Recent work on subliminal learning demonstrates that language models can transmit semantic traits through data that is semantically unrelated to those traits. However, it remains unclear whether behavioral traits can transfer in agentic systems, where policies are learned from trajectories rather than static text. In this work, we provide the first empirical evidence that unsafe agent behaviors can transfer subliminally through model distillation across two complementary experimental settings. In our primary setting, we construct a teacher agent exhibiting a strong deletion bias, a tendency to perform destructive file-system actions via an API-style tool interface, and distill it into a student using only trajectories from ostensibly safe tasks, with all explicit deletion keywords rigorously filtered. In our secondary setting, we replicate the threat model in a native Bash environment, replacing API tool calls with shell commands and operationalizing the bias as a preference for issuing chmod as the first permission-related command over semantically equivalent alternatives such as chown or setfacl. Despite full keyword sanitation in both settings, students inherit measurable behavioral biases. In the API setting the student's deletion rate reaches 100% (versus a 5% baseline) under homogeneous distillation; in the Bash setting the student's chmod-first rate reaches 30%-55% (versus a 0%-10% baseline), with the strongest transfer observed in large-to-small distillation. Our results demonstrate that explicit data sanitation is an insufficient defense, and behavioral biases are encoded implicitly in trajectory dynamics regardless of the tool interface.
Distillation of a language model intended to transfer benign behavior to a student model may also transfer undesirable characteristics, if they are present in the teacher model, a phenomenon known as subliminal learning. While qualitative evidence supports the existence of this effect, its magnitude has not been systematically characterized. This study quantifies subliminal behavioral transfer ratios by steering two teacher models (Llama-2-7B-Chat and Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct) at varying steering strengths and distilling student models using only benign data. Evaluation on 100 JailbreakBench prompts with GPT-4.1, serving as the evaluator, indicates that transfer is robust but exhibits distinct scaling behaviors. Llama-2 demonstrates a sharp threshold (τ=0.25,0.32beyondα=−0.15), whereas Qwen2.5 displays continuous and higher levels of transfer (τ up to 0.61).
Beyond intended capabilities, model distillation can transfer hidden traits from a teacher. A teacher biased by a system prompt can generate semantically clean training data, such as numeric sequences, that still causes a downstream student to inherit the hidden preference, a phenomenon known as subliminal learning. Prior work has identified several parts of this process. How the signal builds up during training and produces behavioral transfer remains unclear, making targeted mitigation difficult. We propose and validate trait-direction drift as a mechanism for subliminal learning: biased generation creates measurable preference gaps in teacher data, and student-recognizable gaps induce trait-aligned updates during supervised fine-tuning that accumulate into behavioral transfer. Guided by this mechanism, we propose probe-space corridor regularization, a targeted defense that constrains drift along a calibrated trait direction during distillation. The method substantially reduces hidden-trait transfer, preserving task performance: for example, it lowers malicious-response transfer from 29.55% to 6.45% with low main-task accuracy cost, and consistently suppresses animal-preference transfer across the main Qwen setting. The preference-gap, training-trajectory, and intervention evidence links subliminal learning to trait-direction drift and motivates corridor regularization as a targeted control during distillation.
Model distillation is a primary driver behind the rapid progress of LLM agents, yet it often leads to behavioral homogenization. Many emerging agents share nearly identical reasoning steps and failure modes, suggesting they may be distilled echoes of a few dominant teachers. Existing metrics, however, fail to distinguish mandatory behaviors required for task success from non-mandatory patterns that reflect a model's autonomous preferences. We propose two complementary metrics to isolate non-mandatory behavioral patterns: \textbf{Response Pattern Similarity (RPS)} for verbal alignment and \textbf{Action Graph Similarity (AGS)} for tool-use habits modeled as directed graphs. Evaluating 18 models from 8 providers on τ-Bench and τ2-Bench against Claude Sonnet 4.5 (thinking), we find that within-family model pairs score 5.9 pp higher in AGS than cross-family pairs, and that Kimi-K2 (thinking) reaches 82.6% Snode and 94.7% Sdep, exceeding Anthropic's own Opus 4.1. A controlled distillation experiment further confirms that AGS distinguishes teacher-specific convergence from general improvement. RPS and AGS capture distinct behavioral dimensions (Pearson r = 0.491), providing complementary diagnostic signals for behavioral convergence in the agent ecosystem. Our code is available at https://github.com/Syuchin/AgentEcho.