An Abstract Worlds Semantic Framework for Belief Change Operators

Belief revision is a process in which an agent begins to believe in something she previously did not. I begin the paper by presenting, based on (Gärdenfors, 1998; Hansson, 1999), postulates for belief revision that constitute the basis of the AGM theory. I will then briefly show the semantics of a modal logic introduced in (van Ditmarsch, 2005), which I call $P$'. This logic formalizes static epistemic states and has greater expressive power than AGM in doing so because it captures the quantitative notion of "degrees of conviction". The third step is to introduce revision operators on $P$ and, mostly following (van Ditmarsch, 2005), obtain the Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) I call $P*$'. It models processes of belief revision in several ways. Original results are presented in the following two sections. The first one of these sections revolves around a formalization of AGM postulates within $P*$ by proving some theorems related to the satisfaction of those postulates by revisions defined in $P*$. The last section features an analysis of $P*$'s revisions that go beyond the mere satisfaction of postulates. I compare their formal behavior with respect to some philosophical criteria. At last, I conclude that the functions presented in (van Ditmarsch, 2005) are not good formalizations of the philosophical intuition behind AGM. Instead, it is captured by the function $*^0$ originally defined in this paper (but highly inspired by (van Benthem, 2007)). An implementation of this function is also provided.

We investigate the belief revision problem in epistemic planning, i.e., what will be the beliefs of all agents in a multi-agent system after an agent gains the belief in some state property. Based on the standard representation in epistemic planning of agents' beliefs via a single multi-agent Kripke model, we generalize the classical AGM belief revision postulates to the multi-agent setting, with the aim to provide a formal framework for evaluating dynamic epistemic reasoning frameworks in which the beliefs of all agents as the result of actions are computed. As an example of a simple operator that satisfies all of the generalized AGM postulates, we present generalized full-meet multi-agent belief revision. We moreover define a generalization of the standard postulates for iterated revision, present a more sophisticated, event model based revision operator, and discuss the potential issues in defining an epistemic operator on Kripke models that can satisfy all of the generalized postulates for iterated multi-agent belief revision.

Knowledge graphs describe reality in crisp assertions, while the systems now consuming them, foundation models and autonomous agents, reason natively in probabilities. We argue that this mismatch is why the integration of language models and knowledge graphs remains a data-feeding pipeline rather than a unified reasoning architecture. We envision Semantic Bayesian World Models (SBWMs): a Web that describes the world not as a database of facts but as a shared, evolving fabric of beliefs over knowledge graphs, where ontological axioms constrain priors, observations update beliefs by Bayesian conditioning, and actions intervene upon the world. We work through what an agent gains from such a model: a home-security agent deciding whether the figure at the gate is a courier or a burglar, an actuarial estimate aggregated by entailment rather than by string frequency, a planning task that language models reliably fail, and the estimation of quantities that no document has ever stated. We then set out what the community must build to make them possible: belief annotation over RDF~1.2, probabilistic entailment regimes, semantic calibration layers, and protocols by which agents that have never met can exchange, and disagree over, calibrated beliefs.