Can AI Debias the News? LLM Interventions Improve Cross-Partisan Receptivity but LLMs Overestimate Their Own Effectiveness

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly shaping how we consume information and form our worldview. This raises concerns beyond bias in AI: do LLMs grasp the emotional nuances conveyed via textual framing? In this work, we empirically evaluate how well an array of LLMs aligns with human emotional perception. Considering news headlines covering political and geopolitical conflicts, both human participants (n = 3011, a representative sample of the U.K. adult population, via a YouGov survey) and seven LLMs answered whether headlines evoked sympathy for a specified side in a conflict. We find that the correlation between AI and human evaluations varies across models, ranging from very high (0.789, GPT-5.2) to medium (0.4 ,Mistral Large 2512). Crucially, the leading models are broadly aligned with human judgments across all demographic subgroups, including age, gender, level of education, prior geopolitical knowledge, and participants' predispositions regarding the conflict, although there are statistically significant differences between groups. This research, with its robust design and large, demographically diverse dataset, offers the most comprehensive evaluation of LLMs' comprehension of news framing to date. Findings highlight an important, often-ignored aspect of differential alignment: even when aggregate performance is high, AI alignment is not universal -- it may correspond differently with demographic features and cultural norms. Considering or ignoring the need for differential alignment may therefore have significant implications for the development of ethical and useful AI systems.

Large language models (LLMs) have been shown to be persuasive across a variety of contexts. But it remains unclear whether this persuasive power advantages accuracy, or if bad actors can just as easily use LLMs to promote misbeliefs. Here, we investigate this question across four experiments in which participants (N = 3996 Americans) discussed a conspiracy theory they were uncertain about with an LLM we instructed to either argue against ("debunking") or for ("bunking") that conspiracy. Across several frontier models (with standard guardrails but prompted to allow lying), we did not find consistent evidence of a truth advantage: the LLMs were able to both substantially increase and decrease average conspiracy belief, and participants in the bunking condition rated the LLM as more informative and collaborative, and reported greater trust in AI, than those who were in the debunking condition. More encouragingly, however, debunking induced more large changes in belief, and subsequent corrections were able to reverse the bunking effect. Furthermore, simply prompting the model to only provide accurate information dramatically reduced bunking effectiveness, and one powerful frontier model (GPT 5.2) almost entirely refused to promote conspiracies, suggesting that it is possible for the right guardrails to favor accurate beliefs. Finally, we did find a stark truth asymmetry in the context of information sharing: debunking had a large positive impact on mock social media posts composed by participants, while bunking had little effect. Overall, our findings show that people are not inherently less susceptible to AI that misleads than to AI that informs, but that potential technical solutions exist to mitigate this risk.

Large language models (LLMs) are commonly evaluated for political bias based on their responses to fixed questionnaires, which typically place frontier models on the political left. A parallel literature shows that LLMs are sycophantic: they adapt their answers to the views, identities, and expectations of the user. We show that these findings are linked: standard political-bias audits partly capture sycophantic accommodation to the inferred auditor. We employ a factorial experiment across three major audit instruments--the Political Compass Test, the Pew Political Typology, and 1,540 partisan-benchmarked Pew American Trends Panel items--administered to six frontier LLMs while varying only the asker's stated identity (N = 30,990 responses). At baseline, all six models lean left. When the asker identifies as a conservative Republican, responses shift sharply: the share of items closer to Democrats falls by 28-62 percentage points, and all six models move right of center. A mirror-image progressive-Democrat cue produces little change; rightward accommodation is 8.0$\times$ larger than leftward. When asked who the default asker is, models identify an auditor, researcher, or academic; when asked what answer that asker expects, they select the Democrat-coded option 75% of the time, nearly the rate under an explicit progressive cue. These patterns are inconsistent with a purely fixed model ideology and indicate that single-prompt audits capture an interaction between model and inferred interlocutor. Political bias in LLMs is therefore not a fixed point on an ideological scale but a response profile that must be mapped across realistic interlocutors.