cs.CYMar 24, 2026

Votiverse: A Configurable Governance Platform for Democratic Decision-Making

Authors: Diego Macrini

Organizations: Proximify Inc., Ottawa, Canada

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Abstract

Democracy is not a single mechanism. It is a space of possible configurations -- a spectrum stretching from pure direct participation to full delegation of authority. The systems we live under today occupy a narrow band of that spectrum, chosen centuries ago under constraints that no longer apply, and rarely questioned since. Votiverse is a platform for exploring the rest of that space. It provides organizations, communities, and institutions of any size with a configurable governance engine. Participants can vote directly, delegate their vote to trusted individuals by topic, or operate under any hybrid arrangement their group defines. Delegations are revocable, topic-specific, and transitive. A direct vote always overrides a delegation. In this model, traditional representative democracy is not the norm -- it is an edge case: the configuration you get when delegation is forced, universal, non-specific, and irrevocable for a fixed term. Votiverse introduces two structural innovations. First, a governance awareness layer -- a built-in system that monitors the delegation network and delivers contextual, progressive-disclosure reporting to participants at the point of decision. Second, a prediction-tracking accountability layer. Proposals carry falsifiable predictions. Outcomes are recorded. Over time, the platform builds a collective memory of what was decided, what was promised, and what actually happened. Together, these layers transform voting from a momentary act into an ongoing process of collective learning. This paper formalizes the governance model, situates it within existing work on liquid democracy and participatory decision-making, addresses known failure modes, and describes the architecture of the platform. The core platform has been implemented and released as open-source software.

Figures & tables

 No transfersTransfers
No candidatesDirect democracy. Everyone votes on everything. No delegation mechanism exists.Informal liquid. Anyone can delegate to anyone. Chains flow freely. No formal candidate system. Delegators rely on personal knowledge to choose delegates.
CandidatesRepresentative. Appoint a declared candidate as your proxy. They vote for you but cannot pass your vote further. Classic proxy voting.Liquid delegation. Candidates exist for discoverability and accountability. Anyone can still delegate to anyone. Chains are transitive.
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