Narrative over Numbers: The Identifiable Victim Effect and its Amplification Under Alignment and Reasoning in Large Language Models

Existing behavioral alignment techniques for Large Language Models (LLMs) often neglect the discrepancy between surface compliance and internal unaligned representations, leaving LLMs vulnerable to long-tail risks. More crucially, we posit that LLMs possess an inherent state of moral indifference due to compressing distinct moral concepts into uniform probability distributions. We verify and remedy this indifference in LLMs' latent representations, utilizing 251k moral vectors constructed upon Prototype Theory and the Social-Chemistry-101 dataset. Firstly, our analysis across 23 models reveals that current LLMs fail to represent the distinction between opposed moral categories and fine-grained typicality gradients within these categories; notably, neither model scaling, architecture, nor explicit alignment reshapes this indifference. We then employ Sparse Autoencoders on Qwen3-8B, isolate mono-semantic moral features, and targetedly reconstruct their topological relationships to align with ground-truth moral vectors. This representational alignment naturally improves moral reasoning and granularity, achieving a 75% pairwise win-rate on the independent adversarial Flames benchmark. Finally, we elaborate on the remedial nature of current intervention methods from an experientialist philosophy, arguing that endogenously aligned AI might require a transformation from post-hoc corrections to proactive cultivation.

Do large language models reason morally, or do they merely sound like they do? We investigate whether LLM responses to moral dilemmas exhibit genuine developmental progression through Kohlberg's stages of moral development, or whether alignment training instead produces reasoning-like outputs that superficially resemble mature moral judgment without the underlying developmental trajectory. Using an LLM-as-judge scoring pipeline validated across three judge models, we classify more than 600 responses from 13 LLMs spanning a range of architectures, parameter scales, and training regimes across six classical moral dilemmas, and conduct ten complementary analyses to characterize the nature and internal coherence of the resulting patterns. Our results reveal a striking inversion: responses overwhelmingly correspond to post-conventional reasoning (Stages 5-6) regardless of model size, architecture, or prompting strategy, the effective inverse of human developmental norms, where Stage 4 dominates. Most strikingly, a subset of models exhibit moral decoupling: systematic inconsistency between stated moral justification and action choice, a form of logical incoherence that persists across scale and prompting strategy and represents a direct reasoning consistency failure independent of rhetorical sophistication. Model scale carries a statistically significant but practically small effect; training type has no significant independent main effect; and models exhibit near-robotic cross-dilemma consistency producing logically indistinguishable responses across semantically distinct moral problems. We posit that these patterns constitute evidence for moral ventriloquism: the acquisition, through alignment training, of the rhetorical conventions of mature moral reasoning without the underlying developmental trajectory those conventions are meant to represent.

Large language models (LLMs) are used to simulate human participants in psychological research. We asked whether LLMs that reproduce human evaluations of a whistleblower's moral character also reproduce the motive attributions that accompany them. Five LLMs and two human samples (N = 125 and N = 742) evaluated a physician who either remained silent about fraudulent billing or reported it to a hospital, regulator, or newspaper. Models reproduced the human ranking of the physician's moral character but portrayed whistleblowers as more helpful, less self-interested, and less hostile. In four of five models, competitive motives were less strongly associated with moral-character judgments. Model ratings changed little when prompts reproduced the narratives and demographic profiles of both human samples, although this comparison cannot isolate a perspective effect. Thus, agreement in average ratings can conceal differences in attributed motives, relationships among judgments, and sensitivity to context. Validating LLMs as simulated participants therefore requires testing psychologically informative response patterns, not average agreement alone.