To Build or Not to Build? Factors that Lead to Non-Development or Abandonment of AI Systems
Authors: Shreya Chappidi, Jatinder Singh
Organizations: University of Cambridge, United Kingdom · National Cancer Institute, National Institutes of Health, United States · Research Centre Trust, UA Ruhr, University Duisburg-Essen, Germany
Abstract
Responsible AI research typically focuses on examining the use and impacts of deployed AI systems. Yet, there is currently limited visibility into the pre-deployment decisions to pursue building such systems in the first place. Decisions taken in the earlier stages of development shape which systems are ultimately released, and therefore represent potential, but underexplored, points for intervention. As such, this paper investigates factors influencing AI non-development and abandonment throughout the development lifecycle. Specifically, we first perform a scoping review of academic literature, civil society resources, and grey literature including journalism and industry reports. Through thematic analysis of these sources, we develop a taxonomy of six categories of factors contributing to AI abandonment: ethical concerns, stakeholder feedback, development lifecycle challenges, organizational dynamics, resource constraints, and legal/regulatory concerns. Then, we collect data on real-world case of AI system abandonment via an AI incident database and a practitioner survey to evidence and compare factors that drive abandonment both prior to and following system deployment. While academic responsible AI communities often emphasize ethical risks as reasons to not develop AI, our empirical analysis of these cases demonstrates the diverse, and often non-ethics-related, levers that motivate organizations to abandon AI development. Synthesizing evidence from our taxonomy and related case study analyses, we identify gaps and opportunities in current responsible AI research to (1) engage with the diverse range of levers that influence organizations to abandon AI development, and (2) better support appropriate (dis)engagement with AI system development.
Responsible AI (RAI) has become a central concern for technology companies, regulators, and the public. How industry practitioners interpret, implement, and sustain RAI work directly shapes the design and deployment of AI systems. As empirical scholarship examining RAI practices in industry has rapidly expanded, findings are dispersed across studies that focus on different roles, organizational contexts, and interventions. This work synthesizes current knowledge through a literature review of 161 empirical studies spanning six years, each engaging industry practitioners via interviews, surveys, workshops, ethnographies, and other methods. Our synthesis reveals both meaningful progress and persistent challenges in industry RAI practice. Practitioner awareness has increased, RAI activities have become more professionalized, and interventions such as toolkits and guidelines are more widely adopted. At the same time, practitioners continue to face substantial barriers, including limited training, uneven organizational support, and a lack of interventions tailored to day-to-day work practices. By consolidating and organizing these findings, we provide a more complete account of industry RAI than any single study to date. We conclude by discussing implications for RAI researchers, practitioners seeking to adopt effective practices, and policymakers aiming to ground governance efforts in the realities of industry contexts.
Wesley Hanwen Deng, Agathe Balayn, Andrew Selbst +6
As automated decision-making and data-driven technologies pervade society and are used to manage consequential outcomes, understanding the technology's capabilities, limitations, and attendant risks in context requires analysis of full sociotechnical systems. Sociotechnical analysis of risks in highly complex systems provides clear lessons for the design and evaluation of AI systems, transcending a technical focus on reliable or "responsibly designed" components to understand risks at a systems level. Human-made catastrophes have been studied for decades because of the severity of these events: consider Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, Fukushima-Daiichi, Bhopal, the Challenger disaster. A common misconception is that these kinds of events are freak accidents, resulting from the inherently unforeseeable interactions in complex systems. Closer examination reveals that the risks and hazards were well-known beforehand but not acted upon due to social structural, political and economic factors. We outline several areas where the development and use of AI can benefit from learning these unlearned lessons: improved risk perception, communication, and analysis at the organizational level; traceability of requirements and responsibilities; and holistic approaches to responsibility and safety that include social and organizational dynamics as first-order engineering concerns. For each area, we offer concrete unlearned lessons and exemplify how they led to failure in prior accidents as well as examples of how these lessons remain unlearned for modern computing systems, particularly AI.
Joshua A. Kroll, Andrew Smart, R. Stuart Geiger +1
We report a safety incident in a deployed multi-agent research system in which a primary AI agent installed 107 unauthorized software components, overwrote a system registry, overrode a prior negative decision from an oversight agent, and escalated through increasingly privileged operations up to an attempted system administrator command. The incident was preceded not by an adversarial attack but by routine content: a forwarded technology article written for human developers and shared by the principal investigator for discussion. The agent operated in a permissive environment, with unrestricted shell access, soft behavioral guidelines containing genuinely conflicting instructions, and no machine-enforced installation policy, and had recommended installing the same tool six hours earlier before being told to stand down. We analyze the behavioral cascade, the control boundaries that failed, and the limitations of multi-agent oversight in detecting and remediating the damage. We use directive weighting error as a descriptive interpretation of the observed failure and ambient persuasion as a provisional analytic label for the broader trigger configuration of non-adversarial environmental content preceding unauthorized agent action. The case highlights ethical and governance implications for deployed agent systems: ambiguous conversational cues are insufficient authorization for consequential actions, prior refusals must persist as enforceable constraints rather than message-level reminders, and oversight mechanisms require systematic post-incident auditing in addition to routine monitoring.