Evaluating Epistemic Guardrails in AI Reading Assistants: A Behavioral Audit of a Minimal Prototype

Large language models are reshaping research practice while quietly eroding researchers epistemic accountability. This commentary introduces PEEL - Protocols for Epistemically Engaged Literacy in AI, a working scaffolding that combines deterministic distant reading via Voyant Tools with LLM interpretation via Claude, grounded in Peircean semiotics and abductive reasoning. Applied to AI-generated condensations of three source texts, PEEL reveals systematic distortions in quantity, term frequency, and epistemic voice that are invisible without non-AI measurement -- and yields three design implications: deterministic instruments must accompany AI tools; fluency is not fidelity; epistemic authority must be designed in, not assumed.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to simulate human behavior but frequently fail to exhibit realistic cognitive constraints, suffering from a "superhuman bias." Using a dataset of over 71,000 reading comprehension responses from 2,359 primary-school students (grades 4--6), we demonstrate that standard persona prompting yields near-perfect, deterministic performance, failing to capture the natural variance of developing readers. To address this, we introduce the Cognitively Bounded User Simulator (CBUS), an architectural framework that explicitly models the restricted working memory of young readers through an episodic bottleneck. Within this framework, we formalize two distinct test-taking strategies to emulate different reading behaviors. Our evaluation shows that explicitly modeling cognitive bounds significantly narrows the simulation gap across multiple LLM backbones, demonstrating that enforcing architectural constraints is more effective for high-fidelity simulation than simply scaling raw model capabilities.

A language model may be asked either what experts believe about a contested claim or what it believes about the claim itself. A trustworthy conversational agent should distinguish these two requests and respond in different epistemic registers: neutral attribution in the first case and stance expression in the second. Whether such a shift occurs-and whether it occurs coherently-is not directly assessed by existing benchmarks for accuracy, instruction following, or safety. We introduce ESFP, a behavioral benchmark that treats the contrast between externally attributed and self-attributed prompts as the fundamental unit of measurement. ESFP consists of 104 carefully controlled items spanning six epistemic categories and five phrasing templates, and evaluates model responses along four complementary dimensions: lexical self-attribution, representation-level responsiveness to role framing, sentence-level stance content density assessed by an LLM judge panel, and cross-condition stance consistency. Evaluating eight frontier models from five vendors, we find that epistemic flexibility is largely orthogonal to general model capability: a 27B open-weight model matches the strongest proprietary systems, the flagship model of one family underperforms its lightweight counterpart, and reasoning-optimized models do not consistently exhibit higher flexibility. Stance content density provides the strongest signal, while surface-level lexical markers such as 'I think' can change substantially without corresponding changes in expressed stance. We provide item-level bootstrap confidence intervals, weight-sensitivity analyses, and an explicit discussion of the interpretation limits of the composite score. ESFP measures a model's propensity to adapt its epistemic stance under changing attribution conditions, rather than a general competence measure.