Strategic commitments shape collective cybersecurity under AI inequality

This work examines an imbalance in artificial intelligence (AI) security research: the field tends to produce more work on attacking AI systems than on defending them. Drawing on related academic papers, we find biased attack-to-defense ratios across subfields, including federated learning, speech recognition, membership inference, large language models, etc. The imbalance possibly means far beyond a simple count: attack papers are routinely evaluated under favorable conditions that make threats look more severe than they are in practice, while defenses are held to a stricter standard that few can meet. The result is a literature rich in demonstrated vulnerabilities and thin on usable and deployed protections. We thus argue that AI security research should better incentivize defense research.

Firms are deploying more capable AI systems, but organizational controls often have not kept pace. These systems can generate greater productivity gains, but high-value uses require broader authority exposure -- data access, workflow integration, and delegated authority -- when governance controls have not yet decoupled capability from authority exposure. We develop an analytical model in which a firm jointly chooses AI deployment and cybersecurity investment under this governance-capability gap. The central result shows a deployment paradox: in high-loss environments, better AI can lead a firm to deploy less when capability is deployed through broader authority exposure under weak governance. Optimal deployment also falls below the no-risk benchmark, and this shortfall widens with breach-loss magnitude and with the authority exposure attached to more capable systems. Governance investment that reduces breach-loss magnitude shrinks the paradox region itself, while breach externalities expand the range of environments in which deployment is socially constrained. Governance maturity is therefore not merely a constraint on AI adoption. It is a condition that shapes whether capability improvements translate into productive deployment.

Cybersecurity literature has extensively documented the operational benefits of artificial intelligence (AI) for threat detection, incident response, and prevention, while raising qualitative concerns about over-automation, algorithmic bias, and analyst-skill erosion. What remains largely absent is a formal, falsifiable model connecting three constructs that recur across this literature: Defense-in-Depth Theory, the Artificial Intelligence Theory of Pattern Recognition, and human-AI collaboration in security operations. This paper develops such a model. We formalize layered defense as a Bernoulli detection cascade in which AI augmentation enters multiplicatively across layers; we formalize each layer's pattern-recognition behavior as a Neyman-Pearson/Bayesian detector with a derived closed-form optimal threshold; and we formalize human-AI triage as a capacity-constrained cascade with an explicit, quantifiable trade-off between detection probability and false-alarm ("alert fatigue") rate. A Monte Carlo/analytical simulation evaluated at illustrative but realistic operating points shows that (i) AI augmentation compounds across defense layers, delivering its largest marginal gains exactly where traditional layering saturates, and (ii) full human review of AI-flagged alerts is not optimal: increasing analyst capacity toward 100% coverage cuts false alarms by roughly 20-fold but simultaneously lowers system-level detection probability, because imperfect analyst accuracy is then applied to every alert rather than a filtered subset. These results give the widely repeated qualitative recommendation of "balanced human-AI collaboration" a precise, testable form and suggest an interior-optimum capacity ratio as a concrete design target for security operations centers (SOCs), including those securing IT/OT-converged critical infrastructure.