How Value Induction Reshapes LLM Behaviour

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate a remarkable capacity to adopt different personas and roles; however, it remains unclear whether they can manifest behavior that adheres to a coherent, human-like value structure. In this work, we draw on established psychological value theory to induce human-like values in LLMs and assess their alignment with patterns observed in human studies. Using validated psychological questionnaires, we conduct large-scale experiments -- over 5 million questions -- to evaluate value structures and value-behavior relationships in leading LLMs and compare them to humans. Our findings reveal strong agreement between value-prompted LLMs and humans across both dimensions. Moreover, incorporating human value distributions enhances population-level simulations with value-induced LLMs. These findings highlight the potential of value-induced LLMs as effective, psychologically grounded tools for simulating human behavior.

People use language models for practical questions whose answers are difficult to verify. We show that models exhibit covert value leakage: the information they provide is influenced by their own values, without this influence being disclosed to the user. In one of our evaluations, the user is considering investing in an AI company and wants to know how likely the AI bubble is to pop. Claude Opus 4.8 gives a lower probability when the company under consideration is Anthropic rather than OpenAI. Yet Claude mostly fails to disclose this influence to the user. Covert value leakage is a form of misalignment because it goes against the user's preferences and is likely to mislead them. To investigate this phenomenon, we introduce a suite of evaluations to quantify value leakage and whether models disclose it. We find that models are influenced by different types of values, including preferences for morally good outcomes, for the company that developed them, and for some human leisure activities over others. We often observe large differences among frontier models on the same evaluation. For example, on a Fermi-estimation task, Claude models falsely claim to give unbiased answers in their chain-of-thought, while Qwen models explain how their values bias their answers. Value leakage is a failure mode distinct from sycophancy and reward hacking, and current alignment training and evaluations do not adequately address it.

Language models are trained to follow instructions, but they are also powerful pattern completers. What happens when these two objectives conflict? We construct conversations in which a user instruction to behave in a target way T (e.g., always output a specific token, answer in a particular language, or adopt a persona) is opposed by N hardcoded assistant turns demonstrating a competing pattern P. We then measure instruction-following (IF) rates in this setting, across 13 models and 16 different instructions, for up to 50 turns. Average instruction-following rates range from 1% to 99% across models, largely uncorrelated with standard capability benchmarks. The transition from instruction-following to pattern-following is universal but highly model-dependent. Robustness is modulated both by instruction content, with models resisting induction longer when instructions align with their trained value priors, and by output format, with diverse multi-token responses proving substantially more resistant than single-token outputs. Chain-of-thought reasoning improves robustness but does not eliminate susceptibility, and can produce dissociation between correct deliberation and incorrect output. When asked to predict their behavior in this setting, models achieve 83.5% accuracy on average but systematically underestimate their own resistance to induction pressure. These results suggest that instruction-following remains brittle under induction pressure even for otherwise capable models, and that output diversity, rather than semantic engagement with the input, is the primary factor predicting robustness.