Comparing Human and Large Language Model Interpretation of Implicit Information

Humans effortlessly go beyond literal meanings: If you mow the lawn, I will give you fifty dollars, is typically understood as implying that the speaker will pay only if the lawn is mowed, whereas If you are hungry, there is pizza in the oven implies that pizza is available regardless of the hearers hunger. Large Language Models - LLMs - show human-like performance on many tasks, yet it remains unclear whether they reason like humans. To address this, we conducted a population-matching experiment assessing how twentyfive LLMs compute conditional inferences across four languages, compared to an equal number of humans per language. We find that humans enrich logical reasoning through pragmatic inferences across languages. Model behavior is more variable. Some LLMs perfectly follow the truth-table of conditionals but they ignore pragmatic inferences, while others deviate from the truth-table, adhering to a single interpretation across the board, thus reflecting accurate rule-based processing but not human-like reasoning. Overall, LLMs are accurate semantic operators, but fail to capture the pragmatic enrichments characteristic of human reasoning. Crucially, LLM accuracy is neither predicted nor boosted by open vs. closed status, training orientation, or architecture type, suggesting that pragmatic reasoning is still an emerging ability in the cognitive toolkit of artificial systems.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into high-stakes decision-making. Inspired by the theory of \emph{inattentional blindness} in human cognition, we investigate whether LLMs, trained on human-preferred corpora that embed attentional biases, exhibit a similar limitation: \emph{failing to attend to subtle yet important contextual cues under explicit task instructions}. To evaluate this, we introduce the task of \textbf{explicit-implicit reasoning} and present \textbf{MixRea}, a benchmark of 2,246 multiple-choice questions across 9 reasoning types with varying distributions of explicit and implicit information. Evaluation of 21 advanced LLMs shows that even the best-performing reasoning model (Gemini 2.5 Pro) achieves only 42.8% consistency, revealing widespread inattentional blindness. To mitigate this, we propose \textbf{Potential Relation Completion Prompting (PRCP)}, a prompting method that improves reasoning by recovering overlooked causal relations. Further analysis shows that this limitation persists across diverse multi-source reasoning tasks, highlighting the need for more cognitively aligned models.

Much work on the cognitive foundations of AI has focussed on comparisons between the ways in which Large Language Models (LLMs) and humans process information and represent it. One aspect of this comparison involves determining the extent to which LLMs can achieve or surpass human performance on a variety of cognitively interesting tasks. A second explores points of convergence and divergence between LLM and human systems for processing information. Here, I consider some recent research that has addressed both issues in two informational domains. The first is the representation of linguistic knowledge. The second is real world reasoning and planning. While LLMs frequently achieve impressive levels of performance and fluency on linguistic applications, they tend to handle linguistic content in ways that are distinct from human processing. They are also, for the most part, less efficient than humans in learning and generalisation for reasoning tasks.