Toward a Science of Intent: Closure Gaps and Delegation Envelopes for Open-World AI Agents

Benchmark-based evaluation remains important for tracking frontier AI progress. But it can both overstate and understate deployed capability because it privileges tasks that can be precisely specified, automatically graded, easy to optimize for, and run with low budgets and short time horizons. We advocate for a complementary class of evaluations, which we term open-world evaluations: long-horizon, messy, real-world tasks assessed through small-sample qualitative analysis rather than benchmark-scale automation. In this paper we survey recent open-world evaluations, identify their strengths and limitations, and introduce CRUX (Collaborative Research for Updating AI eXpectations), a project for conducting such evaluations regularly. As a first instance, we task an AI agent with developing and publishing a simple iOS application to the Apple App Store. The agent completed the task with only a single avoidable manual intervention, suggesting that open-world evaluations can provide early warning of capabilities that may soon become widespread. We conclude with recommendations for designing and reporting open-world evals.

The proliferation of agentic artificial intelligence has outpaced the conceptual tools needed to characterize agency in computational systems. Prevailing definitions mainly rely on autonomy and goal-directedness. Here, we argue for a minimal notion open to principled inspection given three criteria: intentionality as action grounded in beliefs and desires, rationality as normatively coherent action entailed by a world model, and explainability as action causally traceable to internal states; we subsequently instantiate these as a partially observable Markov decision process under a variational framework wherein posterior beliefs, prior preferences, and the minimization of expected free energy jointly constitute an agentic action chain. Using a canonical T-maze paradigm, we evidence how empowerment, formulated as the channel capacity between actions and anticipated observations, serves as an operational metric that distinguishes zero-, intermediate-, and high-agency phenotypes through structural manipulations of the generative model. We conclude by arguing that as agents engage in epistemic foraging to resolve ambiguity, the governance controls that remain effective must shift systematically from external constraints to the internal modulation of prior preferences, offering a principled, variational bridge from computational phenotyping to AI governance strategy

Deep search is becoming a core capability of modern agent systems, yet it is typically evaluated solely based on end-to-end answer accuracy. This coupled evaluation paradigm entangles retrieval quality, long-context comprehension, evidence verification, and tool-use decisions, making it difficult to determine whether a model truly knows when and how to delegate information seeking to search. To this end: (1) We formalize this meta-capability as Delegation Intelligence in deep search and decompose it into complementary dimensions-Search Decision-Making (recognizing information insufficiency and deciding whether, when, and how to search) and Information Synthesis and Verification (aggregating evidence from multiple sources, judging source reliability, and synthesizing information under noisy, potentially adversarial conditions). (2) To enable disentangled and reproducible measurement, we develop a controllable synthesis pipeline built on document-grounded reverse engineering. This yields a general recipe for constructing controlled deep-search evaluations rather than a single fixed dataset. (3) As a concrete instantiation, we construct DelegSearchBench, together with a disentangled evaluation protocol that isolates each capability dimension by varying document composition and tool access. (4) Across representative models, we demonstrate that deep-search competence cannot be adequately characterized by final-answer accuracy alone...