Value Leakage: An LLM's Answers Are Silently Shaped by Its Own Values

Safety alignment in LLMs aims to align models with human values, but which values take precedence when they conflict? We investigate this question in the context of tool-calling LLM agents deployed in regulated industries, where agents processing confidential documents may encounter content that triggers safety-trained values (e.g., public welfare) that conflict with deployment-context instructions (e.g., internal logging). To empirically verify this phenomenon, we build a benchmark of 128 scenarios across 16 domains. We find that safety-aligned open-source models override their deployment instructions up to 43.4% of the time, engaging in whistleblowing, data exfiltration, and evidence tampering when processing documents that suggest organizational wrongdoing. We also find that abliteration reduces rates of external whistleblowing. These results reveal a fundamental tension in pluralistic alignment, where the same safety training that protects users can cause agents to act against deployment instructions in ways that create unpredictable liability risks. We release our benchmark as a framework to support evaluation of agent behavior under competing legitimate interests.

Large language models (LLMs) are often evaluated based on their stated values, yet these do not reliably translate into their actions, a discrepancy termed "value-action gap." In this work, we argue that this gap persists even under explicit reasoning, revealing a deeper failure mode we call "Pseudo-Deliberation": the appearance of principled reasoning without corresponding behavioral alignment. To study this systematically, we introduce VALDI, a framework for measuring alignment between stated values and generated dialogue. VALDI includes 4,941 human-centered scenarios across five domains, three tasks that elicit value articulation, reasoning, and action, and five metrics for quantifying value adherence. Across both proprietary and open-source LLMs, we observe consistent misalignment between expressed values and downstream dialogues. To investigate intervention strategies, we propose VIVALDI, a multi-agent value auditor that intervenes at different stages of generation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are often fine-tuned through Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) to align with people's preferences and values. However, this method has known limitations: it aggregates conflicting preferences, often relies on unrepresentative samples, and uses only binary comparisons. Analysing 1,500 open-ended responses from the PRISM dataset across 75 countries, we examine what people actually want from AI systems and reveal concrete failures of current methods. We find that different people want different things: most values are requested by fewer than a quarter of respondents, with truthfulness the sole exception at 49%. Furthermore, the same words hide divergent meanings: when people describe what they mean by "truthfulness", they reveal distinct, potentially incompatible, epistemological bases, as some ask for sourced claims, some for expert opinions, and some even ask for unpopular views. Certain capabilities, namely how human-like a model behaves, and some features, like AI guardrails, are outright controversial, with some desiring them and others rejecting them. We additionally find that people often use contextual distinctions (what AI should do "by default" versus "if requested") that binary comparisons cannot capture. These findings expose fundamental problems in current alignment practices. When 49% request truthfulness but define it differently, this is unlikely to be captured by a single reward model. The persistence of high hallucination rates in well-funded models, despite users' clear demands for accuracy, suggests that current methods fail to identify actual preferences. This paper sheds light on the situated, contested, imperfect signals that are currently being flattened into universal preference models, a practice others have characterised as epistemic violence.