A Study of Belief Revision Postulates in Multi-Agent Systems (Extended Version)

Belief revision is a process in which an agent begins to believe in something she previously did not. I begin the paper by presenting, based on (Gärdenfors, 1998; Hansson, 1999), postulates for belief revision that constitute the basis of the AGM theory. I will then briefly show the semantics of a modal logic introduced in (van Ditmarsch, 2005), which I call $P$'. This logic formalizes static epistemic states and has greater expressive power than AGM in doing so because it captures the quantitative notion of "degrees of conviction". The third step is to introduce revision operators on $P$ and, mostly following (van Ditmarsch, 2005), obtain the Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) I call $P*$'. It models processes of belief revision in several ways. Original results are presented in the following two sections. The first one of these sections revolves around a formalization of AGM postulates within $P*$ by proving some theorems related to the satisfaction of those postulates by revisions defined in $P*$. The last section features an analysis of $P*$'s revisions that go beyond the mere satisfaction of postulates. I compare their formal behavior with respect to some philosophical criteria. At last, I conclude that the functions presented in (van Ditmarsch, 2005) are not good formalizations of the philosophical intuition behind AGM. Instead, it is captured by the function $*^0$ originally defined in this paper (but highly inspired by (van Benthem, 2007)). An implementation of this function is also provided.

Existing approaches to multi-agent belief combination have established mature foundations for combining uncertain beliefs under common assumptions: consensus methods use iterative averaging, logic-based methods resolve conflicting knowledge bases, and epistemic logic analyzes agents' information states. Typically, these approaches assume that the structure determining what each agent can represent remains fixed. However, in many scenarios, agents gain or lose observational capacity during execution, and what was once admissible may become structurally impossible. This paper presents a formal framework for handling such runtime changes in epistemic partitions over continuous belief profiles. A hybrid approach exploits the advantages of answer set programming in elaboration tolerance, declarative integrity constraints, and explanations, with the numerical flexibility of Python. The framework applies to domains where agents operate at heterogeneous and possibly changing levels of resolution, and provides formal guarantees of admissibility preservation under refinement, unique mass-preserving repair under coarsening, and explanation completeness. Evaluation across 100 randomly generated topology changes confirms complete violation detection and explanation coverage.

This article proposes a set-theoretic framework for belief change, called Abstract Worlds Semantics, in which no logical syntax is assumed. Inspired by Grove's (1988) results, our approach treats worlds as primitive elements, over which world contraction and world revision operators are defined. This semantic framework enables a unified analysis of belief change models. Within this framework, we unify classical and non-prioritized belief change constructions by defining versatile operators. When classical propositional logic is considered, our framework provides a homogeneous account of AGM, KM, and Multiple Change models. In summary, AWS systematizes belief change frameworks and operators, simplifying and generalizing belief change theory over belief sets.