Multi-agent systems rely on communication for information sharing and action coordination, which exposes a vulnerability to attacks. We investigate single-victim communication perturbation attacks against Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning-trained systems and propose methods that use gradient information from the Jacobian to identify which messages, agent, and timesteps are most susceptible to attack and have the greatest impact on the system. We enhance these methods with two proposed adversarial loss functions that trade-off attack success for attack impact which also create more effective perturbations. We empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of our methods against two different multi-agent communication methods in navigation, PredatorPrey, and TrafficJunction environments. Our results show that our novel message selection method achieves a similar or greater impact than random message selection across almost all tested scenarios. Our victim selection, message selection, tempo, and loss functions improve attack effectiveness in half of the thirty scenarios we tested.
Decentralized multi-agent path finding (MAPF) routes a team of agents on a shared grid, each acting from its own local view. The standard solution trains one shared neural policy with Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO), a popular on-policy reinforcement learning algorithm. Such a policy works well on clean observations, but a small input perturbation on one agent often changes its action, which then blocks a neighbour, and the team jams. In this paper we present two training recipes that keep the same network and the same deployment loop, yet make the policy hold up under perturbed observations. The first recipe, Adv-PPO, trains the shared policy against worst-case perturbations of its own input and selects the checkpoint by performance under adversarial perturbation. The second recipe, Adv-PPO+MACER, fine-tunes that checkpoint with a small on-policy smoothness term whose gradient follows the certified radius of randomized smoothing. On POGEMA with 8x8 maps and four agents, the unprotected PPO policy reaches 95.8% clean success but only 2.5% under the strongest attack. Adv-PPO recovers worst-case success to 59.2% at one percentage point of clean cost. Adv-PPO+MACER recovers it to 77.5% +/- 6.0% across three independent seeds at less than one percentage point of clean cost. We support these numbers with per-attack curves, a certified action-stability sanity check (which measures the smoothed-policy wrapper, not the deployed argmax policy), and side-by-side rollout storyboards that show the failure mode and the fix inside one environment instance.
Cooperation is central to multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), yet learned coordination can be fragile when external perturbations disrupt inter-agent interactions. Prior robust MARL methods have primarily considered value-oriented attacks, leaving a gap in robustness when interaction structures themselves are corrupted. In this paper, we propose an interaction-breaking adversarial learning (IBAL) framework that takes an information-theoretic view to construct attacks that impede coordination by perturbing agents' observations and actions, and trains agents to perform reliably under such disruptions. Empirically, our approach improves robustness over existing robust MARL baselines across diverse attack settings and yields stronger performance even under agent-missing scenarios. Our code is available at https://sunwoolee0504.github.io/IBAL.
Learned communication improves coordination in cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning, but it also creates a trust problem: a trained policy may route information through agents that have become faulty or adversarial. This paper studies Byzantine-agent detection for learned-communication MARL in adaptive traffic signal control. We propose BARD-MARL, a post-hoc diagnostic layer on top of BayesG, which is used as an attributed communication substrate rather than as a contribution of this paper. BARD-MARL combines two agent-level evidence streams: policy-graph features extracted from state-action trajectories and Bayesian trust statistics computed from BayesG latent mask probabilities. Across fixed-action, observation-flip, random-noise, and coordinated attacks in SUMO traffic grids, the results show that these signals are complementary rather than universally dominant. On a 25-agent grid, BARD-MARL reaches 0.843 AUC-ROC under a 10% observation-flip attack, while policy-graph-only detection reaches 0.917 AUC-ROC under a 10% coordinated attack. On a 100-agent grid, the unified BARD-MARL variant reaches 0.982 AUC-ROC for both 10% fixed-action and 10% coordinated attacks. The study shows that learned communication policies expose useful diagnostic evidence, but credible resilience claims require attack-specific ablations and explicit separation between coordination, detection, and mitigation.