Online Allocation with Unknown Shared Supply

Tzeh Yuan Neoh; Davin Choo; Mengchu Yue; Milind Tambe

cs.AIMay 8, 2026

Online Allocation with Unknown Shared Supply

Authors: Tzeh Yuan Neoh, Davin Choo, Mengchu Yue, Milind Tambe

Organizations: Harvard University

Abstract

Many real-world resource allocation systems, such as humanitarian logistics and vaccine distribution, must preposition limited supply across multiple locations before demand is realized while stockouts incur irreversible service losses. To study this, we introduce the Online Shared Supply Allocation (OSSA) problem, a stateful online model in which a central hub allocates a finite, unknown supply to multiple sites facing sequential demand under fixed-charge transportation costs and lost-sales penalties. Unlike classical make-to-stock or make-to-order inventory models, OSSA precludes backlogging and replenishment only hedges against future demand. To tackle OSSA, we propose a deterministic threshold-proportional policy GPA and prove that it achieves a $4/3$ -approximation to the offline optimum up to an additive term independent of the total supply. We complement this with matching lower bounds showing that the $4/3$ ratio is tight and that the additive-error dependence is unavoidable, even for randomized algorithms that know the total supply upfront. Finally, we develop a learning-augmented extension to GPA that principally incorporates imperfect forecasts (e.g., from human experts or ML models) commonly available in practice, enabling us to exploit high-quality advice while being robust against arbitrary bad ones. Synthetic and real-world experiments show that GPA outperforms natural baselines with global supply is scarce.

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