cs.LGMay 11, 2026

Identified-Set Geometry of Distributional Model Extraction under Top-K Censored API Access

Authors: Wenhua NieZiCheng ZhuJianan WuBinhan LuoHaoran ZhengJyh-Shing Roger Jang

Organizations: National Taiwan University

Abstract

Modern LLM APIs often reveal only top-KK logit scores and censor the remaining vocabulary. We study the per-position distribution-recovery limits of this access model. For censoring threshold ττ, the compatible teacher distributions form an identified set whose total-variation diameter is exactly UK=(VK)exp(τ)/(ZA+(VK)exp(τ))U_K=(V-K)\exp(τ)/(Z_A+(V-K)\exp(τ)), where ZAZ_A is the observed partition function. For KL recovery, we give a computable binary-endpoint lower bound and an asymptotically matching small-ambiguity upper bound, with an extension to reference-aware attackers. Experiments on a Qwen3 math-reasoning teacher reveal a layered extraction hierarchy: on-task top-KK distillation recovers 12% of private capability, full-logit distillation recovers 56% despite 99% KL closure, and generation-based extraction recovers 96%. Top-KK censoring therefore limits per-position distribution recovery but does not by itself prevent capability extraction, separating fidelity from transfer in prompt-only logit distillation.

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