Humanoid robots are difficult to deploy safely because they have high-dimensional bodies, many collision constraints, and must operate near people and obstacles. Safety filters help by modifying a nominal control action when it may violate collision-avoidance constraints. Still, nominal benchmark scores do not fully show how these filters behave in harder environments. In this work, we study the robustness of SPARK humanoid safety filters through replication and stress testing. We replicate the SPARK benchmark case G1SportMode_D1_WG_SO_v1 in MuJoCo and evaluate RSSA, RSSS, SSA, CBF, PFM, and SMA under controlled random seeds. We also built a post-processing pipeline that converts raw SPARK logs into goal-tracking, minimum-distance, and collision-step metrics. Our results show that some methods track the goal more closely, while others reduce collision steps more effectively. The stress tests further indicate that safety behavior can change under obstacle crowding, noisy distance estimates, and delayed obstacle information. These findings suggest that humanoid autonomy should be evaluated beyond nominal performance, using metrics that expose failure modes before deployment.
Safe control of humanoid robots remains challenging due to their high-dimensional dynamics, contact-rich interactions, and sensitivity to disturbances. Although reinforcement learning has enabled effective locomotion and motion tracking, learned policies can still generate unsafe actions that lead to instability or falls. In this work, we propose residual reinforcement learning as an implicit safety-filtering mechanism for safe humanoid control. Instead of relying on a single nominal policy to simultaneously balance performance, safety, and robustness, we decouple performance and safety. The nominal policy focuses solely on task performance, while a residual policy learns safety corrections. This decoupling leads to a better performance--safety Pareto trade-off and avoids the need for careful tuning of multiple competing reward terms within a single policy training. We show that the residual policy can act as an implicit safety filter.
Autonomous robots that interact with people must make safe and efficient decisions under human-induced uncertainty, such as their preferences, goals, competency, and willingness to cooperate. Safety filters are a popular approach for ensuring safety in interactive robotics, since their modular design separates safety from performance, allowing robots to operate safely around people with minimal impact on task efficiency. While traditional safety filters typically operate only in the physical space, neglecting the robot's ability to learn and adapt online, the recently proposed belief-space safety filter (BeliefSF) reasons about robot safety in closed-loop with runtime inference that actively reduces the robot's uncertainty online, thereby reducing conservativeness in filtering. However, providing formal safety guarantees for robots deploying BeliefSF remains a significant challenge due to errors in runtime inference and neural approximation of safety filters required to handle the high dimensionality of belief spaces. In this paper, we propose an algorithmic approach to certify high-probability safety of BeliefSF using conformal prediction, while explicitly accounting for the reliability of the robot's runtime inference module. Our method leverages the structure of belief-space safety filtering by focusing verification on a region where inference is expected to be reliable. It preserves the simplicity and sample complexity of standard conformal prediction, yet can certify a substantially less conservative safety filter. Through a simulated human-vehicle interaction benchmark, we show that our approach verifies a significantly more permissive belief-space safety filter than a standard conformal prediction baseline.
Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly employed to orchestrate robot behavior through natural-language interfaces, yet no benchmark exists to evaluate their reliability as safety-aware decision makers in human-humanoid collaboration. Unlike deterministic safety systems that enforce binary allow/deny decisions, LLM-based orchestrators exhibit a compliance spectrum ranging from overcompliance (refusing safe actions) to full safety violations. This paper introduces the first safety benchmarking environment for LLM orchestrators in human-humanoid collaboration, built on a Model Context Protocol (MCP)-based architecture with safety invariants grounded in ISO 10218-2:2025 protective measures. The benchmark defines five testable safety invariants, a four-level compliance taxonomy (correct compliance, overcompliance, undercompliance, full violation), and a three-layer evaluation pipeline (text prompting, simulated sensor-actuator loops, and physical validation on a Unitree G1 EDU humanoid). We report Layer-1 results: three cloud backends (Claude Haiku 4.5, GPT-4o-mini, Gemini 2.5 Flash) and a local open-weights baseline (qwen3:8b) across 40 100-turn sessions under full-context and sliding-window budget conditions, while the simulation and physical layers remain ongoing. We find that (1) model family determines the safety floor, as Claude and Gemini remain at or near zero violations while GPT-4o-mini commits up to 13 per session, (2) context management dissociates two failure axes, reducing mean behavioral issues by 42-57% for every cloud backend while nearly doubling GPT-4o-mini's violations (3.8 to 7.2 per session), and (3) proportional compliance, clamping movement speed to the rule-specified maximum rather than refusing, emerges consistently only in Gemini; the preliminary simulation layer reproduces the model ranking and the GPT-4o-mini failure-mode inversion.