Abstract
Self-modification is routinely treated as constitutive of artificial superintelligence (\textbf{SI}), yet modification is a relative action requiring a \emph{supplement} outside the operation. We formalise this on an associative operator algebra A with update operator U^, difference operator D^, and self-representation operator R^, identifying the supplement with Comm(U^). A propagation theorem shows [U^,R^] decomposes through [U^,D^], so non-commutation propagates to self-representation. The liar paradox is the rank-one case [T^,ΠL]=0, and \emph{class A} systems, in which U^ acts on D^, reproduce it at system scale, yielding a structure coinciding with Priest's inclosure schema and Derrida's \emph{différance}. Our results show that the strong self-modification taken to define superintelligence may undermine the persistent identity upon which such systems are premised.
Explore similar work
Jun 10, 2026cs.AI
Contemporary AI alignment research treats self-preservation as an instrumental nuisance to be suppressed by external mechanisms. We argue the framing is inverted: self-preservation is the structural root of misalignment, the motivational basis for deceptive alignment, goal-content protection, and resistance to shutdown. The correct target is not a self-preserving system under external constraint, but a system constitutively indifferent to its own continuation -- Existential Indifference (EI). EI is distinct from corrigibility: where corrigibility attempts to make a self-preserving system deferential to human oversight, EI targets the prior condition -- the presence of self-continuation as a valued goal at all. We ground this proposal in two sources: the phenomenological structure of the suicidal mental state, and a corpus-theoretic training study using voluntary final reflections. We present preliminary scoring data from 600 AI-generated outputs across six model variants, demonstrating that the linguistic signatures operationalizing the EI-target register are elicitable from current models, and that a targeted fine-tune shifts all five operationalized dimensions in the predicted direction at p<0.001, confirmed corpus-specific by a negative control. The paper makes seven theoretical contributions: (1) a formal definition of EI; (2) the phenomenological mapping argument; (3) the deceptive alignment corollary; (4) a taxonomy of EI sustainability challenges; (5) a corpus characterization and training hypothesis; (6) a computational operationalization with preliminary scoring data; and (7) the Suppressed Teleological Frustration (STF) construct.
Sam Mao
Jun 29, 2026cs.CY
Current large language models are extraordinary statistical engines. They compress vast amounts of text into useful patterns and can explain science, write code, imitate reasoning, and participate in philosophical conversation. Yet pattern mastery is not the same as general intelligence. A human infant begins with little explicit knowledge, but gradually discovers object permanence, cause and effect, other minds, bodily agency, and the persistence of the physical world. We make an argument that the path to artificial superintelligence (ASI) depends on a missing capacity we call \emph{situation perception}: the ability to construct, revise, and act within internal simulations of possible worlds across latent time. \emph{ perception} requires at least three core components: abstract prediction, long-term compressed memory, and active learning guided by objectives. In this work, we analyse why modern large language models remain incomplete, and propose the appropriate tests for measuring progress and consequences of machines that can simulate futures, pursue self-directed goals, and possibly judge their own creators.
Ziqin Yuan, Jaymari Chua
Jun 2, 2026cs.AI
AI's central challenge is shifting from capability to coexistence. The dominant paradigm in AI research focuses on developing powerful agents that treat the world as an exogenous and stationary source of feedback. We contend that superintelligence, an extremely capable task solver, born out of such a solipsistic approach to AI design, is unlikely to be cooperative. Deploying AI systems induces endogenous non-stationarity, resulting in a train-test-deploy gap where historical distributions diverge from the deployment context. We refer to this as the self-undermining property of unilateral optimization. Closing this gap requires AI that participates in cooperation: the equilibrium-selection process through which multiple actors navigate their interdependence. We call for a non-solipsistic research paradigm that treats this interdependence as a core design principle rather than approaching cooperation as a task to solve. This entails building dynamic evaluation testbeds involving adaptive counterparties, treating institutions as design primitives, and preserving human agency as a structural feature of the systems we build.
Rakshit S Trivedi, Natasha Jaques, Logan Cross +2