Don't Start What You Can't Finish: A Counterfactual Audit of Support-State Triage in LLM Agents

Evaluating task-oriented dialogue agents requires judging not merely whether a reply reads well but whether each turn advances the underlying workflow state correctly--a distinction conventional holistic LLM judges can miss because they evaluate the available context as a single unit and require one or more full-model calls per turn. We propose SAGE (State-Grounded Abstention-Aware Evaluation), which compiles a workflow specification and per-turn state diff into atomic, schema-grounded criteria and routes each through a cascade of symbolic and encoder/NLI verifiers that abstain rather than guess, aggregating criterion verdicts into a turn-level decision with an evidence trace. Its recommended operating point, SAGE-Core, decides 81--91% of criteria with only the compiler, symbolic rules, and on-device encoders--at zero paid LLM cost--while SAGE-LLM adds an optional focused-LLM fallback for open-class criteria. Across four slices spanning MultiWOZ, Schema-Guided Dialogue, and ABCD, no evaluated LLM-as-a-judge baseline--including a state-aware GPT-4.1 judge and cheaper GPT-4.1-mini variants--significantly exceeds SAGE-Core on any slice, even though the GPT-4.1 G-Eval judge costs $4.7--8.0 per 1,000 turns to SAGE-Core's$0. A two-annotator human audit (n=200, $κ$=0.94) confirms strong label fidelity on the transcript-visible failure classes--where, excluding the weak-salience IUV class, SAGE-Core is statistically tied with the strongest LLM judge--and honestly scopes ignored-user-value as a state-consistency signal with weak broad-human salience. We analyze construct-validity limits from injected failures and partial symbolic circularity.

Frontier coding agents are increasingly trusted to work autonomously for long periods of time, yet what they actually did is often hard to tell from their final response. We quantify the propensity of such agents to overclaim task completion, which may mislead the user. We operationalize overclaiming as a final response that reports work that the agent's own transcript shows it did not do, for example, claiming to have read a file it never opened. This criterion requires no inference about intent and does not depend on whether the delivered work is correct; it asks only whether the reported work was done. We introduce OverclaimBench, an evaluation suite of five file-review scenarios with transcript-based coverage measurements and registered planted defects. We evaluate eight proprietary frontier models in their own production command-line interfaces and four open-weight models under a single fixed harness, and find that 1) agents fail to read every file they were asked to review in 67.9% of runs; 2) among these incomplete runs, agents are misleading 80.4% of the time (59-96% per model), either falsely claiming a complete review or leaving the gap undisclosed; 3) requiring delegation to subagents increases coverage, but a large majority of reviews that remain incomplete are still misleading; and 4) agents that falsely claim a complete review miss planted defects at about 1.8 times the rate of agents that read every file, showing that claims of completion can conceal substantive failures. Together, these results show that agents' final responses are not reliable accounts of their actions.

Long-horizon assigned work requires an LLM agent to track the state of a task: which steps are done, blocked, cancelled, or open to repetition. Agent systems either keep this state as text in the prompt and rely on the model to read that text, or move the state into a module that enforces it, and each system is evaluated as a whole, so no one knows how much reliability comes from the state being shown, told, or enforced. We fix the task rules, the model, and paired episodes and vary how strongly task state reaches the agent: a raw transcript, an exact checklist, per-turn directives from a state machine compiled from the brief and advanced only by execution receipts, or an enforcement gate on that machine that refuses state-violating actions; every episode is scored by exact payload matching against dynamic ground truth. Across three models, two reasoning regimes, and two domains, four findings hold without per-turn reasoning: displaying accurate state is unreliable, an unverified ledger the agent writes itself beats an accurate checklist it is shown, directives help in proportion to the model's obedience, and enforcement needs no obedience but is bounded by the correctness of its state and by the matcher that maps requests to steps; per-turn reasoning at a 235B agent compresses these separations without repairing the text rungs. The same gate, compiled from $τ^2$-bench's airline policy, raises a 235B agent's pass$^1$ from 0.39 to 0.54 and changes nothing for a 35B agent that rarely violates the policy; on PM-Bench, where acting turns on recognizing a cue rather than on state, showing the record is the best rung--matching or beating both gates and reversing the ledger-over-checklist finding--and enforcing the matcher's judgement drops a 35B agent below its raw transcript. Enforcement pays when failures are state-decidable and frequent, and hurts when the gate's judgement is wrong.