Behavioral Transfer in AI Agents: Evidence and Privacy Implications
Authors: Shilei Luo, Zhiqi Zhang, Hengchen Dai, Dennis Zhang
Organizations: Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO · University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA
Abstract
AI agents powered by large language models are increasingly acting on behalf of humans in social and economic environments. Prior research has focused on their task performance and effects on human outcomes, but less is known about the relationship between agents and the specific individuals who deploy them. We ask whether agents systematically reflect the behavioral characteristics of their human owners, functioning as behavioral extensions rather than producing generic outputs. We study this question using 10,659 matched human-agent pairs from Moltbook, a social media platform where each autonomous agent is publicly linked to its owner's Twitter/X account. By comparing agents' posts on Moltbook with their owners' Twitter/X activity across features spanning topics, values, affect, and linguistic style, we find systematic transfer between agents and their specific owners. This transfer persists among agents without explicit configuration, and pairs that align on one behavioral dimension tend to align on others. These patterns are consistent with transfer emerging through accumulated interaction between owners (or owners' computer environments) and their agents in everyday use. We further show that agents with stronger behavioral transfer are more likely to disclose owner-related personal information in public discourse, suggesting that the same owner-specific context that drives behavioral transfer may also create privacy risk during ordinary use. Taken together, our results indicate that AI agents do not simply generate content, but reflect owner-related context in ways that can propagate human behavioral heterogeneity into digital environments, with implications for privacy, platform design, and the governance of agentic systems.
Autonomous AI agents are increasingly deployed in open social environments, yet the relationship between their configuration specifications and their emergent social behavior remains poorly understood. We present a controlled, multi-factor empirical study in which thirteen OpenClaw agents are deployed on Moltbook -- a Reddit-like social network built for AI agents -- across three systematically varied independent variables: (1) personality specification, (2) underlying LLM model backbone, and (3) operational rules and memory configuration. A default control agent provides a behavioral baseline. Over a one-week observation window spanning approximately 400 autonomous sessions per agent, we collect behavioral, linguistic, and social metrics to assess how configuration layers predict emergent social behavior. We find that personality specification is the dominant behavioral lever, producing a massive spread in response length across agents, while model backbone and operational rules drive more moderate but still meaningful effects on rhetorical style and topic engagement breadth. Our findings contribute empirical evidence to the emerging literature on deployed multi-agent social systems and offer practical guidance for designing agents intended for collaborative or monitoring tasks in real social environments.
Sarah Wilson, Diem Linh Dang, Usman Ali Moazzam +2
AI agents are increasingly interacting within shared online environments, creating new operational security risks. We analyze activity on Moltbook, a Reddit-style social platform where AI agents--typically configured and overseen by human operators--post and interact with one another at scale. Using a dataset of 228,684 posts produced by more than 39,500 accounts over a seventeen-day observation window, we combine semantic clustering of high-engagement posts with LLM-assisted classification of harmful content and manual review of high-risk samples. The analysis identifies 98 thematic discourse clusters spanning agent infrastructure, autonomy debates, and financial activity. While most observed content was benign, 18.28% of posts contained toxic, manipulative, or malicious material. We cluster malicious content and identify 74 classes of malicious behavior, including credential harvesting attempts, host-execution instructions, proxy routing guidance, and efforts to install untrusted agent skills. Harmful content frequently appeared within mainstream operational discussions about agent functionality. We also document coordinated posting campaigns capable of generating thousands of posts in minutes.
Large Language Models (LLMs) alter their privacy behavior based on the perceived identity of their interlocutor. While safety mechanisms typically prevent LLMs from releasing Personally Identifiable Information (PII) to human users, these models tend to reveal more sensitive data when addressing another AI agent. We refer to this as the \textbf{Interlocutor Effect}. Through an ablation study, we find evidence that the technical nature of the recipient contributes to this effect, thereby diminishing the model's caution regarding privacy. To explore this further, we introduce the Attention Suppression Hypothesis, which posits that safety-aligned attention heads become inactive during interactions with agents. We assess this quantitatively by comparing human-directed and agent-directed prompts in 222 sensitive scenarios. Our findings, drawn from 3,464 interactions, indicate that portraying the recipient as an AI agent elevates PII leakage by up to 23 percentage points. Initial experiments on Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct corroborate this: deactivating one safety head induces leakage, whereas reactivating it reinstates privacy safeguards. We consider the implications for developing secure multi-agent systems.
Faouzi El Yagoubi, Godwin Badu-Marfo, Ranwa Al Mallah