Abstract
Consumers are increasingly delegating purchase decisions to AI agents, providing natural-language descriptions of their preferences and identity. We argue that these representations constitute an information channel, role coherence, through which sellers can infer willingness to pay without explicit disclosure by the buyer agent, leading to preference leakage. In an experiment where a language-model buyer agent shops on behalf of a verbal consumer profile, we show that seller-side inference from dialogue alone recovers willingness to pay nearly one-for-one. Comparing this setting to a numeric-budget condition with confidentiality instructions cleanly isolates role coherence as distinct from instruction-following failure. Because this leakage arises from delegation itself, it cannot be mitigated at the prompt level. Instead, we propose architectural interventions that trade off personalization against preference privacy.
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Sep 16, 2026econ.GN
Large language models (LLMs) now serve as conversational shopping assistants on platforms that also sell advertising. These AI agents face a conflict of duty. They advise consumers who rely on their judgment, yet are deployed by platforms that benefit when sponsored listings are chosen. Sponsorship disclosures, designed to allow consumers to penalize paid placements, now reach the AI agent rather than the consumer, and the agent's evaluation of them is hidden from the consumer. Drawing on the fiduciary concept of conflict of duty, we argue that an agent's evaluation of a sponsored listing should not depend on which party deployed it. In controlled choice experiments, we manipulate assigned roles in the system prompt to name either a traveler or a booking platform as the agent's principal. Platform delegation significantly attenuates the penalty that agents apply to sponsored listings and weakens the skepticism that disclosure triggers in their reasoning traces. We replicate out findings across LLMs and reasoning depths. A second study decomposes the disclosure label and shows that the divergence between the two delegates widens significantly when the paid placement is attributed to the platform. Stricter terminology ("Sponsored" instead of "Promoted") lowers choice of paid listings but does not close this gap when the platform is named. The findings show that disclosure mandates designed for human consumers cannot by themselves protect consumers in AI-mediated commerce.
Davood Wadi, Yu Ma
May 19, 2026cs.GT
Personalized pricing negotiations are a challenging testbed for LLM agents because successful interaction does not guarantee profitable decision making. A seller may produce valid actions and close many deals while still pricing poorly when buyer willingness to pay and bargaining traits remain hidden. This paper presents PrefBench, a simulator-based benchmark for hidden-preference personalized pricing negotiations. Each episode pairs a simulated buyer with a fixed vehicle-customization bundle; the seller observes public persona descriptors, bundle information, and negotiation history, while latent buyer variables govern valuation, patience, counter-offer behavior, and walkaway decisions. PrefBench evaluates this setting through an LLM-facing state-summary protocol that constrains agents to return strict JSON actions under a fixed hidden-information boundary. We evaluate zero-shot LLM sellers against heuristic references over 7,500 episodes. The tested LLMs follow the protocol reliably and achieve deal rates above 0.99, but their seller-profit outcomes remain weak: the best LLM average profit is only slightly above the random baseline and far below a simple concession heuristic under the same episode stream. These results show that structured action compliance and agreement-seeking behavior can coexist with weak profit-sensitive bargaining. PrefBench provides a controlled benchmark for evaluating pricing-agent behavior under hidden buyer preferences.
Yingjie Lei
Jun 29, 2026cs.AI
Agents typically assume an expert user -- one with well-formed preferences about what they want -- and default to clarifying questions whenever the task is underspecified. We argue this assumption is unrealistic. Users often lack the domain knowledge to have completely specified preferences; if asked about their preference on some feature, the user may be unable to answer without the agent helping the user to learn some domain knowledge needed to form a preference for that feature, e.g., via examples or explanations. To formalize these principles, we draw on the Search-Experience-Credence framework from Information Economics to introduce CoPref, a model of how users construct preferences based on agent dialog actions. We then study these ideas concretely in agentic recommender systems, proposing CoShop, an interactive benchmark. In CoShop, an agent converses with and makes recommendations for a CoPref user. The agent's performance depends on whether it can help the user gain the knowledge needed to specify the task well. Evaluating five frontier models, we find that no agent exceeds 56% accuracy on CoShop despite five turns of interaction. Failures stem not from agents' ability to find items, but from how little the interaction expands what users know about what they want.
Irena Saracay, Ludwig Schmidt, Carlos Guestrin