From Rosetta to Match-Up: A Paired Corpus of Linguistic Puzzles with Human and LLM Benchmarks

We create high-quality datasets for LLM evaluation of logical reasoning skills across nine different languages, which have been manually checked by fluent speakers. The datasets consist of so-called zebra puzzles, and we analyse different ways of tuning the difficulty of the puzzles to fit modern LLMs. This includes the size of the puzzle (number of objects and number of clues), as well as a novel addition of red herring clues containing only irrelevant information. We show that presence of red herrings indeed makes the puzzles significantly harder for the models, and we find puzzle sizes 2x3 and 4x5 are sufficiently challenging for GPT-4o mini (a non-reasoning model) and o3-mini (a reasoning model), respectively. We analyse whether LLM performance of these are sensitive to the language, the cultural sensitivity of the puzzle theme, and the choice of clue types. These analyses are conducted with English and Danish, where we show that there is no significant difference for either of these three aspects, at least for the OpenAI models GPT-4o mini and o3-mini, chosen as representative non-reasoning and reasoning models, respectively. We publish the datasets for each of the nine languages for the identified sizes 2x3 and 4x5. We also publish the code used to generate the puzzles, which can be used to extend the benchmark into more languages.

Humans flexibly adapt their reasoning strategies to the requirements of a given problem. Large language models (LLMs) have performed well on many cognitive tasks, however, it is unclear whether this accuracy is a result of pattern matching from training data or flexible reasoning. Here, we introduce a novel paradigm to test this question: the riddle riddle paradigm. Riddle riddles are word problems written to mimic popular riddles, but altered so their answers only require literal interpretations. Identifying correct answers requires looking past the structure of each question and flexibly apply different reasoning strategies based on the content. If LLMs respond to surface features, such as form, a riddle-like structure should cause models to use an inventive reasoning strategy even when a literal interpretation suffices. Alternatively, if LLMs reason based on content, they should flexibly switch strategies when appropriate. Across two experiments with nine state-of-the-art LLMs and 100 human participants, we show humans and LLMs fail on this paradigm in opposite directions. LLMs were far more accurate on genuine riddles than on riddle riddles (84.9% vs. 50.7%); whereas humans showed the reverse effect (50.5% vs. 80.5%). Error analysis shows that 90.8% of LLM errors on riddle riddles (the condition where they show diminished performance) were due to inappropriate use of inventive reasoning while only 57.6% of human errors on genuine riddles were due to overextending literal reasoning. Thus, while both groups make mistakes, reasoning mistakes are made more often by LLMs than by humans. Overall, LLMs' strong performance on genuine riddles may reflect memory retrieval rather than flexible strategy selection, and without stimuli designed to elicit this contrast, it becomes easy to conflate LLM-generated outputs that look like reasoning with genuine reasoning.

Vision-Language(-Action) Models (VLMs) are increasingly applied to interactive environments, yet existing benchmarks often overlook the complex physical reasoning required for point-and-click puzzle games. This paper introduces Vision-Language Against The Incredible Machine (VLATIM), a benchmark designed to evaluate human-like logical problem-solving capabilities within the classic physics puzzle game The Incredible Machine 2 (TIM). Unlike existing benchmarks, VLATIM specifically targets the critical gap between high-level logical reasoning and continuous action spaces requiring precise mouse interactions. This benchmark is structured into five progressive parts, assessing capabilities that range from basic visual grounding and domain understanding to multi-step manipulation and full puzzle solving. Our results reveal a significant disparity between reasoning and execution. While large proprietary models demonstrate superior planning abilities, they struggle with precise visual grounding. Consequently, they do not yet show human-like problem-solving capabilities.