Regret Minimization in Bilateral Trade With Perturbed Markets

Bilateral trade models the task of intermediating between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, who wish to trade a good. We study this problem from the perspective of a profit-maximizing broker within an online learning framework, where the agents' valuations are generated by a smooth adversary. We devise a learning algorithm that guarantees a $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret bound, which is tight in the time horizon $T$ up to poly-logarithmic factors. This matches the minimax rate for the stochastic i.i.d. case, and is also well separated from the adversarial setting, where sublinear-regret is unattainable. By extending the strong regret guarantees from the i.i.d. case to the smooth adversary, we significantly broaden the scope of settings where such fast rate is achievable, while closing an important gap in the regret landscape of this fundamental economic problem. To overcome the challenges posed by this adversary, we leverage a continuity property of smooth instances and combines this with a hierarchical net-construction of the broker's action space, which is analyzed via algorithmic chaining. We showcase the applicability of these techniques by deriving a similarly tight $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret bound for a related mechanism design model: the joint ads problem.

We study repeated bilateral trade from a fairness perspective. At each round, a fresh seller-buyer pair arrives, and the platform posts a price before observing the traders' valuations. Trade occurs only if both agents accept the price. Rather than maximizing only the gain from trade, we consider platforms that seek balanced divisions of the generated surplus. We show that natural fairness desiderata lead to a one-parameter Rawls-to-Nash family of fair-gain objectives, obtained by aggregating the seller's and buyer's net gains through nonpositive Hölder means. Unlike the standard gain-from-trade objective and the Rawlsian fair-gain objective studied in prior work, our proposed objectives induce a new statistical structure in which expected rewards are recovered from threshold feedback through a two-dimensional singular-kernel integral identity. This leads to a nonstandard pure-exploration problem whose natural estimators are rectangular double sums with row-column dependence and singular weights. Assuming independent i.i.d. seller and buyer valuation sequences with arbitrary unknown marginals, we characterize the optimal learning rates for the whole Rawls-to-Nash family of fair-gain objectives, giving matching fixed-confidence sample-complexity and regret bounds up to polylogarithmic factors.

In contextual bilateral trade under full feedback, the posted price does not affect which valuations are observed. We show that in this model such action-independent feedback removes the polynomial adaptation penalty familiar from heavy-tailed bandits: fully parameter-free algorithms attain the oracle minimax $T$-exponents up to logarithmic factors, with no knowledge of the moment order $p \in (1,2)$ or its scale $σ_p$, and -- in the nonparametric case -- none of the effective Hölder smoothness $β\in (0,1]$. The statistic that makes model selection possible is a paired squared-loss difference, whose noise-square term cancels exactly, leaving noise damped by the candidate gap. The resulting bilateral-trade regret rates are new. Trader valuations have bounded conditional densities and heavy tails -- finite $p$-th moments for some $p \in (1,2)$, with possibly infinite variance. An epoch-based algorithm with truncated means achieves regret $\widetilde{O}(T^{(2-p)/p})$ in the parametric model and $\widetilde{O}(T^{1-2β(p-1)/(βp + d(p-1))})$ when the market value function is $β$-Hölder, with matching $Ω(\cdot)$ lower bounds -- under a mild nondegeneracy condition -- via Assouad's method and a fixed-support mixture construction -- characterizing the minimax rate in $T$ up to logarithmic factors over the effective smoothness range $β\in (0,1]$, interpolating between the classical nonparametric rate at $p{=}2$ and the trivial linear rate as $p \to 1^+$. The enabling structural step extends the self-bounding property of Bachoc et al. (ICML 2025) from bounded to real-valued valuations: within our conditionally independent, conditionally centered noise model, bounded conditional densities and finite first moments suffice for the expected regret of any price $π$ to satisfy $\mathbb{E}[g(m,V,W) - g(π,V,W)] \le L|m-π|^2$ -- no second moment is needed.