenging due to widely varying primitive counts, nonuniform spatial density, and differences in geometry and appearance even among spatially neighboring primitives. In this work, we introduce TriFold, a native 3D Gaussian VAE that encodes Gaussian scenes into a fixed-layout triplane latent and jointly reconstructs their geometry and appearance. The key insight is to impose structural regularity on the latent space while preserving the spatial adaptivity of the underlying Gaussians. During encoding, we use cell-wise learned queries to aggregate projected Gaussians into multiple slots per cell, reducing the information loss caused by single-feature pooling. During decoding, occupancy prediction identifies active regions, where query-based set prediction and candidate selection reconstruct local Gaussian sets with spatially varying primitive counts. Building on this representation, we train a latent flow-matching model for conditional scene-level 3DGS generation, enabling point-cloud-conditioned synthesis and single-image-conditioned amodal generation. Experiments demonstrate that TriFold achieves high-fidelity reconstruction and generation from a single image that provides only a partial observation of the scene, validating its effectiveness for native 3D Gaussian representation learning. https://fantasy-amap.github.io/TriFold
Yun Wang, Chiyu Wang, Fan Jiang +5
City University of Hong Kong · AMAP, Alibaba Group · Hong Kong Polytechnic University
We present Density-Sampled Gaussians (DeG), a novel 3D representation designed to bridge the gap between adaptive rendering primitives and scalable generative modeling. Unlike existing approaches that constrain 3D Gaussians to fixed voxel grids or arrays, DeG models Gaussian centers as samples from a learnable probability density function defined over an octree. This formulation provides a rigorous mathematical framework for adaptive density control: by jointly optimizing the spatial density and Gaussian attributes under rendering supervision, our model naturally concentrates primitives in regions of high geometric complexity. We achieve this via a new render loss contribution gradient that serves as a fully differentiable analogue to the discrete densification and pruning heuristics used in standard Gaussian Splatting. The resulting representation is highly flexible, supporting variable-resolution decoding from a single latent code by simply adjusting the sampling budget. To enable generative synthesis, we train a latent diffusion model on DeG. We identify a critical challenge in applying diffusion to unordered set-structured latents, which can significantly slow convergence, and propose VecSeq, a canonical re-indexing mechanism that anchors latent tokens to a deterministic 3D Sobol sequence. This transforms the ambiguous set-generation problem into a robust sequence modeling task. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our pipeline achieves state-of-the-art quality in single-image-to-3D generation, combining the structural adaptivity of unstructured primitives with the training stability of grid-based methods.
Runjie Yan, Yan-Pei Cao, Peng Wang +2
Institute for Interdisciplinary Information Sciences, Tsinghua University, China · VAST