Domain-Independent Game Abstraction using Word Embedding Techniques

We investigate the problem of learning useful policy representations (embeddings) in two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games. We make three contributions: First, we introduce methods of creating datasets of policies for a given game. Second, we propose methods to learn policy representations. Third, we introduce downstream tasks to evaluate the effectiveness of such representations. We evaluate each dataset method, embedding method, and downstream task on Kuhn and Leduc Poker. Although our methods are very basic, we demonstrate that useful behavioral representations are present in the learned embeddings. To our knowledge, this work is among the first to systematically compare self-supervised learning techniques for learning policy representations in games. Our code is available at https://github.com/VitamintK/ssl-project for others to extend.

JSON Bag-of-Tokens (JSON-Bag) is a recently proposed method to generically represent game trajectories by tokenizing their JSON descriptions. We introduce JSON-Bag VF, a game-agnostic approach to training value functions for game-playing agents using JSON-Bag prototypes. We show that this approach can be enhanced with Random Forest-based feature selection and a method to select game-stage-specific features. We evaluate JSON-Bag VF with One-step-look-ahead (JSON-Bag OSLA) on six tabletop games over different combinations of prototype-tokenization and feature selections. JSON-Bag OSLA outperforms baseline OSLA agents in most games. Our analysis also shows that feature selection significantly improves JSON-Bag VF and that feature selection is the most important factor in JSON-Bag VF performance, over prototype-tokenization.

Learning a strategic task changes more than what is directly taught: fine-tuning on one game can either enhance or degrade an agent's ability to reason in another. Understanding and predicting this transfer of strategic capabilities, however, remains a key challenge for large language models (LLMs). Normal-form games provide an ideal testbed for analyzing this phenomenon, as they feature explicitly defined payoffs and well-characterized equilibrium behaviours. In this work, we investigate whether game embeddings can explain and predict changes in LLM strategic capabilities following fine-tuning across different games. We propose a lightweight two-feature embedding that captures fundamental behavioural demands: the entropy of the Nash equilibrium and the sensitivity of optimal responses to an opponent's action. We show that while existing published structural embeddings primarily memorize game identities and fail to generalize, our behavioural embedding reliably predicts performance changes on held-out games. These results demonstrate that the transfer of strategic capabilities in LLMs is not dictated by the payoff geometry of a game, but by the underlying structure of the decision-making behaviour it requires.