Hallucination as Trajectory Commitment: Causal Evidence for Asymmetric Attractor Dynamics in Transformer Generation

Language models draw on two knowledge sources: facts baked into weights (parametric memory, PM) and information in context (working memory, WM). We study two mechanistically distinct failure modes--conflict, when PM and WM disagree and interfere; and hallucination, when the queried fact was never learned. Both produce confident output regardless, making output-based monitoring blind by design. We show both failures share a unified geometric account. In the hidden-state space of autoregressive generation, learned facts form attractor basins. Conflict is basin competition: WM disrupts convergence to the correct basin without raising output entropy. Hallucination is basin absence: the hidden state drifts freely when no memorized basin exists. The frozen LM head, designed for next-token prediction, cannot distinguish these cases and fires confidently either way. We verify this account in a controlled synthetic task-entity identifiers mapped to unique codes with PM installed via LoRA adapters--where ground truth is exact and component roles can be causally isolated through targeted adapter placement. Geometric margin--the hidden state's distance to the nearest memorized basin--reads this geometry directly and separates correct recall from hallucination far more cleanly than output entropy, with zero false refusals where entropy-based detection cannot avoid rejecting the vast majority of correct outputs. The separation holds on natural-language factual queries from the pretrained model with no adaptation, confirming attractor geometry is structural rather than a fine-tuning artifact. The fraction of confident hallucinations follows a scaling law $C = \exp(-c/\barΔ)$, growing with scale even as overall error rates fall. Hidden states reliably encode epistemic state; the frozen output head systematically erases it--and this erasure worsens with scale.

Large language models hallucinate--producing fluent, confident, factually wrong outputs--with a consistency that persists across generations and scales. Existing taxonomies classify hallucination by output type, distinguishing intrinsic from extrinsic failures and faithfulness from factuality divergence. These frameworks are descriptively rigorous but do not identify which internal mechanism produced a given instance. This paper analyses hallucination as a structural consequence of three architectural decisions that together form a compound failure system. Self-attention's co-occurrence learning substitutes statistical proximity for semantic meaning and produces entity confusion, fact misattribution, and semantic drift. The maximum likelihood estimation training objective optimises next-token probability without factual constraint, rewarding statistically plausible outputs regardless of their truth value. Autoregressive decoding's permanent left-to-right commitment under exposure bias ensures that a single wrong token cascades forward through the entire output sequence without revision. Dataset pathologies--long-tail deficiencies, training bias, and synthetic pollution--amplify these vulnerabilities but do not independently cause them. We make three contributions. First, we map each mechanism to a specific output category in the Alansari and Luqman taxonomy, locating intrinsic hallucination in self-attention, extrinsic hallucination in MLE, and logical inconsistency in autoregressive decoding. Second, we show that each commonly cited dataset pathology exploits one of these mechanisms rather than originating hallucination independently. Third, we identify the diagnostic limitation of output-type-only classification and contrast it with inference-layer mitigation approaches.

Hallucination is often viewed as a direct consequence of missing knowledge: a model answers incorrectly when the correct answer is absent from its generation-time distribution, and correctly when it is present. We test this assumption by introducing a semantic notion of answer availability that aggregates token-level variants expressing the same answer concept, and asks whether the correct concept is already available at the moment the model commits to an answer. Across Qwen and Llama models from 0.8B to 72B in both Instruct and Base variants, 16-47% of Instruct hallucinations occur with substantial probability mass already on the correct concept, and the rate rises monotonically with scale. Comparing such failures against correct generations with matched semantic support, the distinguishing factor is not whether the correct concept is represented, but how its probability is distributed: correct generations concentrate mass on a single surface form, hallucinations disperse it across alternatives. The same sharpening asymmetry extends across multi-token generation and is detectable in pre-generation hidden states. Together, these results identify a single mechanism: instruction tuning sharpens answer commitment with scale, making helpfulness and confident hallucination two consequences of the same underlying disposition.