The Possibility of Artificial Intelligence Becoming a Subject and the Alignment Problem

Classical robot ethics is often framed around obedience, including Asimov's laws. This framing is insufficient for contemporary AI systems, which are increasingly adaptive, generative, embodied, and embedded in physical, psychological, and social environments. This paper proposes conditional mutualism under governance as a framework for human-AI coexistence: a co-evolutionary relationship in which humans and AI systems develop, specialize, and coordinate under institutional conditions that preserve reciprocity, reversibility, psychological safety, and social legitimacy. We synthesize concepts from computability, machine learning, foundation models, embodied AI, alignment, human-robot interaction, ecological mutualism, coevolution, and polycentric governance. We then formalize coexistence as a multiplex dynamical system across physical, psychological, and social layers, with reciprocal supply-demand coupling, conflict penalties, developmental freedom, and governance regularization. The model gives conditions for existence, uniqueness, and global asymptotic stability of equilibria. We complement the analytical results with deterministic ODE simulations, basin sweeps, sensitivity analyses, governance-regime comparisons, shock tests, and local stability checks. The simulations indicate that governed mutualism reaches a high coexistence index with negligible domination, whereas insufficient or excessive governance can produce domination, weak-benefit lock-in, or suppressed developmental freedom. The results suggest that human-AI coexistence should be designed as a co-evolutionary governance problem rather than as a static obedience problem.

AI's central challenge is shifting from capability to coexistence. The dominant paradigm in AI research focuses on developing powerful agents that treat the world as an exogenous and stationary source of feedback. We contend that superintelligence, an extremely capable task solver, born out of such a solipsistic approach to AI design, is unlikely to be cooperative. Deploying AI systems induces endogenous non-stationarity, resulting in a train-test-deploy gap where historical distributions diverge from the deployment context. We refer to this as the self-undermining property of unilateral optimization. Closing this gap requires AI that participates in cooperation: the equilibrium-selection process through which multiple actors navigate their interdependence. We call for a non-solipsistic research paradigm that treats this interdependence as a core design principle rather than approaching cooperation as a task to solve. This entails building dynamic evaluation testbeds involving adaptive counterparties, treating institutions as design primitives, and preserving human agency as a structural feature of the systems we build.

The pursuit of artificial general intelligence (AGI) rests on a seemingly self-evident premise: that general intelligence, the kind of flexible, domain-general cognitive capacity exemplified by Homo sapiens, is extraordinarily valuable. This paper subjects this premise to critical scrutiny. We first present the intuitive case for the value of general intelligence before mounting an evolutionary challenge. We argue that, on evolutionary timescales, its adaptive value is far from empirically established. Numerous taxa, from cyanobacteria to horseshoe crabs, have persisted for hundreds of millions or even billions of years without anything resembling general intelligence, while Homo sapiens has existed for roughly 300,000 years and already faces self-generated existential risks. Mass extinction events do not preferentially favour cognitively sophisticated species. We argue that general intelligence may be the only biological strategy that generates existential threats to the species possessing it, an existential risk paradox with no parallel among non-intelligent survival strategies. Unlike prevailing accounts of AI risk that trace the danger to misalignment, we locate it in structural features of general intelligence itself, implying that even well-aligned AGI would inherit this liability. If the long-term evolutionary value of general intelligence is uncertain or negative, this raises ethical questions about engineering AGI and, more urgently, creating artificial consciousness. Drawing on deontological ethics and the precautionary principle, we argue that this uncertainty imposes a duty of caution: if we create a new kind of intelligent being, we bear responsibility for ensuring the conditions under which it can flourish.