Safety-Oriented Evaluation of Language Understanding Systems for Air Traffic Control
Authors: Yujing Chang, Yash Guleria, Duc-Thinh Pham, Nhut-Huy Pham, Ningli Wang, Vu N. Duong, Sameer Alam
Organizations: 1ATMRI, Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore · School of Management, Indian Institute of Technology Mandi, India · Centre of AI Research, VinUniversity, Vietnam
Abstract
Air Traffic Control (ATC) is a safety-critical domain in which incorrect interpretation of instructions may lead to severe operational consequences. While large language models (LLMs) demonstrate strong general performance, their reliability in operational ATC environments remains unclear. Existing evaluation approaches, largely based on aggregate metrics such as F1 or macro accuracy, treat all errors uniformly and fail to account for the asymmetric consequences of high-risk semantic mistakes (e.g., incorrect runway identifiers or movement constraints). To address this gap, we propose a safety-oriented, consequence-aware evaluation framework tailored to ATC operations. Our results reveal that while current LLMs achieve reasonable aggregate accuracy, their operational reliability is severely limited. Evaluated on clean transcripts, the peak Risk Score reaches only 0.69, with most models scoring below 0.6 despite high macro-F1 performance. Further analysis shows that errors concentrate in high-impact entities despite relatively stable action-type classification, indicating structural grounding deficiencies. These findings highlight the necessity of consequence-aware evaluation protocols for the responsible deployment of AI-assisted ATC systems.
Can language models be trusted in safety- critical operations? In such settings, strong per- formance on semantic metrics does not guaran- tee operational reliability: a misread altitude, a dropped execution condition, or a confused call- sign may score well under standard F1 yet carry sharply asymmetric operational consequences. We study this problem in air traffic control (ATC), where controller-pilot communication demands near-zero error tolerance, and use consequence-aware evaluation to test whether semantic scores misstate operational reliabil- ity. The framework is instantiated in a con- trolled diagnostic ATC benchmark grounded in aviation standards and feedback from 40 air traffic controllers across three countries. Evaluating 8 models, we uncover a system- atic semantic-safety gap: conventional scores give substantially higher performance estimates than consequence-aware evaluation, even for models that appear reliable under standard met- rics. Risk-aware fine-tuning narrows but does not close this gap, showing that consequence- aware evaluation is a necessary complement to standard NLP metrics before any real safety- critical deployment claim
Evaluating large language models (LLMs) in safety-critical, physics-governed environments requires more than accuracy-based metrics, because predictions that are numerically close to the ground truth can still violate operational constraints, combine fields in physically inconsistent ways, or fail to produce usable structured outputs. Existing evaluation protocols do not measure these failure modes reliably. We propose FLY-EVAL++, an evidence-driven evaluation protocol that combines deterministic verification of protocol compliance, physical feasibility, and safety constraints with fixed rubric-guided aggregation into interpretable multi-dimensional scores. We instantiate FLY-EVAL++ for Flight Trajectory and Attitude Prediction (FTAP) by extending the PilotBench setting with history-conditioned and multi-step prediction tasks. Across 66 LLMs, safety compliance is the most discriminative dimension of model behavior: models with comparable predictive performance differ by more than 28 points in safety score, and we observe recurrent failures including safety violations under physically plausible predictions and instability in multi-step rollouts. These results show that evaluation in safety-critical domains should measure constraint satisfaction and structured validity explicitly rather than rely on accuracy-centric reporting alone.
We investigate frameworks for post-flight safety analysis at non-towered airports using large language models (LLMs). Non-towered airports rely on the Common Traffic Advisory Frequency (CTAF) for air traffic coordination and experience frequent near mid-air collisions due to the pilot self-announcement communication protocol. We propose a general vision-language model (VLM) approach to analyze the transcribed CTAF radio communications in natural language, METeorological Aerodrome Report (METAR) weather data, Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) flight trajectories, and Visual Flight Rules sectional charts of the airfield. We provide a preliminary study at Half Moon Bay Airport, with a qualitative real world case study and a quantitative evaluation using a new synthetic dataset of communications and weather modalities. We qualitatively evaluate our framework on real flight data using Gemini 2.5 Pro, demonstrating accurate identification of a right-of-way violation. The synthetic dataset is derived from real examples and includes a 12-category hazard taxonomy, and is used to benchmark three open-source (Qwen 2.5-7B, Mistral-7B, Gemma-2-9B) and three closed-source (GPT-4o, GPT-5.4, Claude Sonnet 4.6) LLM models on the subset of inputs related to CTAF and METAR. Even limited to CTAF and METAR inputs and open source LLMs, instances of our framework typically achieve a macro F1 score above 0.85 on a binary nominal/danger classification task. Future work includes a quantitative evaluation across all modalities and a larger number of real world examples. Taken together, our results suggest that VLM analysis of safety at non-towered airports may be a valuable future capability.